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INTRODUCTION
In July, 2003, three organizations (IDIS, IRIS and CIPDD), rep-
resenting Moldova, Bulgaria and Georgia agreed to conduct a cross
regional study with the aim to undertake a comprehensive com-
parative analysis on selected samples of public institutions. The
particular characteristics of this research were to assess the quality
and extent of democratic functioning of the Parliament and of the
Municipality of Chisinau, through the methodology which has been
known for several years as ‘democratic auditing’.
The ‘democracy audit’ Concept is based on three main assump-
tions. The first assumption constitutes the fact that democratiza-
tion is an ongoing process, being constantly tested in various situ-
ations and transformed in the light of shared experiences and criti-
cism. The second assumption is:  the concept of ‘democracy’ can be
better understood when it is disaggregated into a set of criteria or
indices of positive performances, which are relevant in spite of
the existing differences of cultural or social nature. The third as-
sumption comprises the idea that conducting a democratic audit
is by itself a part of the democracy-building process when it re-
veals its main weaknesses and priorities on a systematic and com-
prehensive way. We believe that democracy and non-democracy
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cannot be treated in a dichotomist manner, but more in terms of a
gradation. Therefore an in-depth comparative research may pro-
vide us with data and information that can largely respond to the
causes and consequences of democracy.
The project aimed at answering a number of questions related
to governance: What should be done in order to make accountable
democratic institutions work effectively? What generates corrup-
tion and ineffective institutions in a nascent democratic state?
Are these institutions too weak or too centralized to deal with their
specific weaknesses? Are their weaknesses a result of the poor
institutional setup and performance or are they a consequence of
the political culture of a transition society? Do the new democratic
institutions create a real democratic system or are they just play-
ing a formal role? How does the mindset of the new political class
influence the shaping of democratic order? To what extent is this
mindset representative or “catching” for the whole society? What
institutional changes are required to sustain proper institutional
performance regardless inadequate civic and political culture?
What induces political violence in a society? Our assessment meth-
odology is based on two basic principles of representative democ-
racy - popular control and political equality: that is, to what ex-
tend do the people exercise control over political decision-makers
and   decision-making process? And, is there political equality in
the exercise of that control, so far? From these two principles we
derive the democratic framework of audit, or “search” questions,
which enable people to thoroughly and systematically examine the
quality of their democracy, human rights and public services.
Our research objectives aimed to throw light on specific ways
in which the legislature can exercise its statutory role of an effec-
tive political reviewer of the executive and public sector as a whole.
We found that there are several institutions that have eagerly ac-
cepted our offer and cooperation and some others that saw our
initiative as an implicit challenge to their legitimacy. Usually,
this approach reflects the preservation of a very wide holdover
class of the former Soviet regime officials who would never at all
accept the premise that NGOs should participate in the policy
making process.  So, without having a chance to officially collect
those indicators that would objectively reflect the personnel’s quali-
fication, experience, contribution, recruitment and aspirations, the
Project devoted a lot of time to collect this information using indi-
rect methods, interviews, press reviews; applying to the existing
open sources that are still available. After three repeated attempts
to involve top-parliamentary officials to accept the need in this
cooperation, we gave up and intensively focused our efforts on
qualitative and quantitative assessments that depicted a rather
fertile ground to acknowledge the statute of insider’s and outsider’s
views on the legislative dynamics. Moreover, particularly intense
political evolutions of the autumn 2003 provided us with the pos-
sibility to watch the real “power play” of Moldovan parliamentary
“democracy”.
METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW
The idea of the democratic audit, or democracy assessment as it
is known, is a very simple one. A democratic audit is a comprehen-
sive and systematic assessment of a country’s political life in order
to answer the question how democratic it is and how well human
rights are protected. The point is to enable citizens in any country
to assess the quality of their democracy and to identify what re-
forms are needed to further democratize their country. A democratic
audit can be a valuable starting point in empowering oppressed
people or marginalized communities. Democratic Audit first devel-
oped its usage framework in the UK. But we re-designed and ex-
panded it for the project commenced by IDIS, IRIS and CIPDD with
assistance received from NED, in order to create a valuable frame-
work to assess the democracy condition in all our three countries.
It was a great opportunity for us to use the format of the NED Project
in order to tease out the implications of what one can conclude to be
the ‘core business’ of a Parliament, what is meant by the legislative
function of considering, reviewing, amending and passing new laws.
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We’ve planned, discussed and conducted a serious evaluation of the
state of these two institutions in order to assess the general and
particular aspects of their functional complexity. We strongly be-
lieve that our policy work may contribute to the promotion of insti-
tutional reforms and to general statute of Moldova’s participatory
democracy.
Our theoretical assumptions originated from the shared ap-
proach that democracy and non-democracy cannot be treated in a
dichotomy manner, but more in terms of a gradation, therefore an
in-depth comparative research should provide data and informa-
tion that responds to the causes and consequences of democracy.
There are several scientific schools that have approached this is-
sue. A graded perspective is likewise adopted by Robert Dahl1,
using the term ‘polyarchy’, and later by Coppedge & Reinicke
(1990)2. By contrast, Sartori finds that ‘treating the distinction
between democracy/non-democracy in graded terms is an analyti-
cally “stultifying” exercise in “degree-ism,” which misses the ba-
sic fact that political systems are “bounded wholes”3. In his influ-
ential writings on democracy, Robert Dahl likewise incorporates
gradations into his conceptualization and definition. He argues,
“Countries vary enormously in the extent to which their govern-
ments meet the criteria of the democratic process”. In his famous
book ‘Polyarchy’, he shares a view of democracy that defines it in
relation to an ideal type and thereby lays the foundation for his
graded approach. Hence, as “one end of a scale, or a limiting state
of affairs, it can (like a perfect vacuum) serve as a basis for esti-
mating the degree to which various systems approach this theo-
retical limit”. Using the term democracy to refer to this ideal, Dahl
is providing us with an outstanding analysis of the political re-
gimes functioning in a permanent state of institutional and social
conflicts, that embraces various forms and standards.
For the purpose of comparing regimes that fall short of their
standard, Przeworski and his colleagues thus preclude the option
of qualifying them as ‘partial democracies’, or ‘aspiring democra-
cies’. Instead of stating clearly what the ideal ‘democracy’ is, quite
a bit of political scientists tried to argue what the ideal is not.
They propose a separate discussion involving three dimensions of
“dictatorship”: whether it is mobilizing or exclusionary, how many
formal centers of power it has (executive, legislative, and parties),
and whether it rules within a framework of law or in some more
arbitrary manner4. We intended thus to consider the relationship
between the theories and factual evidence that describe  the func-
tioning of two major public institutions: the Parliament and the
Capital City by collecting quantified and comparable information
that is comprehensive, precise, clear, reliable and valid. Two types
of instrumental evaluations have been involved in this research:
internal and external, between a very formal, which is regularly
reported by the key-officials representing these institutions, and
a more complex, consisting of various perspectives, categories of
respondents and social groups that have a tremendous impact on
the way how these institutions are directed and how they act. In
both categories, indicators with the help of which we have assessed
the institutions (auditing criteria/indicators) and the public opin-
ion survey, Moldova’s democratic audit was examined in a com-
parative perspective, including public opinion polls, qualitative
measurements and main conclusions stated on the outset.
A review of  basic institutional norms, laws and procedures that
regulate their public functioning served as a first step to identify
differences existing between the ‘institutional’ identity and ‘indi-
vidualities’ of  respective political leaderships that instill implica-
tions in terms of various development experiences. Assembling a
set of indicators has allowed the team to identify a first mapping of
the institutional change that occurred in this institution as a re-
sult of a turbulent and multifaceted transition. Second, a continu-
ous effort has been made to assimilate international practices and
studies assessing the state of democracy/public institutions in other
countries, in particular, having access to the research conducted in
Sweden, UK, Bulgaria, Denmark and USA. Third, internal assess-
ment and interviews were conducted in each of the selected institu-
tion, with the explicit goal to examine the functional aspects, inter-
nal norms of conduct, mentalities and perception of the officials.
Fourth, a national representative survey was implemented in the
last phase of our research to assess the public perception of how
these main institutions function and how this is judged by citizens.
Fifth and the final, gathered data, statistics, focus group’s results,
and processed data from the quantitative surveys; interviews with
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key informants were processed through a Desk Research that con-
cluded the initial documentation stage of the research.
The quality of an indicator depends upon its transparency and
specificity. The indicators should be developed as part of a par-
ticipatory process. Though these indicators can assist with an
evaluation of governance, it is important to be aware of their po-
tential social and political ramifications. Our project found out
that there are several institutions that have eagerly accepted our
offer and cooperation and several other institutions that saw our
initiative as an implicit challenge to their legitimacy. Usually,
this approach reflects the preservation of a very wide holdover
class of the former Soviet regime who would never accept the
premise that the civil society might participate in or contest the
decision-making machinery of state.
We also suggest that six broad groups of factors are significant
in shaping the outcomes.
• First, institutional legacy, we refer here to the initial in-
stitutional framework inherited from the previous regime.
• Second, the policy environment comprising the character
and gravity of issues that new or older legislators face.
• Third, the party system that is external to parliament has
a major impact on events within the parliament.
• The existing institutional environment, the number and na-
ture of other actors with whom the legislature interacts, describes
the fourth factor.
• Fifth is the legislative environment, the character of the
legislative institution within which the committees function and
thrive on their own.
• And sixth, a specialized variable is the concentration of
committees as a specific form of parliamentary cooperation and
supervising body upon the specialized fields, designed by the Par-
liament as ‘strategic relevance’ for the legislative process, com-
bined with the resources representing various parliamentary frac-
tions either in  a balanced or non-balanced way.
As for the local government, this report analyses the main ex-
ternal elements of Chisinau municipality, the institutional dy-
namics that took place in the last couple of years and the public
opinion reaction to the changes.
The legal framework regulating the activity of municipal pub-
lic authorities and municipal services is quite complex and con-
tradictory. There are legal acts attacking directly the most fun-
damental principles of local autonomy and damaging the poten-
tial public output that local authorities might produce. There are
also good legal provisions that may be judged as being quite ad-
vanced compared to other countries of the former USSR. However,
the central impediments badly affecting the efficiency of munici-
pal authorities consist in the lack of real implementation of good
legal provisions and no political and social reactions to the conse-
quences that bad legal acts engender.
The performances of the municipal authorities are diminished
by a strong political conflict inside the municipality held between
the municipal council and the mayor. Besides that another and a
more serious conflict looms between the mayor and the central
governance, mainly the incumbent President of Moldova. The po-
litical and institutional quarrel of the local electoral campaign of
May-June 2003 was only a preliminary stage for the 2004 political
clashes.
Results of the public opinion analysis show that citizens pro-
vide the incumbent municipal authorities with some political credit
but more efforts have to be applied in order to capitalize it on.
Wider and deeper transparency and more frequent public reports
and accounting would help to improve the relations with the pub-
lic and to consolidate the political positions for the general elec-
tions.
The Democratic Audit was conducted on a sample of indicators
that were identified in cooperation with our Bulgarian and Geor-
gian partners. Four types  of social data were thus employed: Field
Survey on each of the targeted institution (20 respondents repre-
sentatives of  the national legislature and 60 interviewers repre-
senting the Chisinau Mayoralty and Municipal Council): Inter-
views with key-informants (12 interviews), representative Na-
tional Survey (1,200 respondents, contracted in 2004, while data
were compared with other surveys implemented on the focused
subjects in the last 5 years), other Surveys/Data Reports accom-
plished recently, including: the Freedom House Report (2003,
2004), Transparency International.
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We’ve planned, discussed and conducted a thorough evaluation
of the state of these two institutions in order to assess the general
and particular aspects of their functional complexity. We believe
that our policy work may contribute to the promotion of institu-
tional reforms and to the general improvement of the public dis-
course regarding the general statute of Moldova’s democracy.
THE PARLIAMENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF  MOLDOVA
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Legislating is a fundamental feature of the political processes
in all democratic states. Law-making and law-enforcing repre-
sent a fundamental pair of criteria that are challenging modern
states. But, legislatures are themselves by definition ‘transitional
bodies’, being at the same time subject to change and an instru-
ment of simultaneous change of the democratic regimes. It is obvi-
ous that the inherited from  the Soviet period structures and pro-
cedures of ‘puppet democracy’ were blatantly inadequate to cope
with the new demands and opportunities, because of disagreement
between many emerging political subjects, and uncertainty be-
cause of  the absence of the former reprisal policies, which comple-
mented usually the ‘façade’ democracies of the former Soviet re-
gime. Moldova has a multi-party political system, with a unicam-
eral Parliament elected by universal, direct suffrage, based on a
proportional system.
Since the proclamation of the independent statehood (August
27, 1991), the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova was at the
core of the process of building up a new political system, advocat-
ing for the key-reforms in economy and social affairs. The Parlia-
ment was therefore one of the essential bodies of post-Soviet trans-
formation. It underwent important institutional changes by as-
similating the emerging political pluralism of the ‘informal groups’
and, by empowering its MPs with effective tools of control over
executive bodies and, to even a greater extent, by adjusting its
institutional format to the standards and models of modern par-
liaments. The first Parliament of the Republic of Moldova (1989 –
1994) has literally ‘revamped’ the role of politicians in the society,
paving the road towards a radical transformation of the former
Soviet-made republic into an independent and viable state entity.
Four major functions were recognized as being its ‘core business’:
representative, legislative, supervising and administrative.
In spite of the instabilities that were inherited from the Soviet
collapse, and lack of relevant democratic experience, legislating
new political realities was a difficult but responsible roadmap for
the first Parliament. A decay of Moldovan democratic conduct is
confirmed indirectly by the fact that many international bodies
(IMF, World Bank, CoE, EU) used to perceive Moldova in the wider
regional context as one of the most trustful and reformist coun-
tries among the pioneers  overcoming the Soviet legacy of dicta-
torship. It came to a great dismay by 2000/2001 when in spite of
the positive accomplishments of the first half of decade, it turned
into a kind of institutional lethargy, contemplating how the
economy continued to shrank, while structural and social reforms
ceased to be implemented as originally planned.
Trust in the Parliament has also dropped significantly, while
confidence in political parties registered the lowest indicators.
Continuous dissatisfactions of ordinary citizens coagulated into a
larger protest-vote that propelled like a snowball the political cri-
sis as the one of early 2000 and served as triggers for the antici-
pated general elections in 2001 in Moldova. We assume that after
August 2000 constitutional changes, the new parliament elected
as a result of the February 2001 elections became more institu-
tionalized, but less functional and representative. Transparency
is of course a fundamental criterion to judge upon the commit-
ment of the legislature to work according to the values proclaimed
in the fundamental acts of the state. But, transparency is largely
linked also to accountability, tolerance, genuine popular repre-
sentation and effectiveness of the law-making, ensuring a fertile
ground for political debates, in which civil society, mass media,
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unions and NGOs should play a considerable role. Therefore, while
assessing performances of the legislative chamber, one must in-
clude not only the numerical/statistic indicators  but also qualita-
tive assessment of Parliament functions as the supreme expres-
sion of the Parliament. And even statistics, however, shall be ana-
lyzed with a great deal of attention because it provides us with a
very interesting picture in this respect5:
First legislature (XII of 1990 – October 1993 years) has
adopted a total of 1,683 acts, out of which 802 were Decisions of
the Presidium of the Parliament, 682 decisions of the Parliament
and 199 laws. One may want to know that during 1990–1994 the
most considerable part of the Presidium’s decisions had a norma-
tive and general-compulsory legal character. In the above men-
tioned period of time, the President had the right to issue decrees-
laws through which most of the fields of activity were regulated.
Here is to be mentioned that out of 199 laws adopted 105 were
totally new laws (52,7%), and 94 (47,3%) were proposals to amend
the existing legislation.
Second legislature (XIII of 1994 – 1998 years) adopted 1,108
decisions and 517 laws, out of which 197 (38,1%) were new basic
laws, while 320 (61,9%) were proposals to amend the existing leg-
islation.
Third legislature (XIV of 1998 – 2001 years) adopted 1,440
acts, out of which 973 were decisions and 467 laws. Almost 147 (or
31,5%) were new laws, while 320 (or 68,5%) were proposals to
amend the existing legislation.
Current Legislature (XV of 20.03.2001 - 26.12.2003) has
adopted 2,181 of new legislative acts, out of which 1,284
were decisions and 897 laws. This is to be mentioned however
that 156 (or 7,1%) were new laws, while 741 or 92,9% proposals to
adopt or complete the existing legislation.
What kind of conclusions can be drawn from the above-men-
tioned statistics? First of all, one may observe that the first three
parliaments have adopted more or less an equal number of deci-
sions/laws: 1,683 between 1990 – 1993, 1,625 between 1994-1990
and 1,440 between 1998-2000. Apparently, the last Parliament has
registered the largest quantitative indicator of newly adopted
decisions and laws at sight. But, if one would look into the quali-
tative analysis of the adopted laws, then, it would be obvious that
an alarming trend is clearly taking place with the acting legisla-
ture. First of all, there is a gradual and substantive reduction of
new laws adopted (from 52,7% in 1990-1994 to 38,1% in 1994-1998,
and 31,5% in 1998-2001 to only 7,1% in 2001-2003.
How can we explain this situation? Of course, the functioning
of the first Parliament was largely unique first and foremost be-
cause of the ‚foundational’ decisions and laws laid down in the
years originating from the Declaration of Independence of the coun-
try (27 of August, 1991), abolishment of the Soviet-based ‚mock’
legislation and the creation of a set of basic legal prerequisites for
the democratic regime. This assessment should carefully consider
the almost absolute lack of legislative expertise among the MPs of
the first Moldovan Parliament, which proclaimed state sovereignty
and independent statehood through a painful process of confron-
tation with the political and military leadership of the USSR.
Needless to say that the first Parliament has been the most active
supporter of Moldovan statehood, independence, and respect of
basic freedoms and liberties by the time when Russian Federa-
tion has violently intervened on behalf of the separatist regime in
Transnistria, which literally split up the country. In spite of the
difficult role it had to play in a ‚violent environment’, the ‚founda-
tional’ Parliament was one of the most effective in law-making.
Following its example, the second legislature of the Republic of
Moldova (1994-1998) continued the path of reforms and showed
its willingness to follow the implementation of structural reforms
within a totally new legislative framework: privatization of the
former state assets, land-reform, that were elements indispens-
able for the strengthening of the statehood, consolidation of the
new political, economic, legal and social-cultural relations in the
society. In July 1994, it adopted a new Constitution and over 200
new laws were enshrined during its mandate. At the same time,
it has revised the older ‚soviet-era’ legislation, while the share of
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the new laws represented almost 38,1%. In the same tradition,
the legislature of 1998-2000 continued the rejuvenation of the leg-
islation, further reforms and the share of new laws were at the
level of 31,5%.
The situation of the current Parliament needs some remarks.
Of course, in statistic terms, it has adopted a record-number of
laws - almost 4,5 times more than in 1990-1994 and 1994 – 1998
and almost 6 times more than in 1998 – 2000, but most of the adopted
legislative acts were amendments and not new laws. How can it
be explained that in 93% of these acts the Parliament makes new
modifications and amendments of the old laws and only 7% of them
were new laws? What is the official and unofficial explanation for
this situation? Our explanation is that the ruling absolute major-
ity of the current Parliament has been more concerned with the
revisions of the legislative and constitutional framework than with
the need to promote new laws and concepts. Apparently, it is the
doctrinal, scheduled position of the ruling Communist party that
has placed itself, from the very beginning, against the state inde-
pendence of the Republic of Moldova and, on its most intimate
feelings, openly claimed for the maintenance of the state within
the framework of the USSR, conservation of the political, economic-
financial and social relations that were bound on Soviet adminis-
trative and political realities. Due to the radical opposition of the
left-wing parties led by the CPM against the emerging Moldovan
statehood, it has devoted the largest part of its energy and initia-
tives to obstruct the path towards genuine independence; it largely
disputed the legislation and practices of introducing private own-
ership in the economy, transformation of the former collectivist
land-ownership in the countryside, strengthening the role of en-
trepreneurship in the society, which were perceived as being at
stake with its old-fashioned ideologies.
Instead, it vehemently claimed to return the country within
the political, legal, economic and military Soviet space, i.e. by join-
ing the Belarus-Russia Union. Another hindering factor is the elec-
tion program of the Communists, whose populist nature is recog-
nized even by the leaders of the Communists6, who admitted that
most of the election promises have never aimed to be accomplished
by its promoters, by mixing up the re-make of the socialist ‚vir-
tues’, increasing the role of the state in the market-led transfor-
mations, while promising that they will be able to triple or qua-
druple the budgetary revenues, to keep medical and education costs
low as in the Soviet time, to cancel existing gas-debates and com-
munal costs, etc. Becoming the hostage of its own ‚election tech-
nologies’, suddenly, it realized that it will be unable to reach most
of its promised ‚golden mountains’. Therefore, the only successful
strategy is to revise at least some of the ‚components’ that were
earlier condemned in ideological terms, without having the ca-
pacity to oppose the transformation process in a radical/concep-
tual way.
For the sake of the analysis, we have selected a sample of laws
adopted in 2001 and have calculated that all together, 23 laws
passed in the last 3 years suffered 322  amendments. Needless to
say that all these amendments have seriously affected the state of
affairs of economic and social actors, suggesting the lack of a con-
sistent and serious governing program, if one considers that from
80 to 90% of all the draft laws are submitted by the Government.
Members of the Parliament confessed that sometimes, the same
law is amended 3-4 times in the same day. Considering the low
level of intellectual potential of its stubborn supporters, the rul-
ing Communists initiated a policy that aims at ‚changing every-
thing but reforming nothing’, thus, increasing legislative insta-
bility and promoting poor draft laws onto the legislative agenda.
Only the budgetary law has been amended  68 times in the last 3
years, Penal Code -  32 times, Administrative Code -  55 amend-
ments, Civil Code -  13 amendments, Procedural Penal Code - 27
amendments, State Tax Law - 16, Law on entrepreneurship and
enterprises - 15,  joint stocks and telecommunications - by 6 amend-
ments each.
LEGISLATIVE LEGACY AND GENERAL INDICATORS OVERVIEW
Though building up parliamentary experience Moldova does not
have a longstanding tradition of parliamentary democracy. First
of all this is because of the permanent political tribulations that
occurred in this region. Only a short period of time of the Moldovan
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history in 1917-1918 is characterized by a national legislative body
(Sfatul Þarii), but it is not entirely clear whether that body could
be deemed as a democratically elected representative institution.
Four Parliaments replaced each other after 1990: the XII Legisla-
ture – 1990-1994, the XIII Legislature– 1994-1998, the XIV Legis-
lature– 1998-2001 and the XV Legislature  – 2001-2003. Obviously,
one should recognize that under the Soviet regime in  1944-1991
the “representatives of the people” were in fact exponents of the
only one political party and no genuine democracy existed. Short-
ages of traditions of representative democracy, memories of tur-
bulent history, parochial political culture dominating in this coun-
try and the associated backwardness of present political elite may
well explain the difficulties that Moldova meets nowadays in po-
litical transition from a totalitarian to a democratic society.
Installing a sovereign Parliament before the USSR dissolution:
It is worthwhile to mention that Moldovan Parliament is counted
officially as the “Parliament of the 15th legislature”, a name im-
plying that the Parliament is a historical successor of the legisla-
tive institution existing in the Soviet period – “the Supreme So-
viet”7. In spite of the emphasized origins and alleged continuity
the Moldovan legislative authorities started to work properly as a
legislative body only after the Declaration of Independence on Au-
gust 27, 1991. A short time before that Declaration, on  July 18,
1991 the “Supreme Soviet” was renamed “Parliament”, and also
“Sfatul Tarii’ that replayed the old name inherited from the 1918
regional assembly. A provisional Internal Regulation was approved
(later on, it had been abrogated in 1994). Except this first Parlia-
ment, the other three Parliaments have been elected in Moldova
by universal suffrage, by free and democratic elections.
Anticipated general elections were held in February 27, 1994, on
the basis of the first Election Law of the Republic of Moldova. The
allegedly centrist although leftist as political stance, Agrarian Demo-
cratic Party (ADPM) won a relative majority in those elections, and
ruled cooperatively with the Socialist/Unity Party (SPUEB) for the
first 18 months of the session. Rightist parties - the Christian-Demo-
cratic Popular Front (CDPF) and the Bloc of Peasants and Intellec-
tuals (BPI) – remained in opposition. For a very short period of
time, President Snegur, Prime-Minister Sangheli and Speaker
Lucinschi succeeded to adopt a new Constitution, in July 1994,
which – in spite of the well-known drawbacks – was one of the first
democratic and reformist Constitutions on the whole space of the
former USSR. Of particular interest could be the provisions related
to the functioning of the Parliament. Thus, art. 60 (1) stipulates
that the Parliament is ‘the only existing legislative authority of state’.
Art. 66 (a, c and g), provide an explanation of the very notion of
legislative activity, stating that ‘the Parliament adopts laws, deci-
sions and motions, interprets the laws and ensures the unity of the
legislative regulations throughout the territory of the country, but
also ratifies, dismisses, suspends or abolishes international trea-
ties agreed by the state. Moreover, art. 72-76 clearly defines the
categories of laws which are adopted by the Parliament: constitu-
tional, organic and ordinary, fields of the social relations that per-
tain to a particular category of laws, as well as the specific law
state budget elaboration and allocation of social subsidies.
On June 26, 1995, the acting President Mircea Snegur resigned
from the Agrarian Democratic Party causing a split in the party
and forcing the Agrarians to rely on SPUEM (Socialists / Edinstvo
Movement) by retaining a simple majority in the House. This
caused a radicalization of the left-wing elements of the ADPM and,
to a certain degree, a marginalization of the moderate supporters
in the ruling party. Indirectly, this caused the leadership of the
Parliament to promote the idea of ceasing the ban on the Commu-
nist Party (imposed in August 1991), as a ‘sign of democratic faith’
to the excluded political wings, which, in time, proved to be a wrong
step. But, the very fact of the former Soviet kolkhoz nomenclature
coming back to power as an “Agrarian Democratic Party” just 3
years after the inception of economic transition proved the perva-
siveness of leftist ideology in Moldova. It also proved however that
unstable coalitions and the inflation of small but weak parties
degenerate into political turmoil and lack of reforms. The same
political pattern appeared to resist in the next 2 general elections
in 1998 and 2001. On the basis of results of the last social surveys
one can reckon that a radicalized leftist orientation, nurtured by
the nostalgic mentality that subsisted in the political class of the
Republic of Moldova have preserved its stronghold force and ap-
peased circulation of elite within the parties.
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MAKING THE CHOICE TOWARDS A PARLIAMENTARIAN REGIME
 At the end of painful talks, a new government was confirmed
by the 1998 Parliament. The 16-member cabinet led by Ion Sturza
consisted of leaders from the Movement for Democratic and Pros-
perous Moldova, the Democratic Convention, and the Party of
Democratic Forces. That government is widely - known as an “al-
gorithm government”,  perceived more as a jargon than a techni-
cal terminology of the political system, and this was due to blam-
able practice of attributing top-led positions in the ruling execu-
tive coalition of the government through  a ‘party deal’ scheme.
Public perceptions were extremely negative on the rumors around
ministries nominations from the lists of political groups, irrespec-
tive the party merits or competence aligned to the “Alliance for
Democracy and Reform”. Since political disparities within the
ruling coalition increased sharply, that government did not last
too much even though important successes were registered in sta-
bilizing the Moldovan economy affected drastically by the 1998
Russian financial crisis. There is a general belief among Moldovan
political establishment that the dismissal of Sturza government
impeded Moldova to obtain or at least to be promised a status of
EU-associated country in 1999-2000.
But in case of Moldova the Constitutional change of July 5, 2000
remains highly controversial. It is still considered to be the trigger
that allowed the CPRM to achieve a brilliant election victory gain-
ing unlimited access to political and economic power. Indeed, one
could assert that in the year of 2000, a short time after being hit by
the Russian financial crisis of 1998, Moldova needed everything
except for a political crisis generated by cynical antagonisms, self-
ishness, arrogance and corporative stance of the main political ac-
tors of the time. Had Moldova not suffered the political blow of sum-
mer 2000, the elections of February 2001 wouldn’t have taken place
and, in 2002 round of elections, it would have probably registered
quite a different score in elections. Certainly, no one was prepared
in Moldova to live under the consequences of full and complete vic-
tory of the Communist party, and even the party that mostly ben-
efited from the sudden ‘smile of fortune’ appeared to be unsure in
what to do with such a snowfall score in elections.
In the early parliamentary elections held on February 2001, the
PCRM scored a “land-sliding victory”8, being cast with 50,07 % of
the valid votes. And again, as in early 1994, anticipated elections
proved to be disastrous to democratic parties that were mostly ori-
ented towards European values and constitutional consolidation of
the statehood. Populist electoral promises falling on the fertile soil
of general impoverishment combined with low rates of participa-
tion of youth determined such a major victory. On April 4 2001 the
Parliament elected Vladimir Voronin, the Chairman of the PCRM,
as President of the country. Pledging to keep the track of reforms,
the new Prime Minister Vasile Tarlev was designated by the Presi-
dent upon consultation with Parliament in April 2001. As a former
manager of the largest candy factory in Moldova, Tarlev has been
appointed as a ‘technical manager of the Cabinet’, thus, underlin-
ing the need to continue the reforms initiated by his predecessors.
It appeared that the Prime Minister plays better off as a ‘political
appointee’ than a reformist; and quite a long series of political state-
ments have eroded his ‘technical neutrality’.
The second parliamentary elections were held on March 22,
1998. The same as in the case of the first elections they were held
on the basis of proportional representation with party lists. The
results of the elections came to a large surprise to the former rul-
ing party which suffered a large failure, and even did not pass the
threshold of 5% to enter the Parliament. Only four parties passed
the 5% threshold, valid at that time, and no independent candi-
date succeeded to collect the reasonable number of votes. Another
major outcome of the elections was that the Communists Party
(registered officially by the Ministry of Justice in 1994) won 30
percent of the popular votes cast in elections, which was trans-
lated into 40 seats in the 101-member chamber. The outcome was
that the non-communist parties were determined to set up a ‘pro-
visional peace’ and initiate talks on how to rule the country. With
a Moldovan population tired by failures of economic transition,
the PCRM’s success should have been carefully considered by the
right-wing opposition as a premonition of potentially more land-
sliding communist victories at subsequent elections. The center-
rightist Democratic Convention of Moldova (CDM) won 26 seats.
The “Bloc for a Democratic and Prosperous Moldova” (BDMM), a
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centrist party closely associated with President Petru Lucinschi,
won 24 seats. The center-rightist Party of Democratic Forces
(PDFM) was represented by 11 MPs. Despite the relative major-
ity of the Communist fraction, the three non-Communist parties
formed in April 1998 a coalition called “Alliance for Democracy
and Reform”.
FROM SEMI-PRESIDENTIAL TO PARLIAMENTARY REPUBLIC
The transition from semi-presidential to parliamentary repub-
lic was one of the most significant and contradictory political de-
velopments of the post-1991 Moldova. Already in the spring of 1999,
President Petru Lucinschi set up a National Committee for the
revision of the Constitution by decree. Although, the Decree did
not mention the task to change the political regime, it envisioned
the ‘need to elaborate a concept for the political regime, consider-
ing the tremendous relevance for the establishment of a presiden-
tial rule for the country and for the future of the society’…9. The
Presidential initiative could not find out an enthusiastic support
among parliamentarians who feared that strengthening the com-
petencies of the president were inspired by the anti-democratic
changes in most of the ex-Soviet republics, thus, they could not
but fight back the attempts of the incumbent President. So, as
soon as the President set up his ‚commission’ and announced that
he would favor this initiative to be voted in a national referen-
dum, almost all parties and fractions strongly disputed his argu-
ment and instead, they connoted a counter-proposal aiming to
transform the semi-presidential type of political regime into a par-
liamentarian one. Passions prevailed in public debates and many
considered the political response as an attempt to punish any other
‚presidentialist trends’ guised under populist slogans.
Firstly the initiative of constitutional amendment came from
the President but his intention was to modify the legislation in a
way that would give him more power and would change the politi-
cal system from a semi-presidential to a presidential one. In May
1999 already, during general local elections, the President initi-
ated a consultative referendum regarding the political system in
the Republic of Moldova. Respondents were asked to express their
preferences either for a parliamentary system or for a presiden-
tial. According to the computations of the central electoral com-
mission, 64% of voters claimed to support the idea of giving the
President supplementary powers. Inspired by optimistic results
of the “first round” the President intended to organize a second
referendum that would engender legal consequences resulting in
amendment of Constitution. His central argument was that a par-
liamentary system would produce nothing more than an increase
of political and social instability in Moldova because of the lack of
consensus among the factions sitting in the previous Parliament.
His constitutional revision came after a long range of acute politi-
cal conflicts between the President Petru Lucinschi complaining
of having few and shallow competences and the Parliament chaired
by Dumitru Diacov trying to impede the excessive concentration
of power in the Presidency.
The Constitution could have remained unchanged had the presi-
dent gave up his initiative. Ironically, that was not the first attempt
to transform the political regime in Moldova. Mircea Snegur was the
first Moldovan President, elected initially by the parliament, then
through the general vote. During his mandate the first president
also asked for supplementary powers to be granted to the President10.
But the Parliament whose chairman at that time was, surprisingly,
Petru Lucinschi ignored his appeals. Now, as soon as the acting Chair-
man of the Parliament went into disgrace of the President Lucinschi,
the situation has sharply changed. In 2000, Mircea Snegur, seating
by then in Parliament, stated that for the  Republic of Moldova the
parliamentary system is more adequate than the presidential one.
He argued that at the beginning of the 1990s his request for supple-
mentary constitutional powers was determined by “the necessity to
solve operatively many problems that the new state was passing
through”. In his opinion, in 2000, Moldova had already developed a
legislative base and it would have been irrational to give special powers
to the President. New presidential elections were scheduled to be
held by the Parliament in December 2000 since the legal mandate of
Mr. Lucinschi was due to expire in January 2001.
While supported by a population intoxicated with the perspec-
tive of having “the President responsible for everything” the above
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argument was faulty and many analysts compared potential con-
sequences if implementing that presidential initiative in Moldova
with the meager situation of democracy in some post-Soviet cen-
tral Asian or Caucasian republics where the “continuity” of power
in presidential systems is guaranteed either via lifetime nomina-
tion of the presidents or, as  the Azerbaijan case shows, via inher-
itance from farther to son. In a road contrary to presidential ini-
tiative, a group made up of 39 MPs launched in response a consti-
tutional initiative to amend the Constitution by cutting up the
elected character of the President, thus, making him subordinated
to the Parliament. The proposed amendments were targeting to
substitute the semi-presidential regime with a parliamentary one,
getting rid of the paternalistic habits of the acting President.
On July 5, 2000 the Parliament amended the Constitution and
political system in Moldova turned from a semi-presidential into
a parliamentary republic. This conflict may be deemed as having
triggered directly the anticipatory general elections of February
2001.The confrontation between President Luchinschi and the ‘hos-
tile to him’ Parliament majority ended only in July 5, 2000, when
the amendments proposed by this majority were fully adopted,
canceling those provisions that stipulated the exercise of direct
popular elections of the President, and setting up the supremacy
of the parliamentary authority over President. But, when the depu-
ties showed an exemplary reason to vote against President’s plans,
they had hardly voted for a new political system that replaced the
pervious semi-presidential system. This can be documentary
proved by the fact that the main prerogatives and attributions
stipulated by the Constitution remained without any change in
fact; that, a President that is elected by the Parliament enjoys
practically the same spheres of power that the previous one - that
has been directly elected by the voters.
The most sensible competencies remained absolutely untouched
in the new constitutional provisions. Art.82 of the Constitution -
nomination of the Executive - disappeared from the Constitution,
but the same provisions reappeared in the art.98, which stipulates
the official confirmation of the Government. Similarly, the aboli-
tion of the art.83, which earlier stipulated the ‘right of the head of
state to participate in the Governmental sittings, to consult it in
the most urgent or outstanding issues, and preside the sittings in
which he participates, could not but unveil the impossibility to de-
cline any President’s role in leading the executive activities as soon
as the main sovereign competencies, such as: defense, national in-
dependence, unity and indivisibility of the territory of the country,
could not be accomplished without having a strong and undisputed
cooperation with the Government11. In addition, President bears
responsibility for the governance results, due to the fact that ac-
cording to the provisions of the art.98 of the Constitution, he is en-
titled to propose candidates for the Prime-Minister, which are ac-
cepted or not by the Parliament, and later on are confirmed through
a ‘vote of investment’, or - dismiss, in case of governmental reshuffle
or vacation of position. At the same time, the President has lost its
legal prerogative to dissolve the Parliament in case of electing of a
new head of state, of the failure to appoint a new Government or,
because of legislative stalemate, which is stated to become thus a
‘destabilizing factor for the political system, which is ‘less func-
tional and more ostensibly bargain-oriented12’.
This led to the dissolution of the former ruling Alliance of Demo-
cratic Forces (ADR) and, to imminent elections in February 200113.
After several months of unstable coalition and mutual accusations,
ADR components split over and, at the time of elections, only 2
parties retained their legislative seats - Communist Party (CPM)
- with 50,2% and Christian Democrat Popular Party (CDPP) -
8,18%. The third parliamentary fraction was Braghis Alliance -
with 13,45%, headed by the former Prime Minister, Dumitru
Braghis, ranked as Lucinschi’s political successor. Thus, the very
initiative of curbing the consolidation of presidential power has
produced even more trouble than previously. It seemed at that
time that the culminating point of the drama was reached and the
President suffered a daunting defeat. However, after two unsuc-
cessful attempts of the Parliament to appoint a new Prime Minis-
ter after the failure to vote for the acting Sturza Cabinet, and later
on, for the candidates, proposed by parliamentary factions, in Janu-
ary 2001 the incumbent President, Petru Luchinski, dissolved the
Parliament and called on early election in February14. The fail-
ure of the previous Parliament to pick a new president was due to
the centre-right majority boycotting the election in a bid to pre-
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vent the election of a communist candidate. The 2000 August Con-
stitutional changes provided a sound basis for the transformation
of the political regime of the country from a semi-presidential sys-
tem to a classical parliamentary rule. One should say that dis-
missal of the Parliament respected all new legal and constitutional
norms introduced by the same Parliament and could have been
forecasted by those that vehemently opposed the nomination of
the Prime Minister, or those that were willing to see sooner or
later the defeat of the acting President.
On February 27, 2001, the Communists gained constitutional
majority (71 seats out of 101) that revamped literally the role of
the legislative body, as well as other major state public authori-
ties that were challenged to adapt themselves to the new rules
introduced by the super-dominant role of the new ruling party.
This is one of the reasons to research the functional transfor-
mations that occurred in this format in order to understand
how democratic institutions thrive and subsist during reactive
governance in the emerging democracies like Moldova. On the
same day with the Parliament’s inaugural sitting, the Commu-
nist super-majority fractions installed their General Secretary
in the position of the President of Moldova. Thus, an “all against
all” conflict between the former President and the former Par-
liament has lead to nothing else than to a political death of the
main actors involved there, and what is even more important -
to the essential revamping of the political scene in Moldova.
Some analysts considered the political system change as a bright
victory of democracy in a post-communist country that permit-
ted to avoid the central Asian scenarios15. The main assump-
tion of political theory is that a parliamentary republic would
assure a sounder democracy than a presidential system. Al-
though some mature western democracies, like France and the
USA, are semi-presidential or presidential regimes, a parlia-
mentary regime is considered more effective in preventing a
dictatorial or authoritarian backslide.
But, the Moldovan case proves that even in a democratic par-
liamentary regime a single party can easily gain a hegemonic
dominance and employ its relative size to undermine political
pluralism. Majority versus minority relations in the Parliament
constantly decreased the space for political maneuvering and
compromise, mainly because decisions were clearly taken out-
side of the legislative house. As analysts commented, ‘the oppo-
sition felt itself annihilated, paralyzed, while the civil society
was unable to countervail the antidemocratic impulses of the
super-majoritarian party’16.
The lack of effective ‘parliamentary-rule’ and unwillingness
for dialogue made the opposition  express their dissatisfactions
in the streets in early 2002, as well as in the fall of 2003. Partici-
pation of the opposition in the street-protests served as a prove
of ‘anti-constitutional behavior’ for the Prosecution, which de-
manded in February 2004 to lift the immunity of a number of
deputies. On February 27, the Communist faction lifted the im-
munity of 3 Christian-Democrat MPs (Stefan Secareanu, Iurie
Rosca and Vlad Cubreacov), raising intense critics from OSCE
and PACE17. Since March 2004, the parliamentary fraction of
the CDPP initiated a new wave of strikes, blocking the central
tribune of the parliament and, thus, being excluded from speeches
in the house. They’ve accused the leadership of the parliament
for their ‘procrastinated interest to hide budgetary expenditures
of the house’ that became for the first time in the history of the
Moldovan statehood ‘fully secret’, ‘for official use’, being unavail-
able even to the MPs of the present legislature. In spite of pro-
gressive discontent of the opposition parties, the super-
majoritarian rule installed at large in the Parliament have not
admitted that the issues rose by the opposition ‘are worth to be
treated seriously’ and, accordingly, blamed the opposition that
it wishes only to ‘politicize the agenda’.
Another important point is the fact that the undemocratic be-
havior of the Moldovan Parliament is replicated by many other
public institutions in the country. This fact holds true for both
central and local levels of public administration. Misconduct, in
democratic terms, of such public institutions like the state TV-
radio broadcasting station, the Council of Audiovisual, the Agency
for Regulations in Telecommunications and Information, the Mu-
nicipal Council of Chisinau Municipality in relations with either
political and bureaucracy actors or with general public only con-
firms this point of view. It appears that the same diagnoses  will
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persist - at least until the next general elections in 2005,  further
exacerbated by gregarious behavior, continuous migration of
Moldovan youth looking for jobs abroad, and political corruption,
which usually multiplies anti-liberal preferences18.
TOWARDS A ‘PRESIDENTIAL PER EXCELLENCE’ PARLIAMENTARIAN RULE
Polls showed in August 2000 that 82% of respondents believed
that ‘the country goes into a wrong direction’ (against 8%), while
the trust in political parties reached the ever worst indicators
(11% as compared to 77% in church, 55% - mass media, and 10% -
Parliament). The negative stance started to drop in 2001 with the
vociferous appeals of the Communists to increase stability and
predictability of the changes19. In November 2001, only 48% stated
that the country is going into a wrong direction (against 21% which
showed optimist). With a large constitutional majority of 71 out of
101 seats in the one-chamber Parliament, the CPM was associ-
ated by many citizens with a good promise to stability and eco-
nomic growth. Over 50% of respondents said they would oppose a
dissolution of the Parliament, governing by decrees, establishing
a censorship in the mass media, banning public protests or dem-
onstrations, other meetings or limiting the right of circulation for
Moldova citizens20.
Very soon a paradox situation occurred with the  newly estab-
lished Parliament. Contrary to the constitutional realities that
provided almost an undisputed role to the Parliament, the CPM
faction promoted its leader in the position of the President of state
and not as of the Speaker of the Parliament, for which, the CPM
lobbied someone that had a totally irrelevant position in the party
until 2001. Political analysts described this choice as an attempt
of the President, Vladimir Voronin, to annihilate any possibility
of power-contest from the position of the Speaker, that earlier had
made the former President Lucinschi to loose control over its pro-
presidential party, (Movement for a Democratic and Prosperous
Moldova, led by the Speaker of the Parliament, Dumitru Diacov).
The President was apparently not satisfied with this situa-
tion and soon started to grow up his staff and policies, showing
to everyone that the real and the most effective power-keeper is
the President, who installed a rigid and omnipresent subordina-
tion of the majority faction to the Presidential ‘indications’ (party-
based), which, of course, run against the constitutional provi-
sions (art.68), which states that ‘during their mandate, deputies
act on behalf and to the benefit of the people’, and not of the party
or its leader.
In addition to its representative role, Parliaments have to ful-
fil two other roles, i.e. lawmaking and monitoring of the execu-
tives. According to article 73 of the Constitution the right to legis-
lative initiative belongs to the acting Members of the Parliament,
Government, President of Moldova and the Popular Assembly of
the Autonomous Territorial Unit ‘Gagauzia’. The acting Parlia-
ment of the Republic of Moldova is a unicameral legislative and
representative body. The election, institutional structure, organi-
zation of sessions and general functioning of the Parliament are
set out by such legislative acts as: Constitution of Republic of
Moldova, in part III, “Public Authorities”; Law on Parliament In-
ternal Regulations;21 Law on the Statute of the Member of Parlia-
ment;22  Electoral Code, in Title III “Parliamentary Elections”;
Law on Legislative Acts23. All law-drafts and legislative propos-
als submitted for examination in Parliament are registered by the
Permanent Bureau and distributed immediately to all delegates,
but can be included in agenda only in a 15 working days time.
The chairman of the Parliament or a vice-chairman submits
the law-drafts to be debated and possibly endorsed by relevant
permanent Committees. Any Permanent Committee has the
right to give its notification on law-drafts, submitted by the
leadership of the Parliament. Curiously enough, however, the
latter legal prescription contradicts the right of the Permanent
Bureau to reject any Committee’s request to give its notifica-
tion. But this decision can be overcome by the Parliament with
a simple majority of votes. As in other legislative practices,
Moldovan parliament can adopt 3 types of laws: constitutional,
organic and ordinary, as well as decisions24. Ordinary laws and
Parliament’s decisions are adopted by the vote of the majority
of MPs having attended the session. Organic laws and other
constitutional laws are adopted by the vote of the majority of
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elected MPs or by other qualified majorities. The MPs vote per-
sonally by open or secret vote.
The law-making process begins with the formulation of legisla-
tive initiative. Then, after its quick examination in the standing
committees, which are responsible for the legal notifications and
reports on the drafts of the law or legislative amendments. All law
drafts and amendments are submitted for obligatory legal advice to
the Legal Direction of the Parliamentary staff and as soon as the
legal report is available, the drafts are included on the legislative
agenda for discussions. Later on, when the drafts are already on
the agenda, general debates are held at common sittings, where
deputies may freely express their opinions on the respective con-
cept or drafts of the law. Usually, drafts of the law are debated in
two subsequent readings. On the other hand, the parliamentary
Regulation stipulates the possibilities of adopting ordinary laws
and, after a first reading - and the organic laws - in their second
reading. Organic laws are adopted with the vote of the majority of
elected deputies, while ordinary laws and decisions - with the vote
of the majority of deputies present in the hall.
The Parliament’s Internal Regulation as well as the Law on
legislative acts set up the basic regulations for the legislative pro-
cess by formulating the main rules, terms and procedures that
are required in order to discuss, vote and enforce new laws. The
Internal regulation stipulates a roadmap for the drafts of the laws
that are to be considered initially in the standing committee, spe-
cial committees and at the plenary sessions of the Parliament.
The law-drafts rejected by the Parliament cannot be discussed
any longer during the same session. A law comes into force on the
day of publication or on the date noted in its text. According to the
Law on legislative acts if a law is not published it actually means
that it does not exist. The Legislative procedure in Moldovan Par-
liament includes several stages: drafting legislative initiative by
law-initiators; examination and endorsement of law-drafts by per-
manent committees; inclusion of the law-drafts in plenary session
agenda; law-drafts debate; adoption (in one, two or three lectures);
signing of the law by the Chairman of the Parliament; promulga-
tion by the President of Moldova and publishing the law. The
stages of the legislative procedure are determined by the Consti-
tution, Parliament Regulation, Law on legislative acts and, in some
cases, by common rules, that result from parliamentary practice
and traditions. It should be mentioned that in spite of the excep-
tionally important role that this Regulation plays for the organi-
zation of the law-making process, the document has been never
published in the Monitorul Oficial.
But this is not an exception. Neither the budget of the Parlia-
ment and the respective distribution of expenditures can be found,
nor are the records of the plenary or special sessions available to
the public. In spite of the repeated appeals to make them acces-
sible to the press, parliamentary staff claimed that this would be
in contradiction with the provisions set up by the Internal Regu-
lation of the Parliament, which thus conflicts with the Law on
access to information, and Constitution. This is to be emphasized
that the drafts of the constitutional  laws on budgetary issues,
finances, economy, which may need considerable financial expen-
ditures, as well as international treaties, by a special decision of
the Parliament, can be debated in the third reading as well. No
obligation to make the drafts of the law available to the public in
the official press is made, although, regularly, drafts of the law
which are launched by the ruling party are extensively mediated25.
No other opposition party can advertise its own legislative pro-
posals in the official press, which are “founded by the Govern-
ment of Moldova”. After the adoption of the law, it is then under-
signed by the Chairman of the parliament, who sends it for the
last promulgation to the President of the state.
If there are some clarifications to be made in this regard, the
President is entitled to send it one time no later than in the fol-
lowing two weeks after its adoption for reconsideration. However,
the Constitution is making the President compulsory to promul-
gate the law in case if the Parliament is keen to stick to its earlier
decision, and if the Parliament gives up, the law is considered
approved. All laws are enforced in the date of their publication in
the Monitorul official. Supervision of the executive power is there-
fore a core regular business of the Parliament. Typically, there is
no a specialized body on behalf of the Parliament in accomplish-
ing this job and it is believed that weekly hearings (Thursday) of
the top-executive officials, who are appointed by Parliament,
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should be enough for any specific communication or inquiries to
the executive officials. Prior to this day, opposition and the major-
ity fractions are entitled to address some of their policy concerns
to the Executive, in a written form, in order to have an official
answer to almost all their questions. Agenda setting-priorities is
formally the business of the Permanent Office, which formulates
it on the basis of the proposals coming from the standing commit-
tees, and later approves it with a simple vote. Decisions adopted
in the committees, the Permanent Bureau as well as in the ple-
nary sessions do represent the political will of the (existing) ma-
jority of MPs.
PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES
The internal structure of the Parliament includes: parliamen-
tary fractions, Permanent Bureau, standing committees and depu-
ties. On top of the standing committees is the Permanent Bureau,
having a representative mandate and a competence to deliberate
and decide upon the agenda of the Parliament. The Permanent
Bureau is the working group of the Parliament. It is established
on the basis of proportional representation of all the fractions of
the legislative body. Every Friday, the Permanent Bureau holds
its working sittings. The Chairman and vice chairmen of the Par-
liament are Members of the Permanent Bureau , making in total a
number of 11 representatives, out of which 7 are Communists, 1
PPCD  (Christian Democrat Popular Party) and 1 BEAB (Elec-
tion Block ‘Braghis’ Alliance)26, and 1 independent candidate (in
fact, that left the fraction he represented in the  elections):
There are 10 standing committees in the Parliament of Moldova.
The number, name and numerical composition of the Committees
is decided by the Parliament at the proposal of the Permanent
Bureau, therefore the number of Permanent Committees varies in
each legislature. Committees are specialized in various areas, re-
flecting in an approximate manner the governmental responsi-
bilities. In Central European legislative houses, the number of com-
mittees varies from 11 to 24, with the number of members per
committee ranging from eight to 32. In addition to the permanent
legislative committees, most of the Parliaments ( two -cameral or
one-cameral) of the Central and Eastern Europe have relied ex-
tensively on the creation of special purpose temporary commit-
tees for both legislative and investigatory purposes. Comparative
analysis based on seven indicators of institutionalization suggests
that the committee systems of Hungary, Poland, and the Czech
Republic are more institutionalized than those found elsewhere.
Bulgaria is a middle case, while the parliaments of Moldova,
Lithuania, and Estonia are the least institutionalized. As the in-
dicators show stability in committee membership and extent of
committee activity are among the most important factors for post-
communist parliaments in their first decade27. Permanent Com-
mittees with distinct responsibilities carry out the work of the
Parliament on “operational” and “sectorial basis”28. The Parlia-
ment of current (15th) legislature has 10 permanent Committees:29
• Committee for legal affairs, nominations and immunity;
• Committee for economy, industry, budget and finances;
• Committee for national security;
• Committee for foreign policy;
• Committee for human rights and national minorities;
• Committee for public administration;
• Committee for culture, science, youth and mass-media;
• Committee for agriculture and processing industry;
• Committee for social protection, health and family;
• Committee for environment and territorial improving.
As in other legislative chambers, committees are designated to
act as instruments of operative work, by which parliaments may
take independent actions from the executive power with the view
to develop, consider, identify and explore new policy options. Hence
understanding legislative committees is essential to evaluating
the role that legislatures play in the overall political system of the
country. The phenomenon of strengthening the mandate and role
of the standing or ad-hoc parliamentary committees was frequently
seen as a sign of consolidation for the legislature. And vice -versa,
relying too much on the data and drafts received from the execu-
tive, irrespective to the linkage/political patronage exercised by
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the ruling or coalition majority of the Parliament means, in fact, a
certain degree of functional dependence on the executive.
The consolidation of the legislative power is known in the politi-
cal sciences as ‘the institutionalization of the Parliament’, that can
be analyzed by looking into the indicators of growing stability and
consistency in salient attributes of standing or ad-hoc created par-
liamentary committees. Among those indicators are: (1) party ra-
tios in both general committee membership; (2) officer positions in
committees on behalf of the parliamentary fractions; (3) changes in
rates of turn over in committee membership; and (4) leadership of
the committees. Our observations now, in the beginning decade of
post communist politics will provide a base line for future research.
As subsets of parliament, committees both reflect, but contribute
to, the ways in which the whole parliament functions. The degree of
coordinated leadership of the chamber will directly affect both com-
mittee membership selection and the rules by which parliament
considers legislation. Furthermore, changes should occur in the
external relations of committees, including the substance and quan-
tity of referral of legislation to committees; inter-committee coordi-
nation mechanisms, relations with parliamentary leadership, rela-
tions with government, and policy impacts.
Permanent Committees - as described by the Acting Regula-
tion - are the ‘working bodies of the Parliament’ (art.14), playing a
special role in preparing  its proceedings, as well as in the exer-
cise of the parliamentary functions, especially legislative creation
and parliamentary control, while remaining subordinated to the
Parliament. In their turn, Committees guide their works accord-
ing to a number of internal proceedings and Charts. Quickly after
the results of the general elections are announced and deputy’s
mandates are confirmed, the new Parliament designates a num-
ber of permanent committees (art.14, p.3) which will be opera-
tional during the whole mandate of the Parliament, preserving
their initial name, number of full-rights members and political
representation, which is endorsed by the Permanent Office of the
Parliament. Chairing the Committees is considered to be of great
political relevance for all the parliamentary fractions represented
in the Parliament, therefore, candidates that are proposed on be-
half of the fractions are later on confirmed through an open or
secret ballot voting in the plenary session of the Parliament and,
with the endorsement of the majority of votes chairmen are ap-
pointed for their field committees.
Public participation at the committee’s open deliberations is not
very encouraged, while art.23 says that the minutes made on the
debates can be made public only with overt consent of the
Committee’s chairman. The same is true concerning the hand right-
ing of the debates in committees, which is specifically decided only
by the chairman of the committee. In spite of the provision that
committee’s sessions ‘are usually public’, most of the decisions to
allow, other than deputies, people is made on an ad-hoc basis, on a
sole discretionary power of the deputies in charge with such pow-
ers, leaving no space to dispute any possibility of limiting people to
access information or report on the hearings made by the commit-
tees on certain issues of public interest. Only the press service of
the Parliament may be commanded to prepare press communiqués
about the works done by the committee in this regard.
Although, the Regulation stipulates a mechanism of balancing
the political diversity of the chamber (art.15, p.5 – ‘if parliamen-
tary fractions do not reach an agreement over the list of members
for a committee, Permanent Office will propose, and in the plenary
session deputies will decide with the simple majority of votes the
committee membership, considering the proportional representa-
tion and personal option of the deputies’. Hence, deputies cannot be
members of more than one committee, while the Speaker of the House
and its two Vice Speakers are not allowed to be members of the
committees, which thus, creates a kind of logical framework for not
allowing that top-level legislative officials   influence the debates
on the bills debated by committees. Usually Permanent Commit-
tees of Parliaments in Moldova have competencies in such areas
like agriculture and rural social development, crime prevention,
culture and religion, ecology, the economy and the budget, foreign
affairs, health and social assistance, human rights and relations
among nationalities, law, local administration and the local economy,
public relations and the mass media, science and education, state
security and military affairs, women and family issues.
The Permanent Committees approve drafts of laws and legis-
lative proposals, perform parliamentary investigations, debate and
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take decisions upon other problems required by the chairman and
vice-chairmen of the Parliament. Each Committee deals with
preparation of drafts of laws in the related field, issues opinions
on drafts submitted by various law-initiators to be passed by the
Parliament. If necessary, the Parliament may launch special and
Inquiry Committees in order to prepare complex legislative acts
of exceptional importance or to investigate various important is-
sues. The Permanent Bureau proposes to the Parliament the nomi-
nal composition of special or Inquiry Committee and conditions
under which the Committee’s report has to be submitted. Estab-
lishing an Inquiry Committee may be required by a parliamen-
tary faction or by a group of at least 5 to 10 elected MPs. During
its activity the current parliament of the 15th legislature set up
the following special and Inquiry committees:
• Special Committee on election of the President of the Re-
public of Moldova;
• Inquiry committee for investigating the cases of electric
power breaking in the northern regions of the Republic of Moldova;
• Special Committee for developing proposals of adjusting
the provisions of the Moldovan Constitution to the provisions of
the Law regarding the special status of the autonomous territo-
rial unity Gagauz-Yeri;
• Special Parliamentary committee for issues regarding
Transnistria;
• Special committee for the examination of the law-draft for
Constitution amendment;
• Special Committee for elaboration of amendments to laws
on local public administration and administrative-territorial
organisation of the Republic of Moldova;
• Special committee for formulating measures for reimburse-
ment of credits and payments to individuals and juridical per-
sons from commercial banks and other financial institutions which
are in the process of liquidation30.
Usually, the duration for a draft law to be discussed in the Com-
mittee is no longer than 15 days, although there are significant
exceptions related to the draft’s complexity or urgency. If the au-
thors of the drafts emphasize the urgency of its adoption, the Com-
mittee may proceed to extraordinary work preparing it for ple-
nary debates, and this is usually decided by the expert of the Com-
mittee. The average technical endowment of the Committee is quite
low. Some of the deputies may have their own computers, while
others have only limited access to electronic facilities, having two
deputies one desk computer, or even having a joint phone line.
Following the provisions set in art.17 of the Regulation, each of
the committees elects a Chairman, vice chairmen and secretaries,
establishing a micro-bureau in the very first session after the nomi-
nation of the members. It is the full responsibility of the Chair-
man to prepare the agenda for the next sessions of the commit-
tees, to set up specific tasks of the members and take decisions in
all issues that pertain to the field of committee specialization. For
instance, the Committee are in charge to set up (if there is a need
defined by the members of the Committee) specific subcommittees
and advising groups, to maintain order during the sessions of the
committee, to carry out any other tasks as stipulated by the Regu-
lation. Assisting the Chairman, vice-chairmen may carry out the
chairman’s competencies, while a Secretary has to edit all the docu-
ments drafted and prepared by the committee (reports, legal noti-
fications, minutes, etc), having also the attribution to count the
votes cast on various issues debated.
Of course, the internal structure and organizational differen-
tiation of the parliamentary parties affect the way how party depu-
ties in committees can interact with fellow party members and
leaders. In the Western democracies, most of the parties have set
working groups that duplicate in fact the number of parliamen-
tary committees, and their members of the party working groups
are the party’s delegated experts on the parliamentary commit-
tees, under their jurisdiction. Some of the parties in Moldova fol-
lowed this example, although, there is still a considerable gap be-
tween the agenda of these committees and the way of communi-
cating with party representatives in shaping the party position.
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THE ROLE OF THE INTERNAL REGULATIONS AND STAFF IN THE LAW MAKING
The more responsible their procedural functioning is, the more
effective their supplementary scrutiny of government activities
will be. A list of preconditions of parliamentary effectiveness is
not confined to the situation of the state, but is relevant to the
general situation of parliamentarian forms of government widely
known in the world. Our evidence will test those intertwined as-
sumptions by providing subsequent analysis on the practices and
experiences notified. In Moldova we do face a particular situation
related to the fact that since July 2000, the Constitution has been
amended and a parliamentary rule was entrenched without re-
vising the main constitutional prerogatives allocated to the Presi-
dent, who thus became elected by the Parliament, but retained
much of the powers it had over the executive framework of agen-
cies and ministries. What resulted from the constitutional amend-
ments and the vote for a super-large political majority fomented a
lot of political developments and implications.
The Parliament Staff ensures the organizational assistance, in-
formation and technical support to the legislative related activi-
ties, to the Permanent Office, Standing Committees, parliamen-
tary fractions and deputies. The Structure and scheme staff of the
Parliament’s personnel is subject for approval by the Parliament.
Today, there are a number of 194 of hired staff of the Parliament.
A General Director is responsible for the functioning of the staff.
The functional structure of the Parliament consists of the follow-
ing units: Press Service, Parliamentary documentation Direction,
Administrative Direction, Legal Direction, Foreign Relations Di-
rection, Center for parliamentary studies and public relations,
Consultants. Quickly after the change in power, the new leader-
ship of the legislature stated the need to reform the internal struc-
ture of the Parliament. A new position of the General Director of
the Parliamentary staff has been introduced in 2001, making him
responsible for the management of the whole staff and assistance
provided to each of the MPs. This technical-administrative posi-
tion is similar in many ways with that of the Secretary-general of
the parliaments, which, in Moldova, are subject to a competitive
examination, and whose appointment rests within the Permanent
Office (a collegiate body) and Chairman of the Parliament.
At the same time, some subdivisions were reformed or totally
changed. For instance, a Center for parliamentary research and
public relations has been established. More staff was added to the
Direction of Secretariat and Petitions and consultants serving the
standing committees of the Parliament31’ Many of the aspects that
were considered to be at the core of the democratic accountability
of the Parliament were however less visible and, perhaps, less im-
portant to our counterparts. The absence of clear criteria or yard-
sticks to evaluate the effective organization of the Parliament,
scarce representation and an almost exclusion of the parliamen-
tary opposition from the law-making process is all issues which
raise the following questions:  How should we assess the demo-
cratic legitimacy of the “inter-party” legislative procedure? How
accessible to citizens are the procedures through which the legis-
lature bodies (standing committees, executives of the Parliament
prioritize the relevant list of issues for the legislature? Just from
the very beginning of our institutional analysis, the Project faced
a staunch and rigid opposition from the highest echelons of the
legislative body, which quickly penetrated into the willingness of
the administrative staff. Although the clerks of the Parliament
accepted our arguments that transparency and openness of the
legislative process is somehow inscribed by the definition of  the
Parliament’s role and mission, they could not but decline any sup-
port that they could provide in institutional framework.
A deep functional analysis using internal information was not
possible therefore since the personnel of the political leadership
of the Parliament is highly vulnerable, having no stability of their
statute and being easily submissive to administrative/political pen-
alties should the top-officials be interested in doing that. But, who
controls today the legislative agenda of the Parliament? Theoreti-
cally, the parliament has the leading role to set up priorities on
law making considering the existing political distinctions and re-
lationships among the main political forces. In practice, govern-
ments control the agenda (regardless whether they are minimum
winning coalitions, minority governments or oversized majorities)
are either positional (governments in multiparty systems either
have a majority supporting them or they are located in the center
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of the policy space), or institutional (a series of devices by which
governments control the agenda which was presented in the pre-
vious section and summarized by the indicator “agenda control”).
Following constitutional provisions, the Parliament is confirm-
ing the Prime-Minister and his Cabinet, which is entitled to imple-
ment the governing program of the majority-party or coalition-
parties. Usually, the governing program is elaborated on the ba-
sis of the largest legislative parties, as a triangular of their eco-
nomic and political views. Thus, 80-90% of the drafts of the law
elaborated and presented for consideration in the Parliament origi-
nate from the Government, 10 to 20% of drafts are elaborated by
the MPs, including those representing the political opposition32.
PARLIAMENT’S INTERACTIONS WITH OTHER PUBLIC ACTORS
According to article 6 of the Constitution the executive, the leg-
islative and the judicial authorities in Moldova are separated. Nev-
ertheless they are supposed to interact in order to implement their
functions effectively. However, the normal principle of “checking
and balancing” with other branches of power has been replaced by
an almost hegemonic submission of the Parliament, Government
and the judiciary to the Presidency. During the last 3 years, the
staff of the Presidency increased by 150%, and so did  the budget-
ary means appropriated by the Presidential Administration, which
is by all aspects, the most important in fact instrument of power
of the country. One could say that the Parliament was in fact ex-
propriated by quite a bit of its competencies and leverages, and
among the most sensible tools that were lost in fact in the process
of ‘power agglomeration’ to the President,  was the so called ‘con-
trol and supervision over the executive power’. A list of relevant
“interactions” of the current Parliament with the opposition, Gov-
ernment and President of the country is analyzed below.
Interactions with the opposition
Ratings continued however to remain favorable for CPM lead-
ers and the inertia of voter’s confidence was re-confirmed in No-
vember 2003, with CPM being the most favored. Polls reveal that
almost 50 per cent of the general public thinks actually that the
country is better governed. The rating is clearly decreasing as com-
pared with the last poll in April 2003, causing some unease within
CPM. The CPM is making the utmost to preserve their link with
the nostalgic segment of voters while trying to convince the West
that they are going to continue with the reforms and privatization
of plants, that previously were blamed to be a ‚robbed’, while pre-
vious governments were harshly criticized because of their ‚re-
forms’. Besides, the CPM has really managed to please a large
share of its traditional electorate by freezing the growth of the
retirement age and by increasing the pension’s amount. The risk
of losing financial sustainability, generated for the retirement
system as a result of the mentioned populist policies, is beyond
understanding or the concern of ordinary voters.
At the same time, the ruling party is trying to exclude political
dialogue as it may certainly loose the competition with more ar-
ticulated centrist and right-wing parties. Thus, CPM has rejected
at the end of 2002 two referendums initiated by the main opposi-
tion parties, and both of them were downplayed by the CEC on
various formal reasons, simply because the CPM was unwilling to
accept opposition’s gaining leverage on public eyes. By mid 2002,
the BA fraction has collected over 200.000 of signatures to initiate
a referendum on changing the election system: from proportional
party-lists vote to majoritarian election system combined with one-
past the post, although the CEC, after repeated checking of the
lists with signatures, suddenly decided to invalided the initia-
tive. The same happened in December 2002 - January 2003 with
the initiative of CDPP aiming to hold a national referendum on
joining EU and NATO.
The 2002 ‘social pact’ initiative launched by President Voronin
revealed that very few NGOs are supportive towards the CPM
policies, therefore, an infusion of some ‘loyal NGOs’ followed. In
order to balance the impact of the real civil groups of the Moldovan
civil society CPM have highly encouraged the creation of alterna-
tive organizations and associations, which were receiving signifi-
cant funds from the state in return for their loyalty.
As the CPM is traditionally gaining benefits out of the polar-
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ized society, the interventions of the state in the third sector ac-
tivities in 2003 were traditionally aimed to increase the distances
between its various member groups. No consistent dialogue with
civil society occurred in 2003, and the legislative activities went
even more difficult than in 2002, with opposition boycotting the
sessions, and with the ruling party doing the same when opposi-
tion MPs were asking to take the floor in the Parliament. The mu-
tual antagonism erupted in September, when opposition parties
decided to boycott the legislative work of the Parliament, by com-
mencing to protest in the streets of the downtown.
Interactions with the government
According to Moldovan legislation, National Parliament is en-
titled to undertake a wide range of control activities over the gov-
ernmental bodies. Moreover, a thorough analysis shows that theo-
retically constitutional prescriptions leave the Parliament with
more political influence than the President over the Government.
Indeed the Government may implement his program of activity
only after the program and the nominal composition of the Gov-
ernment are accepted by the majority of MPs. The President des-
ignates the candidate for the post of Prime Minister only after
consulting the political factions of the Parliament. However, it is
fairly obvious that there is no use of these formal consultations
when one party obedient to the President of the country heavily
dominates the Parliament.
 The Government exists until the validation of results of the
new parliamentary elections. The Parliament holds the Govern-
ment responsible and may require any relevant information and
documents to be presented. Members of the Government have ac-
cess to Parliamentary sessions and are supposed to attend the
Governmental hearing, which is specifically demanded by the
Parliament’s Regulation. Government as a whole and members of
the Government are legally obliged to answer any question and
interpellation of any MP. The Parliament may pass a motion to
express its attitude towards the inquired issue. With a simple
majority of MPs the Parliament may express its distrust in gov-
ernment plans, proposals or law-drafts. Therefore, the Parliament
may delegate the government the competence of issuing “ordi-
nances of urgency” that have a legal power similar to Parliamen-
tary laws until abrogated by the Parliament. The law that del-
egates the Government such competencies should dispense clearly
the areas and the timeframe under which the ordinances can be
issued. Ordinances of urgency may not be enacted in areas regu-
lated by organic law. However, the mechanism of enacting ordi-
nances of urgency may be biased against corrupted interests since
no promulgation of ordinances by the President is necessary.
However, in Moldova the problems of corruption associated with
this kind of governmental legislative creation are by far less im-
portant than in such EU-candidate country as Romania. Up to
now Moldovan government has issued very few ordinances. Inter-
estingly, the Government tried to regulate the pre-shipment in-
spection procedure with an urgency ordinance but it was after-
wards abrogated by the Parliament. One should say that pre-ship-
ment inspections are one of most disputed issue in Moldovan eco-
nomic policy rising debates between members of the Government
and members of the Parliament. Despite all these formal disputes,
for the time being, the interactions between the Moldovan Gov-
ernment and Parliament may be characterized as lacking any mu-
tual antagonism or other serious confrontations, at least, expressed
openly, as registered in the previous Parliaments. Only when be-
ing forced by the IMF or by the World Bank have the members of
the Government tried to contest political positions dominating the
Parliament. Even though hidden clashes of corporative interests
may well poison the relations of the government with the parlia-
ment usually they never become public. However, lack of open con-
flicts does not mean that the current political power feels com-
fortable with the government. Only once the former minister of
finances (currently Moldovan ambassador in the USA) expressed
his negative attitude about the high costs involved by the local
public administration reform of 2002-2003. But, this was paid with
his extradition, in fact, from the top of the Ministry of Finance to
a top-ranked diplomatic position abroad.
The reform was enacted by the Parliament despite the protests
of the Ministry of Finances and personally by the minister but he
resigned a short time after his public statement. Another recent
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case is: the government having proposed radical fiscal measures
(like eradication of VAT exemptions) in the 2004 state budget but
the Parliament rejected the proposals after being “persuaded” by
the President of Moldova. Since February 2001 the President has
removed as many as 12 ministers but these episodes went by qui-
etly and no questions have been put either by the Parliament as
well as by the relevant minister. It would be desirable that the
perfect relationship between the ruling party and its Cabinet
might be compensated/balanced by the opposition voice, which is
unfortunately not listened to at all’33. On the other hand, Prime
Ministers have their own leverages of influencing the Parliament
by ‘supplying in fact’ the legislative chamber with drafts of laws,
while relaying on a vote of confidence of the simple majority of
deputies. The Political scientists say that the strength of Parlia-
ments as compared to the Prime Minister can be stated when a
prime minister has no special competencies compared to minis-
ters, being defined as weak. In all other cases he is defined as
being strong. Strong prime ministers are relatively often found in
cases of weak presidents, and similarly strong prime ministers
are uncommon in consociational countries and relatively more com-
mon in majoritarian democracies (Commonwealth).
Interactions with the presidency
The Constitution of the Republic of Moldova states that the
President of Moldova is the head of the state. He represents the
state and is acting as a guarantor of the sovereignty of the state,
national independence, state unity and territorial integrity (art.77/
2). This major responsibility and mandate remained unchanged
in spite of the changes brought to the Constitution in August 2000.
The President is elected by the Parliament for a four-year term
through secret vote by three fifths of the elected MPs. This is the
highest qualified majority required by the Constitution for the
Moldovan Parliament to adopt a decision. A second round may be
organized if the first failed. If no President is elected during the
first elections, repeated elections are held. If no President is elected
during repeated elections, the incumbent President dissolves the
Parliament and calls anticipatory general elections. This is what
actually happened in December 2000, when the parliament elected
in March 1998 was not able to elect a new president according to
the Constitution.
Parliament can be dissolved if no government is elected or if
the procedure of law adoption is blocked for more than 3 months.
In the latter case, President may dissolve the Parliament after
consulting the political factions in the legislature. Since this pro-
vision is not unequivocal the Constitutional Court interpreted in
1998 the expression of “blocking procedure of law adoption” as the
situation ‘when MPs or groups of MPs, by their actions, do tergi-
versate or hamper the procedure of passing important laws’. Lack
of clarity remained however with the term - “important laws” –
which is still a subject to disputes. Besides, it is not yet entirely
clear what role do Parliamentary factions have to play being con-
sulted by the President in view of dissolution of the Parliament. It
should be said that there are some limitations put by the Consti-
tution on the presidential prerogative of dissolving the Parliament.
To tell the truth, for the time being, the Constitutional Court is
the only institution able to impede (on the basis of its plenipoten-
tiary decisions) the enactment of any decision or law that would
infringe on the principles and provisions set forth by the Consti-
tution, and even the President of Moldova can be certainly refrained
from setting a monopoly on the decision-making process.
On its own side, the President has preserved also a role of
quasi-veto on legislation due to the fact that he is entitled to pro-
mulgate all legislative acts adopted by the Parliament. This spe-
cific competence is enshrined to him by the Constitution, which
makes it be an institutionalized form of veto player, as opposed
to the partisan-veto players (political parties represented in the
Parliament). From another part, with the votes of two thirds of
elected MPs the Parliament may put the President under charge
for legal offences. The Highest Court of Justice is the only judi-
cial body legally competent for conducting the trials related to
President. There are no other ways of President dismissal and
once elected there are no chances to overthrow the President for
political reasons even though, surprisingly, fewer votes are re-
quired for President dismissal than for his election. One third of
MPs can submit the bid for the President to be dismissed. This
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situation is opposite to the way the Chairman of the parliament
is elected by simple majority of elected MPs but is dismissed by
two thirds of elected MPs. In other words it seems that the Chair-
man of the Parliament is potentially more stable in his function
than the President of the country.
Despite this fact, the present Moldovan Parliament dominated
by one political faction is entirely submissive to the political or-
ders given by the President of the Country. This obedience might
be explained by several factors. First of all, the incumbent Presi-
dent of Moldova is also the President of the PCRM; secondly, this
party is acting  as a monolithic structure based on ‘democratic
centralism’ principles and strict discipline, while strong leader-
ship makes its members to be rather reluctant to whatever “her-
etic thinking”, which is usually the way of life in other ‘demo-
cratic parties’. The strategy of PCRM faction in the Parliament is
determined by political decisions of the Central Committee of the
PCRM and party general congresses.
Finally, the communist MPs understand well that a heterodox
approach to the interactions of the communist faction with the
presidency may result in dismantlement of the PCRM in two or
more separate political blocs and, potentially, would put at risk
the while hierarchy the acting MPs. With the President and his
entourage having a grip on political events and economic life and
financial circuits in Moldova, there is no real purpose for the com-
munist parliamentary faction to show up more activity than the
minimally needed and to lose its comfortable positions. The Presi-
dent has very important attributions in foreign policy, in defense
and home security, as well as in controlling the government legis-
lative acts. There is a clear consent on the fact that the Govern-
ment is in fact controlled by President, and it is believed to be
only formally responsive to the legislature. MPs answers to the
Questionnaire employed by IDIS show that the largest influence
over legislative agenda is exercised by Presidential staff, over scor-
ing big business and Ministries. From the survey one can see a
rather negligible role played in influencing legislative agenda by
‘independent mass media, NGOs, unions or church’.
TABLE NO.1. TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU AGREE WITH THE AFFIRMATION THAT THE
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA IS MOSTLY INFLUENCED BY:
President promulgates the laws passed by the parliament and
may send a law-project or a legislative proposal back to the par-
liament to be reviewed. Only if the Parliament insists in the sec-
ond vote, the President must promulgate the law. However, never
since February 2001 the Parliament insisted twice on his law
projects. Hence, despite the “parliamentary republic” logo, actu-
ally the “strong man” runs Moldova. The situation probably will
not change in foreseeable future, if no serious regrouping of politi-
cal forces occurs on the center and on the right wing of political
scene in Moldova. Generally, relationship of the parliament with
the presidency is dominated by the president’s agenda, prima-
rily, because of the position of the President as the leader of CPRM,
as well as by the fact that the President never considered seri-
ously the primacy of the Parliament within the acting constitu-
tional format. Thus, people think that ‘the relation with the Presi-
dent is pretty harmonious, and this is the merit of the larger po-
litical party34’.
COMPLETELY DIFFICULT AGREE/
DISAGREE/DON’T  TO ANSWER COMPLETELY
AGREE AGREE
State interests as a whole 25,7 27,5 46,8
Public opinion tendencies 32,3 40,7 26,9
Interests of presidency 13,1 26,3 60,6
Interests of the ruling party 11,9 26,1 62
Interests of financial oligarchy 13,5 39,2 47,4
Interests of government 11,5 27,8 60,7
Interests of mafia groups 19,5 39,5 41
Interests of rival foreign states 29,3 45,9 24,9
Interests of opposition 37,6 42,3 20,2
Interests of national security forces 36,6 42,8 20,6
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Relations with judiciary
Since February 2001, the Parliament has operated many amend-
ments affecting not only the structure of judicial system but also
its independent functioning. Independent lawyers affirm that as
result of all legal modifications being passed by the current Par-
liament, the independence of judiciary is already a mere fiction in
Moldova and there is a high risk of the current political power to
turn into an authoritarian regime
35
. To mention one of the most
recent constitutional amendments affecting the independence of
judiciary, in December 2002 one layer of judicial system was anni-
hilated by the Parliament (the regional tribunals) without inde-
pendent professionals in law being heard and without consulta-
tions with political opposition being held. While the declared pur-
pose was to streamline the functioning of the judicial system, out-
spoken adversaries of reform, mainly politicians from the previ-
ous Parliament having enact the former judicial system, said that
the new regulations would corroborate with the already over-
whelming influence exercised by the Presidency of Moldova over
the judiciary and would make the judicial system even less inde-
pendent than today36.
One of the most obvious pressures on judiciary was the compe-
tence allocated by the Parliament to the President of state to sug-
gest the dismissal or confirmation of Judges to the Council of
Magistrates37. Since 2001, President Voronin dismissed over 30%
of the judges, claiming that ‘judiciary is corrupt’, but failing to
initiate ANY legal action against the non-endorsed judges. Most
of them were not confirmed at the expiration of the 5-years man-
date and, in the total, their number reached in 2003, over 50% out
of 350 of judges in Moldova that perceive their resignation as a
‘political vendetta’38. Because of  the strong link between the Presi-
dent and the Legislature that allowed him to operate freely  the
judiciary independence, a lot of unease and protests in the society
were caused.
It is worthwhile mentioning that up to now no public reports
reflecting an increased efficiency and simplicity of the judicial sys-
tem since the reform was put in place have been presented. The
Parliament and Government use regularly specific tools of influ-
ence  the judiciary. Even before the liquidation of tribunals, the
Parliament changed the way the judges are nominated in common
courts, in the Court of Appeal and in the High Court of Justice.
Magistrates, presidents and vice-presidents of common courts and
of the Court of Appeal are proposed by the High Magistrate Council
and are nominated by the President of the country. Four candi-
dates have to be proposed to the President who selects only one.
Also, the incumbent judges and presidents of the courts are to be
reconfirmed in their functions by the President. According to the
experts community opinion in Moldova the mechanism of nominat-
ing judges offers the President an inadmissible leverage over the
judiciary system. Judicial corpus in Moldova blames the President
for political interference in the justice, for dismissing inconvenient
judges and replacing them with politically affiliated persons39.
While in a normal democracy the Parliament would be legally,
politically and morally obliged to intervene in order to stop politi-
cal interference in judicial procedures, in Moldova not a single time
the Parliament questioned the legality and transparency of the
judges nominating procedure  in common courts. Instead, this is
the Parliament itself that has voted amendments to the law chang-
ing the procedure of nominating judges and allowing the President
to set  the judicial system under his control. As result, more than 50
judges in Moldova have been removed from their offices or have not
been reconfirmed in their functions40. The Parliament is having a
number of direct leverages of influencing the justice at its highest
levels since the Parliament nominates the president, the vice-presi-
dents and magistrates of the High Court of Justice. The parliament
also approves the financial resources of the courts and these re-
sources are included in the state budget. Besides, the parliament
nominates the candidature of the general public prosecutor who is
proposed by the President of Moldova. Lack of public control in this
realm leaves the Parliament too much room for politically inspired
nominations and dismissals of the general prosecutors. It is not
therefore surprising that the judiciary budget for 2003, despite the
inflation growth and decline of the national currency, dropped as
compared to 2001 by  10%, while all the other executive branches
increased their expenditure by 20% at least.
The example of the former general prosecutor, Victor Rusu, dis-
missed on December 4, 2003 by the Parliament for ‘not having
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stopped illegal street protests of the opposition” is a telling ex-
ample of  how the ruling party is increasing its pressures on Judi-
ciary. A new General Prosecutor coming from the position of the
Security Services (former KGB) was confirmed on the same date
without serious debates on the spot. With several professionals
being ignored or repressed by the power, one may see that any
confirmation leaves enough room to suspect that political condi-
tioning and strong dependence on a series of pay-offs are clearly
the price to be paid by those who are employed today by the state
authorities, most of them being among the most intensively politi-
cized. Opposition and independent press report many MPs in
Moldova to abuse their positions and obstruct the process of jus-
tice and prosecuting criminals41. To quote only the most scandal-
ous example of influence, Press Secretary of the General Prosecu-
tor Office has been dismissed, in March 2003, by the general pros-
ecutor for having disclosed a letter addressed by the vice-chair-
man of the Parliament, in which, the MP “suggested” Prosecutor
to stop the inquiry against a policeman. The press secretary’s duty
of providing information to the public was vociferously qualified
as “position abusing” and fire, while no single action against the
top-legislative official was initiated.
Parties in Parliament: the ruling party
and the opposition
Parliaments are mirrors of the society and party systems that
give rise to their role in the governance debate. Winston Churchill
once called parliament the “workshop of democracy” and it is
widely acknowledged, that legislatures play a crucial role in build-
ing up the format of representative democracies, especially in the
emerging democracies. Legislatures express the will and prefer-
ences of the people and transform those in to policy, building up
transparent channels of communication with the public, through
which conventional voters may have a voice in influencing the
politics of their representatives. Among the most debated issues
of the Parliament after 2002 was the European integration. For
years, this issue was considered to be the natural fief of the ‘pro-
European’ democratic parties, and suddenly, when the Commu-
nist ruling party announced it as a ‘strategic and the most funda-
mental choice it made for the country’, it made a great deal of
confusion amongst traditional electorate of the CPM42. But, Par-
liaments are not as homogenous as they are sometimes portrayed,
having their own cycles, complexities, and critical stages43. The
political reality in most countries, however, is different and unique,
making the legislatures to be highly fragmented in political terms.
Parliamentarians frequently vote dividedly on most issues, as they
are driven by party interest and regional or issue-related inter-
ests. In addition, the parliamentary political parties who are rep-
resented in government are not so keen to oversee too critically
their counterparts in the government.
 Small as it is, Moldova boasts a high number of political par-
ties. Fifty parties and political movements were officially regis-
tered at the time of 1998 parliamentary elections, but with only 4
parties penetrating into the Parliament. Two years later on the
eve of the anticipated general elections, in February 2001, only 3
parties out of 33 officially registered succeeded to overcome the
election threshold, thus, suggesting that the political spectrum is
evolving by rationalizing political actors. Exploring the changing
role of the parliaments, one shall regard therefore the political
parties from a 3-sided perspective: historical, conjuncture with
party systems and the current role of parliaments in the gover-
nance debate. A general analysis of political events being carried
out in Moldova in the last three years lead us to the conclusion
that from the point of view of institutional and democratic perfor-
mances registered by its Parliament, nowadays Moldova is even
much more distinguishable in a negative way from other Euro-
pean countries than how it was till 2001. What is most surprising
is the fact that while the underlying legal conditions of parlia-
mentary democracy are not largely dissimilar from those of other
transitional countries, the observance of legal provisions as real
practices in Moldova is significantly worse than in countries of
Central Europe. From another part, Moldova is narrowing the gap
with countries like Ukraine, Belarus and Russia; after an opti-
mistic and assuring start in late 1990s when the central authori-
ties of nominated countries were criticized for’ degeneration of
their democratic performances’.
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The party systems analysis focuses on parliaments because they
are the source from where governments originate, in technical
terms the “principals” who select their “agents”. According to the
traditional literature two party systems generate single party gov-
ernments where the parliament is reduced into a rubberstamp of
government’s activities, while multiparty systems generate more
influential parliaments. In comparative politics, the party sys-
tem of a country plays a crucial role in understanding the politics
of the country. Beginning with Duverger (1951), the party system
has traditionally been connected with other significant features
of the country, either as a cause or an effect. With respect to the
effects of the party system on coalition formation, Duverger’s ar-
gument was straightforward: two-party systems give the major-
ity to a single party, and consequently produce stable governments
that dominate parliament; multi-party systems generate coalition
governments that can lose votes in parliament (including confi-
dence votes), and are consequently weak and unstable.
Studies assessing the transitional governance show that typi-
cally there is a natural temptation of the executive power to con-
trol the agenda of the legislative house. This is happening fre-
quently even in the most traditional parliamentary political sys-
tems. For instance, in more than 50% of all countries, governments
introduce more than 90% of the bills. Moreover, the probability of
success of these bills is very high: over 60 percent of bills pass
with  a probability greater than 90%. The situation in Moldova is
very much similar. Only 10-15% of the drafts that are included on
parliamentary agenda belong in fact to the political fractions or
individual deputies, including those of the opposition, while the
lion’s share of the laws originate from the Government or Presi-
dent. It is to be mentioned that this situation is not totally due to
the fact that there is a deficit of legislative initiatives; in fact,
there are plenty of ideas and drafts of the laws submitted or pro-
moted by the law-makers in the Moldovan Parliament. However,
rarely the drafts that are submitted by the opposition are accepted
by the Permanent Office to be considered as legislative initiatives.
Ostrow’s comparative institutional design confirms the pre-
sumption of many political scientists that parties are essential
for legislative consensus building. However, it also reveals that
parties may have paradoxical effects on a legislature’s perfor-
mance. The Moldovan Parliament has 101 members elected by
universal suffrage for a four-year term. The term can be extended
in case of such exceptional events as war or natural disasters.
Parliament is legally constituted only after the Constitutional Court
validates two thirds of elected MP mandates. In case of an alleged
violation of electoral legislation, the Constitutional Court, on pro-
posal of the Central Electoral Commission, decides on validation
of the MP mandates.
Parliament meets in two ordinary sessions per year. The first
session starts in February and May not extend beyond the end of
July. The second session starts in September and lasts until the
end of December. The chairman of the Parliament, the President
of Moldova or at least one third of elected MPs may require ex-
ceptional or special sessions to be called. Parliamentary leader-
ship in Moldova is composed of the chairman of the Parliament
and two vice-chairmen. The chairman is elected by the majority
of elected MPs but, interestingly, is dismissed by two thirds of
elected MPs. Vice-chairmen are proposed to the Parliament by
the chairman after consultations with political factions and they
are elected by simple majority. In order to create working bod-
ies, to keep the political activity of the legislative and to carry
out the electoral programs of political formations represented in
the Parliament, the MPs may constitute themselves in parlia-
mentary factions. In accordance with the provisions of the Law
on Parliament Internal Regulations, parliamentary factions can
be constituted by at least 5 MPs. Since the criteria of establish-
ing this minimal threshold are not obvious, the latter constraint
may be judged as being purely subjective and limiting democratic
rights of elected MPs. Currently there are 3 political factions in
the parliament and a group of 8 independent MPs. The three
political factions as of December 2003 were:
 Party of Communists (PCRM)
PCRM has acquired 71 mandates, out of which 3 were vacant
after some of the PCRM deputies were appointed in a number of
key-executive positions of the Tarlev Cabinet, Auditing Chamber.
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Curiously those 9 representatives of the PCRM are officially listed
by the communist faction as being “with no membership of the
Communist party”. With so many representatives in the Parlia-
ment, the PCRM is indisputably the ‘owner’ of a strategic position
in the legislative process, having enough resources to initiate and
adopt any desirable by the party’s leadership political aim, and
even, change the Constitutional format as they would please, eas-
ily bypassing any eventual attempt of the opposition to dispute
the legislative amendments proposed by the PCRM. Because of
the  fact that most of the drafts of the law and amendments are
usually produced outside the Parliament, being channeled from
the Government or Presidency, and considering the exemplary
party discipline of the Communist fraction, the PCRM is frequently
complaining that the opposition is in fact ‘melting its games’. As a
result, this sense of ‘legislative supremacy’ makes PCRM to op-
pose restlessly open debates, while making every effort to exploit
fully its voting advantages. The average age of the PCRM is 54,7
years. Out of 71 deputies of the PCRM 8 are women (11,26%). Pro-
fessional composition of the PCRM is the following: 9 deputies are
lawyers, 9 economists, 13 are school teachers, 18 agronomist, 16
engineers and 6 - other professions.
Alliance “Moldova Noastra44” (AMN)
Aliance Moldova Noastra is known also as the former Social-
Democrat Alliance or former “Braghis Alliance”, being registered
after the February 2001 Elections with 28 deputies from its part.
Thanks to its second position (although at a very long distance
from the 71-seats of the CPRM, they’ve got also a position of the
Vice chairman of the Commission on Economy). In the last 3 years,
however, an intense circulation of deputies occurred from the main
2 oppositional parties: the CDPP lost 1 deputy, while the Braghis
Alliance lost 8, and therefore, the current AMN has only 11 man-
dates today, with the rest leaving the fraction and becoming inde-
pendent candidates. In the fall of 2003, the Braghis Alliance re-
named itself, as the party merged with other parties in creating,
apparently, the largest oppositional centrist force in the Republic
of Moldova. The actual leadership of the Parliament then contested
the decision to rename the fraction on the basis of the existing
Regulation that does not allow fractions to be renamed, which
provoked the Alliance to vehemently protest against ‚abuses’ and
send complaints to the Council of Europe. The Alliance is repre-
sented by 12 deputies, including 1 woman.  There are 6 econo-
mists, 3 engineers, 1 agronomist and 1 zootehnician. Among other
7 deputies that left their previous fractions is only 1 woman.
Christian Democrat Popular Party (CDPP)
It has 11 seats, out of which 1 is currently vacant. On its turn,
the CDPP has only 1 woman out of 11 deputies. The party is per-
haps the oldest party in the Republic of Moldova, being at the
outset of the creation of the state. At the end of ’90s, it emerged
more as a coalition of ‘informal’ individuals and organizations that
contested the Soviet regime, and gradually, acquired public reso-
nance, new leaders, resources that assisted them to gain in the ’89
a significant part of influence over the state institutions. With
the recession of the Communist Party, being banned as result of
the August 1991 ‘coup d’etat’ in Moscow, the Popular Front en-
tered into the vertigo of setting up the first non-communist Gov-
ernment, but later on, its influence decreased  as a result of the
radicalization of its leadership, and the consolidation of the cen-
trist-left Agrarian Party. The average age of the CDPP is 46 years.
Professional background of the CDPP fraction is: 3 journalists, 2
economists, 2 schoolteachers, 2 university professors and 2 of other
professions.
Parties play the dominant role in the political process in
Moldova and this is explained often in the proportional election
system and a high threshold for independent candidates that are
clearly disadvantaged. It has been stated that the stability of the
political regime depends on the framework of decision-making
(unanimity, qualified or majority voting, number of seats, cohe-
sion, ideological positions of parties), making the parties to trans-
late their interests and behavior into a kind of player constella-
tion, which is a vital condition for the political regime. According
to the traditional literature 2-party systems usually generate
single party governments, while multiparty systems generate more
influential parliaments. There are three possible configurations
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underlying the relationship between government and parliament,
minimum winning coalitions (which are the textbook case), over-
sized governments (i.e., governments that include more parties
than necessary to form a majority) and minority governments (i.e.,
governments not supported by a majority). These categories are
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive forms of govern-
ment in parliamentary systems. Of course, they still are mandated
with a complex multiple function in policy formulation, interest
representation and administrative oversight on the implementa-
tion of the national legislation. But in spite of the evidence, they
have perhaps even a greater role in concealing or failing to recon-
cile the differences between the opposition and party in power,
and when they cannot accomplish that, deep political crisis take
place. The party systems analysis focuses on the legislative cham-
bers / parliaments, mainly because they are the most legitimate
source from where governments originate, in technical terms the
“principals” who select their “agents”.
The Communist party’s victory in 2001 had a tremendous im-
pact on the political system. The factual evidence testimony that
a supermajority rule changed the functioning of the multiparty
system into a bi-party system, in which the parliamentary rule
has been converted into a majoritarian rule, where the ‘alien’ par-
ties or formations are almost excluded in fact from the decision-
making process, while the genuine source of decisions reside strik-
ingly outside the parliamentary system where the most impor-
tant decisions of the super-dominant Party of Communists were
taken. From the outset of the new legislature in 2001, it became
clear that the super-dominant political majority of the CPRM will
not be interested to compromise its position with the tiny minor-
ity of ‘nationalists’ (a nick-name which is frequently sentenced to
the Christian-democrats), as well as with centrists (former
‘komsomol’ off -springs, as they are pejoratively labeled). The Par-
liament turned into a bi-party ‘win-all’ system that incorporated
all the violence, hostility and disdain towards the values of par-
ticipatory democracy, that apparently were suppressed for so long
in some marginal elite. In March 2001, the CPRM leader, Vladimir
Voronin, stated clearly and shortly:
‘no need for coalition-building; we do have 71 mandates, they
have nothing. As a result of the elections there the center of the
political system collapsed, it does not exist anymore! These small
children from the komsomol, Braghis and Co. failed down, no need
to pick them out’45
Considering the fact that the acting President of the country is,
at the same time, the First Secretary of the CPRM, one may con-
clude that the supremacy of power shifted to the Presidential of-
fice, which overrules any attempt to dispute his formal and infor-
mal powers. Although the Cabinet has been preserved till now, most
of the Ministers have been sacked by the President, having this
competence inherited from the previous semi-presidential system
of authorities. Thus, the political system is functioning as a two-
chamber Parliament (Chamber of Deputies and Chamber of Lords),
with the exception that in Moldova, there is the Presidency com-
pleting the role of the Lord, having an overwhelming influence on
the legislative and executive branches, intertwined with several
deputies of the majoritarian fraction appointed to the top-leader-
ship positions of the Government. When Duverger discusses the
number of parties in the party system he is referring to the number
of significant parties in a country’s parliament. Classical theories
are challenged however with facts that often expand beyond the
conventional format, and this is the case of the sovereignty in
Moldova. A country might have the most perfect democracy inter-
nally, but enjoy little real self-government if most of the decisions
that matter for the life of its citizens are taken beyond its borders.
Such a situation has been called the “hollowing out” of democracy.
A comfortable majority (71 out of 101-seats Parliament) allows
Communists (CPM) to pursue a rather decisive implementation of
their own objectives and ideological predilections, having almost
excluded inter-party negotiations with the rest of the parties. In
fact, decisive decisions are clearly taken outside of the Parliament,
within the triumvirate of the Communist Central Committee which
is led by the same President Voronin, and this has led to several
political troubles and unease that culminated with a deep political
crisis in 2002. The crisis started in January 2002 with some street
rallies of the Christian Democrat Popular Party (CDPP) and ended
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up only by the end of April. The political deadlock came to an end
only as a result of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe’s The (PACE) intervention to secure a peaceful resolution
of the conflict. The PACE has adopted on April 27, 2002 a Resolu-
tion on functioning of democratic institutions in Moldova’, that
brought both the ruling party and protesters at a Round-table where
they were coached to settle their mutual antagonism.
The Moldovan opposition so far has no self-sufficient mecha-
nisms of making the ruling party  act in a democratic way. There-
fore, its leaders voiced out their concerns in the PACE, and ac-
cused the CPM of violating political pluralism and human rights.
They drew the Council of Europe (CoE) attention to the fact that
previous Resolutions of PACE (adopted in April and September,
2002) were not fulfilled satisfactory by the Government and, there
is a strong need to reform the existing frameworks for political
dialogue. They also blamed the draft Law on political parties, as
well as the ruling CPM for ‚dictatorship’, presenting evidence of
steps aimed to ban the opposition, as well as its temptations to
ignore earlier reached commitments with Parliamentary Assem-
bly of the Council of Europe and other stakeholders.
To avoid the risk of plunging into a new wave of strikes, Presi-
dent Vladimir Voronin announced in February 2003 that the reg-
istration of political parties will be suspended till November 2003,
and sacked one of his personal protégé (Minister of Justice, Ion
Morei). However, in February 2003 the CPM tried to initiate a
new series of amendments to the Electoral Code with the goal to
prohibit the re-election of those who were elected 2 consecutive
times. The amendments were obviously aiming to ban the elec-
toral participation of Serafim Urecheanu, the main non-commu-
nist competitor for the position of the mayor of Chisinau, the capi-
tal of Moldova. The dynamics of party competition in a moderate
pluralist political system is similar to the two-party system: 2
coalitions compete for office, one of them wins, and both coalitions
are close to the ideological center. In contrast, polarized plural-
ism includes a party that occupies the center and is opposed by
bilateral oppositions on its left and its right.
These oppositions are ideologically extreme and/or include anti-
system parties. According to Sartori, the dividing line between
moderate and extreme pluralism is “around” five parties. From his
discussion, it becomes clear that the cutoff point is an empirical
regularity, not a theoretical argument. In Moldova, however, we do
face a system that can be called ‘suppressed pluralism by great
majority party’. Some simple statistics suggests  that a political
continuum of parties, in which the leading/great party not only domi-
nates and rules the game, but attempts to exclude the rest of the
parties into the margins of the politics jeopardize the very founda-
tions of the political system. The model of ‘suppressed pluralism by
a great majority party’ is not unique, but it is equally not European.
MEASURING INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS
OF PARLIAMENTARIAN RULE
SELF-PERCEPTION AND OUTSIDE PERCEPTION
The task of measuring the ‘parliamentarian rule’ in Moldova is
challenging us with several difficulties. First of all, it should evalu-
ate the material/constitutional difference in which the Parliament
has acquired (after 2000) a leading role within the format of the
other powers of state, and its particular role in shaping up state
policies on the sole responsibility of the mandate received from the
electors. On the other hand, one shall agree upon the imminent dif-
ficulty in assessing the difference between the ‘material’ reality of
the Parliament in a parliamentary regime with the ‘subjective’ value
owing to the public perception, which is often penalizing public in-
stitutions for their own internal disputes, confusions or hesitations.
But, in spite of its ‘public visibility’, the positive image of the Par-
liament is frequently challenged with a very low level of trust, un-
dermining the role it should play for the country. Finally, a third
perspective owns to the fact that constitutional changes did not
alter the practices that allow executives to play even a greater role
in the new institutional circumstances, and thus, an indirectly-
elected President is propelled in the fore of controlling the Parlia-
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mentary majority in spite of the constitutional amendments.
While assessing institutional performances, top-ranked officials
abound in rhetoric emphasizing of  their special ‘abilities’, ‘role’,
and comparative prevalence over their political contenders. When
top-officials comment on their institutional performances, they usu-
ally argue their relative numerical superiority of the laws adopted.
Moreover, they are inclined to believe that performances of the Par-
liament can be measured by the increasing number of laws adopted
and the number of meetings of the MPs with their electors’.
‘Figures show that between 2001 and 2002, the Parliament
adopted 1.597  legislative acts, including 607 laws. Our effective-
ness is clearly much higher if one would compare them with the
number of laws adopted by the previous Parliament, which adopted
only 766 decisions and 230 laws’46 (E.Ostapciuc).
‘Parliament’s activities are generally positive. Many problems
were resolved, particularly; most of the election promises of the
Communist Party have been accomplished. As such, the elimina-
tion of salary and pension arrears, returning to rayons were fully
implemented, and now, every MP is responsible for a concrete
rayon’ (Valeriu Burca).
The opposition views on the legislature performances are strik-
ingly different:
‘The Parliament did not fulfilled its constitutional functions, but
mainly accomplished the orders and tasks that the ruling party
received from the President, and adopted some laws inter alia. For
instance, every year the Government shall report its own activities
before the Parliament, but this never happened since 2001. Govern-
mental reshuffles are never discussed, and even the majority frac-
tion hardly know anything about what may happen in the Cabinet
of Ministers which is entirely at the President’s disposal47’ (I.Gutu)
‘I think that this is the most ineffective Parliament since 1991.
Quality of the legislative process is below any level of critics, and
this situation grew several protests from the civil society, political
parties, as well as of international organizations. The fact is that
the majority fraction has installed an atmosphere of secretomania
coupled by lack of transparency. Funds are abusively managed,
while the largest problems of society are neglected’
(V.Cubreacov)48.
Second after the number of laws adopted or prepared, MPs see
their ‘meetings with the voters’ as the most important role of the
Parliamentarians. Legislating means law-making and this is the
primary task of a Parliament. In order to increase its effectiveness
it would mean to increase  the number of  working sessions of the
Parliament, this would be shown to the voters that parliamentar-
ians dedicate more time and efforts than they do in the present.
Another proposal would be to provide the right for legislative ini-
tiative to extra-parliamentary parties, thus, more ideas and alter-
native options would be brought to the legislature, coupled with
public hearings on  legislative acts., regularly held by the secretary
of the staff. Standing committees and public hearings may repre-
sent a major incentive for the reformation of the legislative process.
It is clear from several discussions that were held in the focus groups
that the legislature is recognized as a hermetic, non-transparent
and unpredictable body. Thus, NGO representatives stated that:
‘Parliament’s image has been elapsed because of the governance
mistakes. Most of the decisions are taken in a Byzantine way; par-
liamentary hearings are more than rare, while independent experts
are never consulted. It appears that MPs show rarely in public.
There are no weekly press conferences that would shed light into
the legislative process, which increases the split with the rest of the
society’ .. Thus, during the last 3 years of activity, out of 2,182 legis-
lative acts (including 900 new laws and 1,282 decisions )were
adopted, in  comparison  with the previous Parliament of XIV ses-
sion that adopted in a similar period of time 1,440 legislative acts.
Some of the MPs have never spoken in the house, hiding their in-
competence behind the party discipline and group solidarity. The
Bolshevik’s thesis that every cook could become a state leader has
became true through the example of the speaker
49
.
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LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY
Usually, the responsibility of deputies islimited by the party hier-
archy. This makes the opposition to be neglected by the majoritarian
rule, while the former proposals are usually ignored increasing the
crisis between the opposition and power.
The democratic legitimacy of a system is generally evaluated
through the parameters of accountability and representation. Low
legitimacy in any lawmaking procedure is commonly traced back
to a lack of participation by the citizens in the making of the laws
they will abide by. According to classical theories on democracy,
democratic legitimacy is the main feature of parliamentary sys-
tems, wherein public government is exercised by “the people”
through elected representatives. It has been largely observed in
recent times however that two other sources of legitimacy, beyond
parliamentary representation, have increasingly become relevant
in a democratic discourse: the functional articulation of interests
of society into the political system and the ability to effectively
deliver stability and welfare (“effectiveness”).
TABLE 2. TO WHAT EXTENT, DO YOU CONSIDER THAT OTHER OPINIONS ARE CON-
SULTED BY THE PARLIAMENT, (FOR INSTANCE, OF NGOS, INDEPENDENT EXPERTS)
WHILE ADOPTING LEGISLATION:
Three such components (parliamentary representation of in-
terests, functional representation and effectiveness) are usually
combined and attributed different weights in the various politi-
cal systems. This is confirmed by the poll in which respondents
still place a higher level of trust in the President rather than in
Parliament, which is over scored only by Church (81,2%) and lo-
cal authorities (49,8%) in 2004, a rating which remains almost
with no radical changes from 2000.
TABLE 3. LEVEL OF TRUST IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
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Most of the analysts of human rights, development and statis-
tical backgrounds use the definitions and theoretical approaches
on good governance and democratization that have been developed
within their fields. This can result in incompatible approaches.
The motivation and mandates of the stakeholders tend to differ.
Representatives of donor organizations may highlight concerns
different from those of the participants from developing countries
who emphasize the need in increased ownership.
The design of indicators depends on whether the data should
assist in implementing national strategies or whether cross-coun-
try comparability is desired. Respondents blame the fact that leg-
islation is not implemented: 55,5%, while those that refute this state-
COMPLETELY DIFFICULT TO AGREE/
DISAGREE ANSWER COMPLETELY
/DON’T AGREE AGREE
a. Civil society is actively 55,1 29,9 15,1
consulted when a new bill is
adopted and a decision is made
b. There are few cases of consulting 17,1 36,9 45,9
other opinions than those on which
the present power is leaning on
c. Only those NGOs 15,3 48,8 35,8
which don’t criticize the present
power decisions are consulted
d. There are no well established 11,2 40,0 48,9
procedures for civil society
consulting in parliament
e. Consulting is necessary but in 7,5 23,4  69
the present time is not used
2002 2003 2004
Church 77.9 78.3 81.2
State printed mass media 46,6 43.8
State electronic mass media 52.9 48.1
Private printed mass media
(i.e.party-based, commercial) 32.2 29.1
Private mass media 40.7 32.4
NGOs 32.9 27.3
Police 29.7 41.1 31.1
Government of Moldova 37.4 49.3 39.8
Political parties 26.8 31.4 25.4
Parliament 34.5 44.0 34.0
Presidency 41.1 53.9 42.1
Justice 31.1 43.7 35.4
Local authorities 41.1 50.9 49.8
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ment - 22,4% are somehow balanced by those who ‘don’t know’. Even
larger is the number of those respondents who do not believe it is
possible that citizens may participate in the preparation of the drafts
of the law - 59.4%, with 12,9% admitting it. Still, respondents be-
lieve that it plays a huge role in ensuring constitutional rights and
liberties - 33,5%, but with 33,8% that negatively assess this respon-
sibility, and 32,7% who don’t know. Yet, one could easily notice that
the number of people thinking that they can not influence the im-
portant decisions in public life has decreased by almost 10% as com-
pared to the year 2002, as shown in chart 5.1.
While assessing the factor that mostly influences the legislative
process, 46,8% of the respondents say that the ‘general state inter-
ests’ dominates it, while the opposite is true for 25,7%. People say
however that the Presidential influence is the largest factor – with
60,6%, as against 16,1% disagreeing with that. 62% of the respon-
dents say however that the Parliament ‘owes’ its situation to the
‘majority party ruling’, which is only slightly exceeding the rating
provided to the Governmental influence, and this is even less dis-
puted as an argument.
Respondents do not believe that the politicians have sufficient
qualification to conduct an effective legislative work. Thus, 53,5%
of the polled respondents do not share the opinion that the acting
MPs have enough experience and knowledge to adopt adequate
laws, while the opposite is supported by 19%, while 27,6% don’t
know. Similarly, they do not trust that civic society is consulted
by the parliament in the law-making process (55,1%). Only 15,1%
of the respondents believe that  there is some sort of consultation.
69% of the respondents believe that a key-condition for the effec-
tive law-making is the capacity to involve more consultation, which
is not a practice today - 69%, against 7,5% who disputed it. Speak-
ing about the professional statute of the MPs, respondents do not
trust they are qualified enough – 64,6%.
THE INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS
A procedural definition of democracy, made most notably by Rob-
ert Dahl (1971) in Polyarchy, includes two dimensions that are in-
ter-linked with the social demands for contestation and participa-
tion in the public sphere. Contestation captures the uncertain peace-
ful competition necessary for democratic rule, a principle presumed
as sine-qua-non elements of the regime: legitimacy of the opposi-
tion, right to challenge incumbents, protection of the twin freedoms
of expression and association, free and fair elections, and a dynamic
political party system.
Participation captures the idea of popular sovereignty, which
presumes the protection of the right to vote as well as the exist-
ence of universal suffrage. But, in addition to the above mentioned
aspects of procedural democracy, it incorporates also a number of
aspects that institutionalizes it. Like the procedural definition,
the institutional dimension of democracy evolves on the idea of
popular sovereignty, and includes notions of accountability, con-
straint of leaders, representation of citizens, and universal par-
ticipation. The rights dimension is upheld by the rule of law, and
includes civil, political, property, and minority rights.
CHART 1. PUBLIC PERCEPTION ON POSSIBILITIES TO INFLUENCE DECISION MAKING
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Accountability
The accountability of rulers is described as being a crucial fea-
ture of any democratic system. According to Schmitter and Karl,
the term “democracy” can be referred to a “regime or system of
governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions
in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the com-
petition and cooperation of their representatives”. The need for
‘accountability’, in general, is more often presented as a capabil-
ity of subjects exercising public functions to be held responsible
for their actions; therefore it implies, in political terms, the prob-
lem of ‘citizen’s control’ over the actors deliberating on public is-
sues. The Constitution (art.65 part 1) stipulates that ‘sessions of
the Parliament are public’. But, in reality, every session may be
declared closed to the public if the political majority of the Parlia-
ment will decide that the subject discussed may be unwise to reach
mass media, and therefore, create additional public pressure. To
declare a session ‘closed’ for the public can be done if a specific
decision will be taken by the legislature, and this decision has to
be motivated. In fact, the decisions are usually fully conflicting
with the Law on access to public information, and Law on state
secret, leaving a broad space for the politicians to restrict non-
parliamentarian actors to get necessary information on the de-
bated topics. As a rule, constitutional provisions are blatantly ig-
nored while attitudes of the officials in charge with the access of
visitors to the plenary or extraordinary sessions of the Parliament
are hindering.  Applications to receive credentials to attend any
session of the Parliament are issued only to a specific set of out-
lets, or TV channels, while applications to get access to the legis-
lative sessions are permitted only through a standard procedure
which begins with at least 20 days ahead of the specific session.
No facilities are provided to NGOs, Church representatives, trade
unions, or conventional citizens who are, most probably, ‘better
preferred at their working places’,  where MPs are showing their
‘achievements’.
Generally, the attitudes are negative if not visibly hostile to
the public attendance. All visitors shall apply for credentials ‘at
least one month before the public event is scheduled’, and even in
case of conformity with this procedures (that are not publicly ad-
vertised, but only explained at the request by the officials), one
cannot be sure that he will get right in time to the session as there
are security regimes that are posted at the reception that will not
allow visitors to go to their places. Equally, visitors invited by
individual MPs cannot attend the sessions of the Parliament, and
special interdictions are enforced by military personnel in front
of the session’s hall. The official explanation for the shortage of
permits, as well as for the ‘militarization’ and obscurity of the
whole process of attending the sessions is often explained by the
limited capacity of the available places. This is however untrue.
Usually, most of the seats for visitors are empty, and therefore,
people get frustrated because of the ‘double-standard language’
replicating in fact specific instructions received by staff from the
political leadership. Often, this is an effective tool to reject re-
quests from the mass media and NGOs on the basis that they are
not specified  on the parliamentary agenda.
MPs cannot invite their staff or invitees to attend the sessions
if they were not accredited beforehand and the decision is taken
sometimes only by the highest official of the Parliament, Speaker
of the House, whose political views and/or interests usually pre-
vail over the general standards of democratic criteria and trans-
parency. It is rather difficult for the general public to attend the
session, particularly when the issues debated in the legislative
INSTITUTIONAL STABILITY TRADITIONS
Overall stability of the Trust/confidence
gov.bodies
Accountability/ Absence/ Enlighted understanding
Effectiveness or abundance of conflicts of democratic norms
Representativeness Political violence Use or abuse of
power/traditions of
authoritarian rule
Responsiveness/ Social, linguistic, Inclusiveness of the
Transparency ideological, confessional political system
or inter-ethnic strife
Checks and balances Minority rights and
representation
Integrity and supervision Lack of vested interests
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house are bound on social sensitive themes, or when mass media
is searching for statistical evidence or political arguments on the
policies that became of top-interest. Even within the project of
Democratic Audit Moldovan experts faced a lot of obstacles in ob-
taining the free access to public sessions. In 2004, there were sev-
eral cases in which national mass media could not receive creden-
tials to attend to the plenary sessions of the Parliament, being
refused to apply. On July 7, the Supreme Court of Justice exam-
ined the application of the TIMPUL Magazine against the Parlia-
mentary staff that refused to provide them with records of ple-
nary sessions of the summer 200251. The argument invoked in court
by the Parliament’s representative was that records of the parlia-
mentary sessions are considered to be confidential, therefore any
information on this subject is strictly limited, and only other MPs,
parliamentary staff and ministers could be allowed to use them.
Mass media contested both the interdiction to access session’s
records and also that the Internal Regulation has never been pub-
lished in Monitorul Oficial.
Article 34 on the right of access to information places both the
state and the private media under the duty “to ensure that correct
information reaches the public opinion” (#4).  Such a requirement
can also be found in Article 1 of the 1994 Press Law, which provides
that the state guarantees everyone the right to “truthful informa-
tion from periodicals and press agencies”.  The constitutional duty
of the media to disseminate only “accurate” information and the
power of the state to prescribe what is or is not “accurate” is re-
flected in the ordinary legislation imposing the burden of the truth
proof on the journalists. These provisions –which are contrary to
the good faith and public interest defense as defined by the case
law of the European Court – have a potentially chilling effect on the
media, which can lead to self-censorship. In 2000, the Parliament
adopted a good Law on access to information. The law should con-
tribute to improving the quality of public life in the country. But
most of the public officers ignore this Law which remains also largely
unknown to the public. Not surprisingly, therefore only 17,9% of
respondents say that the Parliament is ‘open and transparent’, as
opposed to  49,8% saying the contrary, with 32,2% having no an-
swer at all.
Article 32 of the Constitution guarantees the freedom of opin-
ion and expression. Surprisingly, this right is guaranteed to “citi-
zens” only, excluding foreigners and stateless persons  (paragr.
1).  The text further provides for content-based restrictions and
places freedom of expression below other rights or interests:  “free-
dom of expression may not harm the honor, dignity, or rights of
others …” (paragr. 2), “all actions aimed at denying or slandering
the state or the people are forbidden”; “instigation to sedition …in-
citement to territorial separatism” is also prohibited (para.3). How-
ever, slander against the state is par excellence a political expres-
sion.  Criticism of the government and of its policies is at the very
core of the concept of freedom of expression as guaranteed by the
ECHR and the Strasbourg’s Court case-law (see the Lingens v.
Austria cornerstone judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 103).
Representativeness
Most of the indicators focused on ‘representation’ try to cap-
ture the extent to which elective institutions, national parliaments
and other public institutions that are managed by political elected
top-officials, accurately express public preferences. One of the two
indicators chosen to measure the degree of representativeness is
party dominance, describing how the legislature is dominated by
one or a limited number of political parties. This indicator as-
sumes that if there is a strong majority fraction that dominates
undisputedly over the rest of small parties, then there are consid-
erable public unrest, policy frustrations and large segments of the
populations remaining without effective representation. A party
dominance index has been internationally accepted because of its
simplicity. It allows to divide the size of the legislative body by
the number of seats held by the largest party and multiply by 100,
thus, the index ranges between 100 – ‘full control’, in other words,
all legislative seats belong to a totalitarian party, multiplied by
100, a figure which varies from country to country52.
The smaller the number of seats of the largest party, the higher
the index score, is signifying diminishing dominance and better
representation. Of course, there are exceptional cases in which, in
spite of the obvious statistical domination of one large party, all
citizens enjoy a relatively well-established formal representation,
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although, as a general rule, the likelihood of conflicts when a strong
party dominates the legislative chamber is much documented. Sub-
stantial changes occurred in the Moldova since 1989, when the
first Parliament was elected in circumstances of the incipient plu-
ralist social groups. Party dominance increased in 1994, with the
Agrarian Democratic Party winning a majority of seats in the leg-
islative chamber incorporating other three parties (Unitatea
Edinstvo, CDPP and DFP), and decreasing in 1998 to a slim alli-
ance of forces (51 deputies) vis-à-vis the emerging Communist party
(40 seats). The erosion of the ADR (Alliance for Democracy and
Reform) and the continuous stalemate between the Parliamentary
parties and President Lucinschi has paved the way towards a deep
political crisis in 1999, a non-confidence vote to the acting Gov-
ernment, and then, when the legislature was unable to confirm a
new Prime Minister because of the acid confrontation between the
Communist opposition and the ruling (but disintegrating alliance),
elections appeared as inevitable. Erosion of political parties and
legislative process is truly a significant factor in the instability of
the political system, but the experience that has been registered
in Moldova shows brilliantly that no super-dominant party would
be a recipe in this sense.
It is stated that representativeness of parliaments can be
achieved by conducting fair, free and democratic elections53. But
this is only the first and foremost condition which does not guar-
antee that the legislatures will remain (if they were at the time of
their foundation!) representative for during the whole duration of
their mandates; therefore, in addition to the formal/procedural
understanding of representation, Parliaments should fit to a num-
ber of criteria that are often described as being of functional rel-
evance to the law-making process. The functional representation
of interests has mainly been expressed, as partially discussed
above, in the two forms of corporatism (and this especially in some
small European countries with a reduced fragmentation in sec-
tors and greater cultural homogeneity) and lobbying schemes (US
model). If, at national level, the emergence of direct functional rep-
resentation of interests has increasingly taken place in the last
decades as a supplement to strong parliamentary systems, at EC
level such representation has played a strong role. The widespread
tendency to stress the significance of effectiveness of the legisla-
ture has led to a significant delegation of decision-making power
to informal groups and organizations (with the consequent reduc-
tion of the parliamentary role), giving rise to the phenomenon of
what has been named the “post-parliamentary or organic democ-
racy”. Parliaments can be made ‘more representative’ according
to a number of criteria that cannot be ever completed, for instance:
each party’s share of the votes cast for its election, geographic dis-
tribution, and other social characteristics.
Almost immediately after the elections of February 2001, oppo-
sition raised the question of biased political representation of the
Parliament. There were some arguments supporting their skepti-
cism. In addition to the irregularities registered in elections, which
were minor according to the international observers, concerns were
raised because of the effects of the election system. Indeed, be-
cause of the peculiarities of Moldovan electoral system it comes
out that the PCRM is over-represented in the Parliament. More
exactly, while gathering 50.07% of the poll at general elections of
February 2001, the majority faction has 71 of 101 seats (70.3%).
Moreover, only 67.52% of the population included in electoral lists
participated in 2001 parliamentary elections, which means that
not 50.07% but only 33.4% of the population expressed their sup-
port to the current ruling party, who does not seem to realize it.
Because of the existing thresholds of 6% (for one party), 9% (for
coalitions of two parties) and 12% (for coalitions of more than two
parties) in elections as many as 14 parties and electoral coalitions
were left off the board. However these parties gathered 26.4% of
all the votes cast in elections. The ten independent candidates are
responsible for spreading other 2.3% of the votes.
It results that almost 29% of the votes expressed in February
2001 were lost for participating parties and went mainly to PCRM.
However, only very few of the parties left out are ideologically close
to PCRM. This is why the existing minimal representation thresh-
olds are subject to periodical harsh political debates in Moldova.
Many analysts and politicians representing middle and small po-
litical parties have questioned the compatibility of such high quan-
titative criteria of selection with the democratic standards that
Moldova wants to meet. The d’Hondt algorithm of attributing MPs
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mandates leads to political configurations in Parliament which are
clearly favorable to any party wining elections with a high relative
majority when a large number of political parties disperse signifi-
cant shares of votes without meeting the minimal representation
threshold. The algorithm is another issue spurring hot debates in
Moldova. The results of the Survey show however that 49% of the
respondents believe that the Parliament ‘is not representing the
whole society’, against 28,6% who affirm the opposite. The support
is heavily underpinned by ethnicity. Only 25% of the Moldovans
believe that the Parliament is truly representative to the society,
while the same opinion is supported with 42% by Russians, 40% by
Ukrainians, and other nationalities - 46%.
Secondly, there is the issue of fair representation of political par-
ties in working and steering bodies. For example, the speaker of the
Parliament is from the PCRM and so is one of the vice-speakers
while the other vice-speaker is for the time being an independent
MP (even though he was elected on the lists of AMN). Hence neither
the current AMN, nor the CDPP are effectively represented in the
leadership of the Parliament.  As for the Permanent Bureau num-
bering 11 members,  the  opposition has only one representative for
each of both, AMN and CDPP while the ruling party has 8 mem-
bers and one member is independent. It is difficult however to ap-
preciate this representation as unfair since the independent MP is
a former member of the AMN that left the faction. Generally the
structure of the Bureau is similar to political configuration of the
Parliament but on the assumption that the latter is not fair it re-
sults in the fact that no fair representation is possible in parlia-
mentary working and steering bodies. According to Internal Regu-
lations of the Parliament each Permanent Committee should con-
sist of representatives from all parliamentary factions and thus, to
reflect the political configuration of the legislative.
However not all political forces are represented in every Per-
manent Committee and not all elected MPs are actually repre-
sented in a Committee at all. Moreover, three MPs were identified
as being members of two Committees54. On the other hand, elec-
toral alliances - that would also encourage circulation of elite and
political pluralism - face similar difficulties with ever-higher voter
threshold (7% for two parties, 9% for three parties, and 11% for
four and more). Internal erosion of the parliamentary fractions
made some of the deputies leave their original parties (that mostly
assisted them to enter the legislature), whereas they have tried to
set up a group of ‘independent deputies’ (illegal according to the
acting Regulation), allowing them to vote in an opportunistic man-
ner on an ad-hoc basis.
Participation
Participation in the law-making process is an essential condi-
tion for the legislature to remain democratic and representative.
Participatory democracy is always conceived as a bottom-up, rather
than a top-down model in which civil society is enabled to give
inputs in order to shape and influence the governance of public
community. But in order to follow this model which is to some
extent embraced by most of the nations aspiring towards EU mem-
bership, public institutions must be clearly ahead in designing
effective channels of communication with citizens. For instance,
the EU Commission identifies 5 basic elements for good gover-
nance55: “openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness, co-
herence”.  Civil society participation, through organizations rep-
resentative of supranational interests, to the developments of
transnational governance, has been framed as “a means to con-
necting society to structures of governance”.
In Moldova, there are several acts that could be perceived as
satisfactory in meeting the general international standards while
setting up an adequate basis for democratic elections. A Law on
the access to public information has been adopted in 2000, follow-
ing a series of other legislative acts (Law on state secret, Law on
mass media), providing a sound regulatory framework in the coun-
try. However, more precise regulations are needed to interpret
legislation, in particular with regard to secrecy of the vote, mobile
voting, the rights of election observers, and display of voters’ lists.
For an election to be valid, the law requires that one third of the
registered voters for each electoral unit must vote, including the
voters on the supplementary lists. As the turnout requirement
also applies to repeated elections, such a provision may lead to an
endless cycle of elections if the turnout continues to be below the
threshold. The characteristic defined by participation reflects usu-
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ally a variety of aspects. On the one hand, participation is usually
documented by the voter turnout in national elections. This is
mainly because voting in elections is very important for political
participation, but also because of difficulties in measuring par-
ticipation by other indicators.
The typical approach in measuring participation is to refer to
the percentage of voters in relation to the adult population of the
country, while another tool would be to consider the existing rela-
tion between the proportion of voters and the number of regis-
tered voters. The voting rate appears in % as the number of bal-
lots counted after the voting has taken place (valid and invalid
ballots). This approach considers, as well relatively easy rules for
voting so that eligible citizens would be freely allowed to express
their election preferences.
CHART 2. VOTERS TURNOUT IN MOLDOVA
Compared with other countries, voter turnout in Moldova is
not as high as we are used to think of. The last election turnout
(67,52%) rates the country on the 23-th place, close to Bulgaria
and Israel among 37 surveyed states, where the largest level of
participation was registered in 2001 in Australia – 94% and the
lowest in Switzerland –41%. Voter participation is fluctuating as
to voters’ perception or, the so called‚ relative importance’ of elec-
tions, which usually coincides with the political or administra-
tive distinction among election campaigns. Thus, general elections
attract a larger number of voters while local elections are chal-
lenged usually with a much lower participation of voters.
Data on the voter turnout in the last decade in Moldova reveals
an alarming trend of decreasing of voters’ participation. Some of
the politicians would be inclined to see this steady decline, as a
proof of ‘normalization’ of the political life – providing the examples
of the Western democracies where low voter turnouts are largely
considered as lacking importance. But not in a poor country like
Moldova where high voter participation is an expression of insti-
tutional dynamics. Indirect measurements show however that voter
deception and low confidence in the major political players – po-
litical parties – do explain partially why voters ceased to get in-
volved in elections in Moldova. Only 4,3% of respondents do gen-
erally trust parties, while less than 1,3% of them have a member-
ship to a political party.
CHART 3. DECLINE OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS IN MOLDOVA 1989-2003
One of the most frequent remarks of the domestic and interna-
tional observers of the Moldova’s elections is the formidable chal-
lenge faced by the precinct election bodies and local administra-
tions to compile the lists with registered voters. Due to the fact
that the last public census was held in 1989 and that there are
various types of technical difficulties to update the official lists of
voters, errors range between 10% to over 30% of the number of
voters which is, of course, a substantial tool in altering the results
of every turnout, usually by the ruling party or by party loyal ac-
tivists operating at the level of bodies in charge with the election
administration. In addition to the demographic decline experi-
enced today in the country, quite a large proportion of the active
population is today considered to be outside of Moldova being em-
ployed as ‚cheap labor force’, and this economic emigration is esti-
mated today at  over 600.000  citizens.
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As soon as in  February 27, 2001 Elections the CPM gained  a
large majority of votes (less than 50% of the votes cast in elec-
tions!), the parliamentary model of governance has been infused
with a sense of authoritarian governance that simply reduced the
opposition to a totally decorative role, consistently impacting on
the democratic criteria and practices that were earlier consid-
ered as a sine-qua-non for the constitutional framework in
Moldova. The existing electoral system displays a lesser degree of
representativeness, because voters are invited to vote mainly for
party list candidates, while thresholds for independent candidates
are extremely high (4%), making individual choices to fade before
parties that clearly dominate the political landscape.
Responsiveness and transparency
Over 3,300 of citizens applied in 2003 to the Ombudsman (Par-
liamentary Attorneys) to defend their rights, registering a slight
increase as compared to 2002. The most frequent type of complain
is related to the free access to justice - over 25% of all the requests,
other complaints concerning the limitations in the rights for so-
cial assistance and protection - 20%, and over 15% - regarding the
ownership rights, 12% - also on the right to information, and 6% -
on labor violations56.
Accountability is perceived often as being exclusively related
to the meetings that deputies should have in the territories. There-
fore, acting officials of the ruling party and parliamentary leader-
ship have over scored the importance of having regular meetings
with ‚workers’ and ‚simple people’, which is of course, one of the
most important forms in making deputies responsible before their
constituencies. However, all of these actions are done at the ex-
pense of other forms of parliamentary accountability, including
the ways of making procedures easier to understand, and more
friendly for the eventual users of parliamentary information. Thus,
the only official site of the Parliament is providing  a minimum of
data and information about the key-characteristics of the acting
Parliament. It does not consist of conclusive information in the
commissions, agenda of parliamentary debates, and channels of
communicating directly with parliamentarians, etc., or even mini-
mal information concerning the parliamentary budget.
Thus, accountability understood in institutional terms is almost
a terra incognita for the Moldovan parliament. The opinion of citi-
zens concerning the legislative process is somehow divided, with
41,5% saying that the laws adopted by the Parliament reflect the
true social, economic and political issues of the society, whilst 32,7%
oppose it, and 25.1% don’t know the answer. The positive answers
are again shared by ethnic minorities and the titular (Moldovan
nationals) are more divided in their answers (yes - 37% of Moldovans,
52% of Russians, 50% of Ukrainians and 62% others).
‘In our state, laws are adopted in secret, in spite of the fact that
there are various mechanisms: conferences, publications, focus
groups, brainstormings, that could serve as a tool to collect expertise,
or involve simple citizens in improving the legal framework... Some-
times, even the MPs are not yet familiar with the legislative agenda,
and they have not any chance to acknowledge the drafts of the law’57.
It is interesting to note that 40% of the respondents believe they
can increase their influence over law-makers ‘by picketing the
Parliament’s House’, while 34.4% are categorically opposing that.
This option is however more credible to conventional citizens than
others listed. For instance, 34,9% of them believe that audiences
and debates might be a better solution to influence the law-mak-
ing machinery, as opposed to 31,2%. Definitely, political parties
are viewed by 43,4% of the respondents as natural engines to in-
fluence the law-making process. A special field for increasing par-
liamentary accountability is usually the quality of overseeing ac-
tivities of the Parliament, or the so-called – parliamentary con-
trol over the executive agencies of the Government or over those
agencies that are strictly supervised by it58.
Considerable effort should be dedicated to make the parliament
more transparent, more responsible. Neither this Law nor the De-
cision of the Parliament on administrative costs or of the person-
nel expenditures, or other material support provided to the staff
nor MPs (No.22-XV din 29.03.2001, published in the Monitorul
Oficial al RM no.42-173 of 06.04.2001) provides clarity on these
issues. For instance, the Decision stipulates in  art.1-2 only the
fact that
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‘the Parliamentary staff is approving the personnel scheme in a
number of 194 of units, in accordance with  attachments 1 and 2’,…
it stipulates also that it:
… ‘approves the organizational charter of the Parliament con-
sisting of 101 MPs, and the executive staff of the Parliament as
necessary, according to anexes’.
But, none of the mentioned annexes were ever published in
Monitorul Oficial or in other public sources. This shall begin with
the accountability of the Parliament regarding the financing of
its major activities. Due to the fact that the Parliament is funded
from the state budget it should follow the same rule as any other
public institution by placing its own budget to the scrutiny of citi-
zens. Today, its budget can be found only as a total net in the Law
of the state budget for 2004.
Access to information
On May 11, 2000 Law no. 982-XIV on access to information was
adopted. According to several NGOs, the adoption of this law was
a major breakthrough. Article 4 provides for “the right to seek,
obtain and disseminate official information”.  Article 7 lists the
many categories of restricted information: (a) state secrets, pro-
tecting the military, economic, technical-scientific, foreign policy,
intelligence, counter-intelligence and investigations activities
whose dissemination, disclosure may endanger the security of the
state; (b) confidential commercial information; (c) personal data
whose disclosure could interfere with privacy; (d) criminal or other
investigation whose disclosure could affect the fair trial or endan-
ger one’s life; (e) results of scientific research in order to ensure
the copyrights.
“State secrets” as an exception from the access to information,
are regulated by Law no. 106-XIII of May 17, 1994. Article 12 pro-
hibits that information on unlawful activities of public authori-
ties be classified, except where such disclosure threatens the na-
tional security. Unlawfulness could, therefore, be covered under
the national security umbrella.  A positive aspect refers to the
access to court against the denial of information (Article 23 of the
Law on access to information) and against the decision to classify
information as a state secret or to declassify such information (Ar-
ticle 14 of the Law on state secrets). In 2004, the Parliament has
accredited 151 journalists, which is almost 20% less than in 2003.
New accreditations are issued at the end of the year, when the
Press Office of the Parliament is announcing a short deadline for
renewing official accreditations. Usually, the Press Office is al-
lowing only 2 persons from news agencies, 1 per printed publica-
tion, and 3 to 4 individuals from the electronic media. It was stated
that if the accreditation time has expired, the official approval
takes more time than needed.
Article 140, §4 of the Criminal Code – introduced in June 2001-
punishes with imprisonment up to three years the civil servants
who violate the law on access to information if the victim’s rights
have been substantially affected and if the information requested
concerns public health, public safety or the environment. Article
199§7 of the Administrative Code – introduced in June 2001- pun-
ishes with a fine civil servants in charge of enforcement of the law
on access to information if they violate its provisions. These provi-
sions have not yet been enforced. In most of the cases, the law on
access to information is not implemented. Due to insufficient demo-
cratic education and training, or even professionalism, many jour-
nalists are reluctant to use this Law and it remains still on the
paper. The large majority of the population lacks information on
the existence of the Law and on the instruments to use it. Equally,
the experts were informed that many civil servants have never
heard of it. The public authorities apparently failed to make prepa-
rations provided by the Law, such as publicizing the basic data
about the institutions which should ensure training, copying ma-
chines, etc. Although public authorities should create their press
units, many of them have reportedly failed to do so. In this re-
spect, the “Center for the promotion of freedom of expression and
access to information”, an NGO was unsuccessful in obtaining data
about the measures adopted to enforce the law.
It was also reported that, in general, the attitude of the offi-
cials is to keep in secret most of their activity except when they
want to give certain pieces of information to some friendly jour-
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nalists for a specific purpose. However, such kind of relationship
falls outside the scope and aim of the law on access to information.
It would appear to discriminate between different segments of me-
dia and lead to an unhealthy environment for them. Also, access
to the records of the parliamentary sessions seems to be consider-
ably limited.  By a reportedly unpublished decision of April 2001,
the permanent bureau of the Parliament issued an exhaustive list
of persons who could have access to such records and denied the
access of outsiders, including the media.  Moreover, the Prime
Minister allegedly refused the press to cover discussions in Par-
liament on the 2002 budget without providing an explanation for
doing so. The government’s meetings are, so it is reported, exclu-
sively attended by journalists working for the Communist Party’s
newspaper or for the state-owned broadcasting institutions.
Moldovan journalists complained about the inaccessibility of offi-
cials and lack of transparency in their activities. Journalists rep-
resenting non-State media have been, so it was often claimed, re-
peatedly denied access to various events hosted by the authori-
ties. It seems that information on corruption is among the least
accessible to Moldovan journalists.  Although court hearings are,
in principle, public, one non-governmental organization - the
Moldovan Helsinki Committee - was denied access to a court in
June 2000. The organization’s complaint is still pending before
the court.
Moreover, it would appear that it is very difficult to have ac-
cess to some important official document. The refusal to publish
the Treaty on Moldovan-Ukrainian delimitation of borders was
given by human rights defenders as an example. The courts’ atti-
tude in cases of denial of information cannot be evaluated since
the experts had been informed that no complaint has yet been filed.
This absence of complaints can be explained by the lack of trust in
the courts (as explained above). Article 34 on the right of access to
information places both the state and the private media under the
duty “to ensure that correct information reaches the public opin-
ion” (paragraph 4).  Such a requirement can also be found in Ar-
ticle 1 of the 1994 Press Law, which provides that the state guar-
antees everyone the right to “truthful information from periodi-
cals and press agencies”.  The constitutional duty of the media to
disseminate only “accurate” information and the power of the state
to prescribe what is or is not “accurate” is reflected in the ordi-
nary legislation imposing the burden of the truth proof on the jour-
nalists. These provisions - which are contrary to the good faith
and public interest defense as defined by the case law of the Euro-
pean Court - have a potentially chilling effect on the media, which
can lead to self-censorship.
Checks and balances or Parliamentary supervisory function
Parliamentary control is the most visible tool and capacity of the
legislature to constrain executive behavior. Parliamentary hearings
represent in this sense a pivotal form of parliamentary control and
supervision over the executive policies. Unfortunately, in many tran-
sitional countries, exactly this crucial institution tends to be weak
in relation to the executive. The representative function is funda-
mental as it shapes the democratic character of the other functions.
Generically, this paradigm would force the Parliament to plan vari-
ous ways to increase the responsibility of the officials, to respond to
political pressures which are perceived as ‘non-productive’ or ‘ef-
fective’ over individual ministries, and improve the collegial respon-
sibility of the Cabinet before the Parliament.
The Parliaments can legislate and conduct oversight, but with-
out effective mechanisms of representation, they cannot be demo-
cratic, and are not likely to act in the interest of the society as a
whole. This allows the legislative power to play a role in assign-
ing responsibilities at the national level and control effective use
of the public mandates, resources, competencies for the sake of
‘public interest’. Therefore, all deputies of the Chamber have full
rights to question the acting Cabinet, on behalf of their parlia-
mentary fraction, on their behalf and on voter’s behalf on various
subjects, which are neither limited nor constrained by any kind of
limitations of the legislation. Typically, deputies have to respond
to their own inhibitions or self-interests by the hearing sessions
so as to not prejudice their party interests if they are from the
ruling party fraction, while the opposition will employ its argu-
ments on the hearing’s day to gain additional leverage of criticism
on a tactical basis. Of course, this is the reason why the opposi-
tion exists in Parliament, to shed light into the public affairs.
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On the other hand, the Cabinet will do everything to keep the
information that may endanger its own position before the legis-
lature. In addition, the traditional concept of responsibility may
envision that Ministries and not civil servants are directly sub-
jected to Parliamentary hearings; therefore, invitation of civil
servants at the hearings would increase tensions between the
ministries and ministry staff. The elaboration of a Code of Con-
duct for the ministries and civil servants is clearly a recom-
mended instrument to assess the degree of shared responsibility
of these distinct categories to the Parliament. The classical model
of parliamentary supervision is emphasizing the principle of
‘separation of powers’, and of checks and balances. Even if it does
not totally eliminate the traditional meaning of this paradigm,
the supervision function is to be conceived as a form of promot-
ing cooperation between the executive and legislature in order to
accelerate the provision of services. Supervision and assignment
of responsibilities help the executive to implement legislation in
accordance with the constitution and sense of justice that be-
longs to the legislative house.
The effectiveness of parliamentary oversight is diminished in
those situations when a majority of the political parties in parlia-
ment is closely linked to the executive. This situation poses an
interesting challenge to aid providers because parliamentary as-
sistance programs will not be so effective since the parliamentar-
ians themselves, forced by the political situation, are not willing
or able to use fully all instruments belonging to parliamentary
oversight of the security. The Parliament is capable to maintain
control over the legislation adopted and promote the constitutional
values only when there is a concerted effort with the executive,
and policies have responsible officials behind. The very original
sense of parliamentary supervision is to search for flaws that may
endanger public benefit, or draw the attention of the executive
upon eventual errors for policies subject of implementation. The
implementation of the supervision of laws should be initiated with
the identification of systematic reasons for failures. The Parlia-
mentary Committees need to have necessary resources, informa-
tion and expertise in order to assume the role of monitoring in-
struments of the political cycles. In a parliamentary regime, the
pillar of the system is the ministerial responsibility before the
Parliament. Thus, constitutional amendments create a Cabinet of
Ministers that shall be fully dependent on the vote and agreement
of the legislature.
The new text of the Constitution is specifically stating that;
members of the Government are responsible individually and col-
lectively to the Parliament’. But, the application of the constitu-
tional provisions in our politically turbulent environment is not
that easy and clear. The traditional approach of the governmental
responsibility to the parliament originates from the concept that
ministries exercise alone the powers of the Government, and there-
fore, they are to be made fully responsible for their actions or for
actions made on their behalf. The Cabinet is however not at all
homogenous. It is highly supervised by the President of the state,
while individual policies are more often encroached by public ser-
vants which are not politically subservient to the Parliament, but
on Civil Service law. Thus, the responsibility of the Cabinet to the
Parliament is often obscured by an interplay of political interests,
which often is entailed not on the criteria of evaluating the true
performances of the Cabinet, but largely by the pure-political ‘rea-
sons’ of erecting a new Government, or taking the risk to main-
tain the Cabinet, but diffuse the failures by sacking some of the
weak Ministers. It is obvious however that the refusal of the tra-
ditional doctrine to allow a distinction between the political and
managerial responsibility  is not in line with the modern shapes
of the current legislative - executive relations, discouraging open
debates and transparent governance, at the expanse of the larger
missions in the public sector reform.
Usually, opposition is believed to rely strongly on the tradi-
tional concept of ministerial responsibility. Not surprisingly that
CDPP has shown repeatedly after 1995 its will to pass through
the Parliament a Draft Law on ministerial responsibility, this is
certainly confirming that parties with a solid background in op-
position are usually more sensitive on the lack of genuine infor-
mation about the executive policies as such, while parties which
circulated in power have their own reasons to abstain from in-
creasing too much the level of confidence into a regulatory frame-
work that will define very strict obligations before the legislature.
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Therefore, the implementation of checks and balances would be
preferable to signify more ‘a shared responsibility’, which does
not mean automatically a demission unless there are considerable
arguments or documents showing compromising materials, which
would shift the issue to an overt obligation to present to the Par-
liament the whole information and immediately making necessary
steps to correct the identified mistakes.
There are several complaints that the existing Commissions have
a rather decorative role, limited to the drafting and adoption of the
new laws with very few efforts directed to oversee the implementa-
tion of the legislation. Thus, the Commission for Culture, Science,
Education, Youth and Mass Media which is responsible, in Parlia-
ment, for the drafting of legislation concerning freedom of expres-
sion does not appropriately oversee institutions in charge of guar-
anteeing a fair policy in public media, like e.g. the Audio-Visual
Coordinating Council (CCA). They do not take the necessary mea-
sures to put an end to the conflict of interests within the CCA, thus
leaving the door open for violations of the rule of law. Members of
that Commission who met the experts were even unaware of the
content of the draft legislation that will regulate defamation59.
Stability of the political system, and stability
of the government
Indicators of regime stability are employed in political sciences,
where it assumes that the degree of ‘stability’ or ‘lack of stability’
has a direct impact upon the quality of democracy. We’ve decided
to identify two indicators to assess the stability of the political
regime: one is related to the number of changes of government in a
state, (for instance, the number of prime-ministers confirmed by
the parliament to lead the executive branch of the Government60)
while the second indicator is to assess the number of times when
the Cabinets are subject to subsequent changes affecting individual
ministers during the term of office confirmed to a Governmental
mandate61. Lijphart differentiates his approach from what he calls
the “prevalent” point of view according to which “cabinet durabil-
ity is an indicator not just of the cabinet’s strength compared with
that of the legislature but also of regime stability”62.
Government duration is a function of when the government in
power resigns or is voted down by parliament. Government resig-
nation is an indication of a political disagreement between gov-
ernment and parliament, and whenever such a disagreement oc-
curs the government will have to resign whether or not it is strong,
or parties participating in a government for their own reasons
will create disagreements in order to lead to the formation of a
new government. The index is related to the percentage of the term
a government actually manages to fulfill, being estimated on the
basis of months spent in office from the time of official swearing to
the swearing of the next Prime Minister.
Legislative instability propelled frequent changes of the Cabi-
nets, the average length of the executive mandate being estimated
at 17,5 months. Although the acting Prime-Minister, Vasile Tarlev,
has enjoyed a reputed experience of stability in office - with over
38 of months behind, his Cabinet was the field of the most swift
CHART 4. GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IN MOLDOVA 1991-2003
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and unexplained changes in Ministers. Political reshuffles were
more frequently than in any other Cabinet of Ministers, although
the Prime Minister has survived all of his Ministers. Interesting
to note that most of these changes were initiated by  President
Voronin, who did his utmost to keep his almost undisputed con-
trol over formation, mentoring and dismissal of the top-level and
even mid-level servants of the Cabinet. This was a competence
questioned by many even in a semi-presidential form of republic,
and it blatantly conflicts with constitutional provisions laid down
in the amended Constitution (August 2000). But, due to the exist-
ing ‘monolithic majority’ in the Parliament, all reshuffles were
never agreed nor opposed by the acting majority of the ruling party,
while opinion of the opposition were not heard at all.
Lijphart constructs executive dominance based on government
duration the following way. He first measures the average cabinet
life of governments where the only feature that counts is party
composition (governments with identical party compositions are
counted as one even if the Prime Minister resigns or if there is an
election). I argue that executive dominance is a matter of agenda
control, that is, reflects the ability of the government to have its
proposals accepted the way they are as opposed to have them mas-
sively amended by parliament. As a branch of the executive power,
Presidents were clearly a model of institutional stability. Even in
this case, however, the latest constitutional amendments dated of
August 2000 changed the legitimacy of the Presidential office –
from popular national elections to parliamentary vote of confir-
mation, which has thus transformed the political regime from a
presidential into a parliamentary republic. Thus, the mandate of
President Lucinschi came to an end in early 2001 when the Com-
munist leader, Vladimir Voronin, succeeded to install his own per-
sonal supremacy over the whole constellation of legislative and
executive powers.
Moldova is ranked among the less stable systems of government
in the last decade along with Italy, Japan and Thailand - with 8
changes of government over the surveyed period of time. In most of
the democratic states included in the study - 27 in total - govern-
ment changed only one or twice during the last decade, showing a
rather competitive stability within a pluralist environment. We did
not incorporate in the study any reference to Cuba or North Korea
where governmental stability is synonymous with lack of democratic
institutions and harsh/brutal dictatorship of the totalitarian lead-
ers and parties. But, in addition to frequent changes in government,
Moldova is a leader as well in the incomplete terms of office.  No one
of the prime ministers has completed the full term of office as allo-
cated by the Parliament’s vote of confidence.  Chart 5. describes the
number of changes of the government in the surveyed states during
the last decade. We shall conclude on the basis of these estimations
that Moldova is one of the less stable political regimes and, clearly,
among the least stable democratic states.
Today, having less political responsibility - as only the Parlia-
ment is directly elected by voters - the President is masterfully
playing the instruments that were ‘forgotten’ in the Constitution
by the time of transiting from the semi-presidential form of gover-
nance to the current parliamentarian republic. The growing dis-
cord that was registered since 2001 between the largest parlia-
CHART 5. STABILITY OF CABINETS
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mentary fraction of the Communists and the opposition fractions
is somehow compensated by its greatest extent and by  its institu-
tionalized stability. Apparently, in spite of the out crying cases of
deputies being persecuted for their opinions, penal cases opened
against deputies for their participation in the ‘illegal’ street ac-
tions (2004), lifting the immunities of the opposition (2003), kid-
napping deputies (2002), legislative machinery is unconvention-
ally functioning, with statistical evidence proving that the exist-
ence of a very disciplined and compact dominant group of parlia-
mentarians may simply disconnect the opposition from the nor-
mal way in which Parliaments function, simply because the par-
liamentary agenda is well established and agreed long before dis-
cussions are initiated in the chamber.
Culture of dialogue and democratic standards
Central to the question in this section is the assumption that
citizens attitudes matter. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba’s
theory of civic culture postulates that the viability of democratic
institutions is significantly affected by attitudes, such as belief in
one’s ability to influence political decisions, feelings of positive
affect for the political system, and they believe that  citizens’ opin-
ions are trustworthy. Challenges to political culture theory have
taken place primarily on two levels and have emerged from vari-
ous intellectual camps. The November 2003 Barometer of public
opinion63 revealed interesting tendencies with regards to the per-
ception the public has over the civil sector and the state authori-
ties. Following up the dynamics of the public trust in the civil
sector main players, compared to the one of the authorities repre-
sentatives (figure 2.2), one could easily notice that the number of
people trusting the main civil sector actors has increased in 2003
compared to 2002, while the number of people trusting the au-
thorities had decreased. And, at the same time, the distrust for
the authorities had increased, while the distrust for civil sector
players has decreased.
On Friday, 16 of April, the CPDP fraction demanded dismissal
of the Speaker of the House and Auditing Court Chairman on the
reason of ‚professional incompetence and abuses in performing
their obligations’64. They’ve stated that this is due to a total legal
nihilistic attitude and ostensible inclination to infringe system-
atically on the Internal Regulation of the parliament, stipulating
the way and regular proceedings of the Parliament, climbing up
of the new drafts on the legislative agenda without necessary ex-
pertise and typical notifications from the permanent committees,
of the parliamentary fractions and the Government, while elimi-
nating other initiatives and proposals that have been submitted
by the opposition. As in the past, these kind of actions made the
object of severe critics and recommendations of the Council of
Europe, as stated on April 24 and September 26 of 2002. Simi-
larly, the CPDP leader blamed the Speaker is hiding information
on the use of the Parliamentary budget with the purpose of build-
ing up a house for her in the downtown of Chisinau, and similar
services provided also for other CP deputies. These wrongdoings
are encouraged by the fact that the Auditing Chamber is also hid-
ing its reports and available information referring the use of fi-
nancial resources of the Parliament as well as of the president of
the country. Following these arguments, the leader of the CPDP
fraction demanded that a special inquiry committee shall be set
up, that will confirm or infirm the evoked facts, and particularly,
that this committee shall be chaired by an opposition representa-
tive to ensure a credible investigation.
Parliamentary boycott continued in the following week after
Easter, very close to physical clashes between the majoritarian
and minority fractions65. When the CPDP deputies have blocked
again the main microphone of the Chamber with large posters
‚Demission’, Down with Corruption’ communist deputies re-
sponded and have attempted to ‚disarm’ their rival fraction, while
chasing out mass media reporters to stop shooting the scenes of
open hostilities. At the end of the session, CP leader announced
that they will consider amending the Regulation in order to use
the force to free up the session from ‚hooligan elements’. Christian
Popular Democrat boycotted several sessions of the Parliament
by blocking the access to the main tribune under the argument
that the leadership of the Parliament did not respect earlier com-
mitments to provide clear answers and information to the parlia-
mentary inquiry submitted on behalf of the CPDP fraction (art.108
of the Regulation). On her side, the acting Speaker warned that
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she will apply art.116 of the Regulation, to calm down the depu-
ties that create disorder in the legislative chamber66. CPDP depu-
ties claimed that what they demanded was totally natural to know
about the report on expenditures made up by the Auditing Court
on Parliament, Presidency and Centre for Economic Crimes and
Corruption, other state bodies, and they found that all these re-
ports became overnight withdrawn from the public use.
Therefore, this was the reason to boycott the sessions until a
legal solution would be found out in this regard. For instance, the
CPDP leader claimed that some of the expenditures of the Cham-
ber were particularly spent for personal apartments provided to
the Speaker, Eugenia Ostapciuc, and that was an illegal decision,
a secret one, which cannot be accepted.  In his turn, the leader of
the majoritarian fraction stated that the Chamber shall adopt a
tough position against ‚hooligans’, and that the Committee on
National Security shall be invited to state clearly what informa-
tion is ‚secret’ and what cannot be ‚securitized’ from the deputies,
in particular, and public, in general. In addition to that, the leader
of the Communist fraction stated that the stalemate will be re-
solved with the adoption of tougher amendments to the Internal
Regulation of the Parliament, which follows to receive a legal no-
tification from the Council of Europe’s Legal Committee.
With a large constitutional majority of 71 out of 101 seats in
the one-chamber Parliament, the CPM was associated by many
citizens with a good promise to stability and economic growth.
Polls show over 55 percent of population believing ‘the country
goes into a wrong direction’, but the highest rates of popular sup-
port still belong to CPM. Over 50 percent of respondents say they
would oppose to the dissolution of the Parliament, governing by
decrees, establishing a censorship in the mass media, banning
public protests or demonstrations, other meetings or limiting the
right to circulation for Moldova citizens67. Latest developments
revealed however that most of the democratic institutes and re-
forms initiated at the mid of the 90th can be easily revised, par-
ticularly when a party is succeeding to install its overwhelming
control on the key-positions of the state. Voter’s credibility in
the nostalgic appeals of the CPM has prompted its leaders to
rely on policies that have almost no relevance for the overarching
social and economical issues, but foment cultural and symbolic
divisions of the country’s population. The prevalence of symbol-
ism over policy-making efforts coincided with a large mobiliza-
tion of political protest, difficult to appease even by the Council
of Europe’s mediators.
The opposition, NGOs, and international experts have strongly
criticized recent amendments to the law on political parties
stipulating excessive requirements and for the violation of citi-
zens’ right to privacy. Among other issues, the amendments re-
quire all parties to submit to the Justice Ministry on an annual
basis a list of all their members, including personal information.
Despite recent amendments to the Election Code that shortened
the electoral period from 90 to 60 days, the election administra-
tion carried out their tasks professionally at all levels. The CEC
operated in a transparent manner; in general, its decisions were
well-considered and in accordance with the law. Media and ob-
servers had access to CEC sessions. No consistent dialogue with
civil society occurred in 2003, and the legislative activities went
even more difficult than in 2002, with opposition boycotting the
sessions, and with the ruling party doing the same when opposi-
tion MPs were asking to take the floor in the Parliament. The
mutual antagonism erupted in September, when opposition par-
ties decided to boycott the legislative work of the Parliament, by
commencing to protest in the streets of the downtown
Another important characteristic of the Moldovan civil sector
is that it is highly polarized, as it is in fact the entire Moldovan
transitional society. The CPM is still classifying the civil sector
participation according to the criteria of loyalty to the commu-
nist ideas, and moreover, favoring the loyal actors on the account
of the others. The 2002 ‘social pact’ initiative launched by Presi-
dent Voronin revealed that very few NGOs are supportive to-
wards the CPM policies, therefore, an infusion of some ‘loyal
NGOs’ followed. In order to balance the impact of the real civil
groups of the Moldovan civil society CPM have highly encour-
aged the creation of alternative organizations and association,
which were receiving significant funds from the state in return
for their loyalty. As the CPM is traditionally gaining benefits
out of the polarized society, the interventions of the state in the
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third sector activities in 2003 were traditionally aimed to in-
crease the distances between its various member groups.
A public policy process is clearly missing in Moldova, which
make the rulers to attempt to “privatize” their public positions
and capture state institutions. Civil society involvement is still
limited and weak, although some of the challenges of the state, i.e.
the EU expansion, sensitive issues related to identity markers, or
regulation of Transnistrian conflict, are highly sensitive for the
civil society. Some pressures from state authorities were also ex-
perienced in 2003 by trade unions, whose leaders were not enough
supportive to the CPM policies. The authorities intended to split
the unions’ movement by fiscal controls and even security ser-
vices68. Another example of how the CPM is trying to eliminate
the opposition elements of the civil society would be its recent at-
tempt to create a unique association of mayors by simply erasing
the already existing associations from the Public Register. All the
mentioned cases show how by administrative pressures, over black-
mail or manipulation, the CPM is trying to get rid of the critical
views expressed by the most dynamic part of the civil society, and
in this regard, it attempts to re-create a soviet-like framework
where public organizations may have the freedom only to agree
with the leadership69.
Enlighted understanding of norms
Most of the Parliamentarians lack a clear understanding of
their role as representatives of the people, independent of gov-
ernment whims and loyal to the country. The linkages between
members of parliament and constituency are weak partly because
of the election proportional system (party lists in one elections
national precinct), but also because of the lack of proper chan-
nels of communication with the public. This could be attributed
to the lack of preparatory training to familiarize new and old
MPs with the ‘accountability’, ‘transparency’, effective use of
public mandates as political values. Similarly, institutional link-
ages making the legislature responsible to the public constraint
would certainly increase individual responsibilities and ‘en-
lighten understanding of public duties’.
One of the main conclusions is that current electoral system is
not adequate for Moldova. The absolute proportional electoral sys-
tem introduced in 1993 is blamed for having serious effects over
political standoffs. Most of the parties having ruled in Moldova af-
ter 1991 disintegrated lamentably. Scandals and lack of trust were
a norm not only for inter-party relations but also within various
political parties. Because of the electoral system and associated lack
of transparency and fuzzy criteria for lists compilation, there is no
link between the party elite and the electorate. A political party in
Moldova means first of all from one to three leaders. It means also a
political activity concentrated in the capital city and practically no
efforts to reach the rural and small towns’ inhabitants. Finally, as
political analysts affirm, there is no  real inflow of new young lead-
ers in political establishment in Moldova and as result this class
has become self-complacent and ineffective.
Constraints associated with the wide range, variety and com-
plexity of the issues debated in a modern parliament are of expert
nature and often lie outside the scope and understanding of the
majority of the members of the parliament. This prospect could
also be linked with the inadequate facilities available to members
of parliament to improve their abilities to cope with the myriad of
subjects they are expected to deal with (poverty alleviation, anti-
corruption campaigns, international crimes, refugees, environmen-
tal protection etc). In most African parliaments there is a lead
voter who sounds to the majority of the members of parliament
from his/her party on how to vote, sometimes with little to know
knowledge of the implications of their votes.
Constraints associated with the social context of the post-so-
viet parliaments, are particularly popular misconceptions of the
role of parliament in political accounts and the role of parliamen-
tarians to bring government to account/full political responsibil-
ity. Political culture aside (ethnicity, social obligations, patron-
client relationship), democratic culture is inadequately under-
stood. Criticizing a Minister or the Prime Minister could be seen
as an attack on a representative of an opposing ethnic group -
with its socio-political ramifications, or an attack against the rul-
ing party. Within this perspective is also the weakness of
Moldovan civil society and its inability to take its responsibility
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seriously to articulate demands and lobby parliament, political
parties and government take their role more seriously.
Constraints associated with scarcity of resources (such as re-
search facilities, analytical capabilities, and access to financial
resources to hire professional consultancy) affects the well func-
tioning of the legislating body effectiveness. The situation is even
worse for members of opposition who are often denied equal op-
portunities of access to information about government conduct or
refused reception by the political executive. The lack of internal
democracy in parliaments also means that opposition members
are demonized and often given inequitable treatment relatively to
those of the incumbent political parties. One may divide the con-
straints that impinge on the potential role of the parliament into
six main constraints: inherent in skewed democratic experience,
weak democratic institutions, lack of internalization of democratic
norms and values described elsewhere as the existence of only vir-
tual democracies or democracies without democrats. In some in-
stances, people began to lose trust in politics, politicians and po-
litical institutions that they see doing little to solve impending
social, economic and political problems. Parliamentarians from
the opposition parties are denied information and in some in-
stances treated as enemies of the state.
Mass media watchdog on parliamentary activities
Over the last 3 years, the CPM leader has substantially in-
creased its control on the most important public institutions, in-
cluding mass media and judiciary, and that generated several con-
flicts with the opposition. A content analysis on the coverage of
parliamentary agenda in a sample of mass media was done by the
Project experts between January - May 200470. A number of 279
materials were printed in the above-mentioned period on both in-
stitutions: Parliament and Chisinau Municipality. The state-run
Moldova Suverana printed three times more articles on Parlia-
ment than the opposition daily FLUX or weekly Timpul, and two
times more than Kishiniovskie Novosti and Moldavskie vedomosti.
The official press is publishing more news (45) than other publi-
cations, which prefer reportage (33) and, comments (22).
Particularly interesting was to see the tonality of the press to-
wards the Parliament. Apparently, FLUX is constantly excelling
in negative portrayal of the legislature (26 articles) and so is true
about  the Municipality of Chisinau (22). The most frequent words
describing the Parliament are: abuse-prone, anti-democratic, ir-
responsible, dishonest. On the other corner, Moldova Suverana is
the most exalted promoter of the acting Parliament (73 articles),
abounding in: ‘the highest mark’, high responsibility, best experts,
when it comments on the legislative activities. In between the two
poles of public information, the other two publications, Timpul
(19) and Moldvaskie Vedomosti (27) àðå largely negative on both
institutions 71.
On a more neutral basis, Kisinevskie Novosti (37) is usually
providing short news abstaining from commenting in a way or
another the political developments in the legislative house72.
In most of the cases, negative articles approach the poor qual-
ity of the adopted legislation by the majoritarian fraction, ten-
sions between the ruling party and the opposition. Most of the
publication say that the Parliamentary activity is far from being
transparent, and just a number of examples in this case: „Trudno
biti parlamentschim paparazze”, (Kisineovskie Novosti of April
23 (2004), No.17 (69), netransparenta (FLUX), a pune la cale
(Timpul). The main reason for this criticism is that the
majoritarian faction has declined repeatedly to broadcast life the
plenary sessions of the Parliament by the State TV and Radio,
while restricting the access of mass media to very important events
of the legislature.
PUBLICATION FLUX TIMPUL MOLDOVA KISINEVSKIE MOLDAVSKIE
SUVERANA NOVOSTI VEDOMOSTI
Tonality + + - + 0 - + 0 - + 0 - + 0 -
Parliament -- 3 26 -- 11 19 73 30 -- 2 37 8 -- 43 27
Mayoralty -- 8 22 47 10 -- 3 10 27 56 6 3 45 8 --
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In contrast to the rest of the publications, Moldova Suverana is
continuously following the official position of the ruling party, pro-
viding extensive coverage of the key-topics of the party initiatives
(Communist Party), abounding in terms of: cooperation, open to
everyone, and joint efforts. Corruption is clearly the most frequent
marker in assessing the relations with the legislature.
Thus, FLUX and Timpul usually describe the Parliament as
being the most ‘corrupt institutions’, with ‘corrupt leaders’ and
‘non-transparent way of business’73. Dozens of investigative ma-
terials were printed by the outlets to show that controlling bodies
are blocked by the Parliament while supervising the incomes of
the top-officials, or properties owned by the MPs. The arguments
of the mass media is that weak state institutions succeed in pro-
ducing large-spread corruption in Moldova and fail in making
honest businesses profitable and secure. About two-thirds of
Moldovans consider that it is simpler to solve their problems with
state officials by using unofficial ways, and over 60 per cent are
giving bribes.74 These data, as a matter of fact, shows that the
population is used to the idea that the official approaches are time
and effort consuming. Among the most common distortions ad-
mitted by the state is the hampering of competition through ex-
tensive barriers to entry, which encourage monopolist practices,
or instill an environment of fear and insecurity that force busi-
ness-people to search for protection.
MUNICIPALITY OF CHISINAU
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
General regulations
Chisinau is the capital city of Moldova and because of this fact
Chisinau benefits from  a rather special situation comparing to
other local communities of the country. Senior municipal officials
affirm that a privileged role of the Chisinau municipality is rec-
ognized by the mere fact that differently to other local communi-
ties it enjoys a special municipal status provided by a special or-
ganic law75.
However one should recognize that legal provisions regulating
the Chisinau municipality are quite complex and ever evolving.
For example, amendments to the law on the status of Chisinau
have been proposed and approved by the government as a law-
draft in October 2003 when this study was under preliminary
preparation. The government also approved amendments con-
ceived to cut off the number of  staff of the municipal mayoralty.
As senior municipal officials and independent policy observers
say, this kind of structural changes are influenced by political
reasons rather than reasons of administrative efficiency76.
 So, the legal and institutional dynamics affecting the Chisinau
municipality are influenced both by interactions of local and cen-
tral public authorities and by relations between various munici-
pal authorities. Neither public opinion nor independent experts
are consulted in the process of making laws affecting the func-
tioning of Chisinau. However the lack of transparency and ignor-
ing public opinion is a “normal” way of doing political business of
the incumbent central administration that goes beyond the in-
tergovernmental relations and holds practically every law and
decision that the government and the parliament adopt.
The forefront regulations consist of the law on the status of
Chisinau municipality77, the law on local public administration78
and the law on territorial-administrative organization of the Re-
public of Moldova79. In addition special stipulations are provided
FLUX TIMPUL MOLDOVA KISINEVSKIE MOLDAVSKIE
SUVERANA NOVOSTI VEDOMOSTI
Parliament 29 30 103 47 70
Mayoralty 30 57 40 65 53
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by the law on local public finances80, the law on the property of
administrative-territorial units81 and other normative acts. Ev-
ery of the laws mentioned above has suffered significant amend-
ments during quite a short period of time. The mere fact that a
wholly new version of the law on local public finances has been
adopted lately by the Parliament is a vivid symptom of the legal
volatility affecting the external environment of the municipal pub-
lic authorities. This law was drafted by the government and has
been approved by the parliament in a totally obscure manner and
not a single local community has been consulted. Nor were the
Chisinau authorities consulted in the process of developing the
new law on local public finances and this is despite the fact that
Chisinau municipality is the largest contributor to the national
consolidated budget and one of the very few local communities of
Moldova enjoy a financial autonomy from the government.
According to the law on territorial-administrative organization,
the system of local public administration in the Republic of Moldova
is organized in two levels. The second one comprises the recently
re-established districts (raion in the Romanian language). The dis-
tricts were built on the administrative and infrastructural rem-
nants of the previous counties (judetse). The first level encompasses
the villages (communes) and towns (municipalities). However the
Chisinau municipality is an exception since the law on local pub-
lic administration articulates that the public authorities of
Chisinau municipality belong to the second level of public admin-
istration.
The law on the status of Chisinau municipality establishes the
organization and functioning of the municipal authorities - the
municipal council, the mayoralty and the general mayor as well
as local councils and mayors of the cities and communes (villages)
of the municipality. The municipal council is the local represen-
tative and deliberative public authority. The mayoralty and the
general mayor are executive authorities. The law prescripts that
competencies that the municipal authorities are invested with
cannot be contested or limited by any higher hierarchical body
unless under legal conditions. The general mayor of the munici-
pality and the mayors of the municipal communities are elected
directly by the electors.
According to this law the municipality of Chisinau consists of
the city of Chisinau itself , 6 towns and 13 communes (rural com-
munities) adjacent to the city with their own public authorities.
It is important to note that the 13 communes embody a total of 27
villages. The Law stipulates that all the communities of the
Chisinau municipality are “autonomous administrative-territo-
rial units”.
For administrative and historical reasons the city of Chisinau
itself is divided into five sectors. The municipal council of Chisinau
nominates the praetors who are in charge of running the sectors.
Preturas are executive authorities of the municipality mayoralty
in every sector, they are legal entities and do not have their own
elective bodies. Relations between the municipal public authori-
ties and the public authorities of the communities of the munici-
pality are founded on the principles of autonomy, legality and co-
operation in dealing with problems of general interest. However,
the municipal council of Chisinau is empowered to coordinate ac-
tivity of the local councils in communities of the municipality in
order to deal with problems of general interest. Indeed, the mu-
nicipal council controls important leverages on the adjacent com-
munities as it decides on the percentage of fiscal subsidies (direct
transfers) and shared revenues to be allocated from the municipal
budget to the budgets of communities of the municipality.
According to the law, Chisinau municipality is a legal entity,
owns propriety and enjoys financial autonomy. The organization
of the municipality is based on the principles of local autonomy,
decentralization of public services, eligibility of the local public
administration authorities and consultation with the public re-
garding problems of local importance. Autonomy means both the
organization and functioning of the municipal authorities and the
management of the interest of the citizens and communities that
they represent.
Regulations on provision of public services
For the administration of the municipal and local public ser-
vices are created within the municipal and towns and communi-
ties mayoralties. These services are created in every area of social
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and economic activity, in fiscal administration, public order, and
environment protection. The law on local public administration
designates the general areas that the municipal public authori-
ties are responsible for.
In the law on local public administration we distinguished as
being the most important tasks of the municipal authorities the
following:
• Social and economic development of the municipality;
• Building and maintaining local roads;
• Building large public infrastructure (hospitals, schools,
highways) in limits of own necessities and possibilities;
• Health care and social protection;
• Assuring public order;
• Financing and maintaining colleges, schools, orphanages.
According to the above mentioned law the mayoralty of Chisinau
is responsible also for housing, local public transportation, public
hygiene, construction and maintenance of houses, youth and child
protection and activities, public markets and halls, environmen-
tal protection and others. The local public authorities of the lo-
calities of Chisinau municipality have their own similar areas of
responsibility that they coordinate with municipal authorities.
However, in Chisinau municipality the problem of delimitating
executive power between the first and second administrative level
is much more complex than in other parts of the country.
Among the most sensible public services that municipal au-
thorities are responsible for one can mention the housing services
– heating, running water, waste management and others
82
. But
the regulatory chaotic framework, the in-built structural weak-
nesses of the management and contradictory policies promoted by
central government affect seriously the efficiency of the local pub-
lic services management.
Fierce institutional battles were fought in the last couple of
years in the realm of housing services. As a result the municipal
authorities do not entirely control anymore such public enterprise
as Termocom, the provider of thermal energy. Interestingly, this
enterprise reports and subordinates both to the municipal coun-
cil and to the Ministry of Energy. An institutional, technical and
financial disorder affects practically every segment of housing in
Chisinau municipality spurring even more the political conflict
between the municipal and central authorities and generating lack
of trust and dissatisfaction from the part of customers. To men-
tion only the most striking and fresh example, at the beginning of
November 2003 most of the houses and living blocks of the Chisinau
city were not yet connected to the centralized thermal network of
the municipality whilst the average outside temperature was be-
low 10 Celsius degrees. This situation repeats regularly every year
and with time passing by and no service restructuring it gets more
and more complex.
Regulations on transparency and accountability
There are several legal provisions regarding the general stan-
dards of transparency and accountability that local authorities in
Moldova are supposed to meet. However, experts believe that while
the general quality of legal provisions is quite satisfactory, strin-
gent problems arise when it comes to their real implementation
and respect83. These problematic features become visible also when
one analyses the activity of Chisinau public authorities and this
is despite the fact that in Chisinau the civil society is more active
than elsewhere in Moldova.
To cite only one example, while the free public access to the
sessions of the Chisinau municipal council is provided by the law
on local public administration, a sophisticated accreditation pro-
cedure is required any time when a journalist or a simple citizen
wants to participate or to be present at the sessions. Difficult and
time-consuming bureaucratic procedures are also in the case of
the mayoralty officials. Even the implementation of the “Program
on Democratic Audit of the Public Institutions” was tergiversated
in August-October 2003 by an outdated procedure of getting per-
mission in order that the IDIS Viitorul to be able to conduct the
democratic audit. This very fact per se is to be judged as a telling
indicator of the level of democracy and transparency in the activ-
ity of the municipal authorities.
A good practice of transparency was set by the general mayor
to report annually to the municipal council on the state of munici-
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pal affairs. Last year report was published in municipal mass me-
dia and can be accessed also on the official site of the mayoralty.
However, the rather good performances reflected in the mayor re-
port are shadowed to some extent by the findings of a series of
financial audits conducted by the Court of Accounts.
When it comes to the legality of the operational management
and to the general budgetary transparency most of these audit
reports reflect serious breaches84. The Court identified repeated
breaching of transparency principles in public procurements, in
renting municipal land plots, in contracting private enterprises
for public works.
To begin with the fundamentals, the article 34 of the Constitu-
tion insures in paragraph one  free access of the citizens to any
information of public interest. The second paragraph of the cited
constitutional article requires the public authorities of any level
to provide adequate and correct information about affairs of pub-
lic concern. Only governmental secrets and personal information
is not for public disclosure. However the remnants of a Soviet men-
tality specific to a large part of public officials, including the
Chisinau municipal public servants, dictate secretive attitudes
towards their tasks, tools and performances.
Article 22 of the law on local public administration affirms that
sessions of the local councils must be open to the public. Article 25
specifies that normative decisions of the local council come to have
legal power only after they are acknowledged to the public by pub-
lication in local mass media or by display in public places.
Specific legal provisions are related also to the budgetary
transparency. According to  article 22 of the law on local public
finances the budgets of territorial-administrative units adopted
by local councils and subsequent amendments are to be published
in a mandatory way. However nothing is said about the publica-
tion of financial reports on executed budgets. Article 29 requires
the financial divisions of the local executive authorities only to
compile monthly, quarterly and annual reports on budgetary ex-
ecution and the executive authorities to examine and approve
them. Quarterly and annual financial reports have to be pre-
sented to the local council in order to be approved.
As for the financial control, only the Department of Financial
Control of the Ministry of Finances and the Court of Accounts are
empowered by law to conduct revisions and audits of local public
finances. The fiscal inspections also have some attributions in
auditing the fiscal correctness of the budget execution as for the
part of fiscal revenues. No legal provisions provide explicitly for
the participation of general public in periodical assessments of
financial probity of local public authorities. Moreover, understand-
ing financial reports on local budget execution is complicated for
the public since the general accounting procedures and financial
reporting standards are complex. The municipal budgeting in
Moldova is founded on the principle of itemized expenditures. Dif-
ferently to program-based or performance-oriented budgeting the
system in place is favorable to less transparency.
Moreover, as mentioned above, the Court of Accounts has dis-
closed repeatedly financial irregularities in the municipal budget
but no strong social reactions calling for more budgetary trans-
parency and responsibility followed. Prior to the local elections of
2003 the general mayor and other members of mayoralty qualified
these decisions of the Court of Accounts, together with arrests of
managers of municipal enterprises, as tools of political pressure
on local public authorities of the municipality worked out by the
central governance, allegedly in order to create preconditions for
dismissal of the legally and democratically elected representatives
or, to influence the results of the local elections. These allegations
may be plausible since they were not singular and not limited to
the Chisinau municipality. Before the local elections several op-
position mayors from around Moldova were arrested and not al-
lowed to run the elections.
Article 10 of the law on local public administration stipulates
that local referenda can be held on problems of special importance
for the administrative-territorial unit. No local referenda have been
ever held in Chisinau municipality and, as far as we know, no
objective necessity for this has ever arisen. The representatives of
the municipal authorities have declared that public consultations
(in form of general assemblies of the local communities) have been
held in towns and villages of the municipality on various issues of
local development85. According to the same sources in the city of
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Chisinau the public was consulted on such issues like the Gen-
eral Plan of Urban Development, budget approval, digging of wells
and others. However, these consultations limited only to specific
lobby groups and were not conducted in due course to the rigors of
a truly public debate.
We conducted an experiment to assess the public openness of
the municipal bodies. One of our staff members played the role of
an ordinary citizen Z wishing to assist at the session of the mu-
nicipal council of November 28, 2003. He called the Department of
Public Audience of the mayoralty which directed him at the Cabi-
net of Municipal Counselors. The Cabinet assistant said firstly
that “there are no more places” and then added that she had no
competencies to admit an ordinary citizen at the council session.
According to her words only the mass media representatives have
permission to assist and the citizen Z should contact the secre-
tary of the municipal council in order to get permission. In her
turn, the assistant of the secretary said firstly that the citizen Z
should approach the Cabinet of Municipal Counselors. After know-
ing that Z comes actually from where she directs him, the assis-
tant said ironically “I cannot help but can you imagine what could
happen if every citizen is given permission to attend the session of
municipal council?”.
We can conclude that while good legal provisions guaranty the
public access and participation in the municipal affairs, there is
still a long way to go until their full implementation and obser-
vance in real-life practices. The conflict amongst exercise of politi-
cal authority in municipality is a further impediment to more trans-
parency and more public consultation.
 INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS
Local public administration - systemic evolutions
Among the transition countries the Republic of Moldova is a
rather specific case. Its contemporary political history stands as
a dramatic evidence of the negative impact that the political vola-
tility may exert on the administrative, economic and social effi-
ciency of the local public administration structures. Four parlia-
ments and eight governments changed in Republic of Moldova since
the independence act of 1991 and the legal instability associated
with frequent political changes impeded establishing a viable lo-
cal public administration that would correlate with the recom-
mendations of the European Charter on the “Autonomous Exer-
cise of the Local Authority”. Moreover, since the general elections
of February 2001 the provisions of the Charter have been violated
openly many times.
Only during the last five years two antagonistic political trends
shaped the local public administration system in the Republic of
Moldova and these trends had a noticeable impact on the Chisinau
municipal authorities also. Moreover, according to what some
policy analysts say the changes that the communist government
initiated since 2001 arguably has been inspired by the strategic
goal of taking over the Chisinau municipality86.
In the time span 1991-1998 the public administration system
in Moldova moved along an amorphous trajectory with no clear
development policies and with very few priorities of decentraliza-
tion. It was only in 1998 that the decentralization reform was con-
ceived and in 1999 that it started. The 40 former districts inher-
ited from the Soviet regime were legally abolished and new larger
and more viable regional structures were put in place. In parallel
to these changes a systemic restructuring of the public adminis-
tration began in order to complete the administrative-geographi-
cal reconfiguration of the territory.
A law on local public finances has been passed by the previous
legislature providing the local and regional authorities with more
financial resources required by the increased administrative au-
tonomy they had been provided with. Hence, the two directions of
reform were conceived as tools of a further political decentraliza-
tion of the country in order to bring the most fundamental demo-
cratic elements in local public administration and to enhance the
economic efficiency and financial sustainability of the new local
and regional communities. Obviously the new local public admin-
istration system and the new territorial-administrative system
were supported morally, technically and financially by the inter-
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national community, including the Council of Europe, Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and World Bank.
The reform of 1998-1999 engendered significant political gains
for the Chisinau municipal authorities. Indeed, a short time after
the Parliament passed the local public administration reform on
the 29 December 1998, two parliamentary factions adopted sev-
eral amendments to the law. The amendments were allegedly lob-
bied by representatives of the former Soviet nomenclature in dis-
tricts around Chisinau and envisioned the removal of three mu-
nicipal communities off the municipality. The president of that
time Petru Lucinshii refused to promulgate the amendments, a
political stance that was supported vociferously by the inhabit-
ants of these communities pleading before the Parliament edifice
against this change. Two of these communities managed to remain
within the municipality and obviously this comforted the politi-
cal stance of the general mayor, who is widely supported politi-
cally by people living in adjacent communities. Besides territo-
rial and political consolidation of the municipality, the decentrali-
zation led to delegating the municipal authorities with more com-
petencies than they previously enjoyed and with a legal back-
ground enabling them to protect more efficiently than before the
local interests against government inferences.
However, capitalizing on the social unrest arising from a gen-
eralized poverty and corruption affecting the country, the com-
munist party of Moldova has broadly won the general parliamen-
tary elections of February 2001. Retrograde political forces have
stopped and then reversed the decentralization developments. The
new political leadership called upon the necessity of having more
control over the local public authorities and of bringing the local
authorities “closer to the citizens”87. This is the well known “ver-
tical of power”, a concept quite popular with the elderly political
elite educated in former USSR coming again to life after the gen-
eral elections of 2001. According to this position the 11 counties
created in 1999 have been abolished as being unconstitutional and
36 districts came back. As result of further political events the
administrative and financial autonomy of local communities and
districts have been reduced to merely symbolic levels. To quote
only the most recent example, in the project of consolidated bud-
get for 2004 local communities have been deprived the right to
collect the VAT that is going to be paid directly into the state
budget.
Despite the fact that the re-centralization policies have been
severely criticized by the representatives of the Council of Eu-
rope88, the Moldovan governance nonetheless went its way until
creation of the “new” local public administration system.
Chisinau municipality in Moldovan political game
Domestic and foreign policy analysts believe that notwithstand-
ing the populist rhetoric of the communist leaders the main reason
for reversing the decentralization reform in Moldova was to create
the necessary preconditions to set total control over the entire ad-
ministrative and political establishment89. With such a strategic
goal behind the official agenda, one of the main barriers standing
across the way of the communist party was deemed to be the
Chisinau municipality, more exactly, its general mayor wishing to
keep political and administrative independence from the central
government and from the Moldovan presidency. Indeed, while the
Chisinau municipal council was and continues to be dominated by
communist faction obedient to the party bosses sitting in the Par-
liament and Presidency of Moldova the Chisinau general mayor has
turned during last years into one of the leaders of the main opposi-
tion party pleading against the administrative re-centralization.
The desire of the central governance of setting control over the
capital city is obvious because of the crucial importance the
Chisinau municipality in political life in Moldova. To note an im-
portant fact, the general mayor of Chisinau is the president of the
Moldovan Federation of Local and Regional Authorities and is
member of the Moldovan delegation to the Congress of Local and
Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe. Moreover, Serafim
Urechean is the president of the “Alliance of the Non-Affiliated”,
a political movement which in local general elections represented
a large part of incumbent Moldovan mayors. For now the Alliance
is a part of the “Moldova Noastrã” socio-politic movement. This
movement is forecasted to run as the main competitor of the com-
munist party in general elections of 2005.
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The importance of Chisinau municipality derives also from the
economic potential that dominates the entire Moldovan economy
and provides jobs for people living quite far from Chisinau. Fi-
nancial experts estimate that this attraction goes as far as at a
150 km distance from Chisinau90. With the economic transition
affecting the entire country but worse in the peripheral cities and
rural communities, Chisinau became an attractive economic pole
providing more economic opportunities, more jobs and more at-
tractive facilities for foreign and domestic direct investment.
According to the report of the general mayor for 200291, between
1994 and 2002 the share of Chisinau in the national consolidated
budget increased from 48% to 64%, the share in total manufactur-
ing - from 46% to 57%, the share in the total foreign direct invest-
ments - from 20% to 64%, and the share in the domestic trade and
services provision - from 43% to 57%. Chisinau is also the most
dynamic construction site with many new buildings and cottages
arising during last years, a symptom of enrichment of several so-
cial segments (quite narrow, by the way). The demand for real
estate is also increasing and this is a sign of imminent demo-
graphic changes to happen in the future. In the years to come the
economic situation in Chisinau is forecasted to improve quicker
and to a much larger extent than in the rest of the country. To cite
only one example, under optimistic circumstance the revenues per
capita in Chisinau are expected to rise up to 17000 USD at PPP
until 202092.
Beyond the economic reasons, there are also simple electoral
factors to be considered. Within the geographical area of the mu-
nicipality the total population is about 1 million. 27% of the popu-
lation with electoral rights of the right-bank Moldova lives in the
Chisinau municipality. Chisinau is also a focal point for youth
leaving their villages and settling in Chisinau as a way of avoid-
ing the rural communities much worse stroke by poverty. So, one
can predict that population of Chisinau will play an even more
important role in the future electoral campaigns in Moldova.
While the last general local elections did not prove that politi-
cal support provided by people living in Chisinau to the commu-
nist party is eroding and the largest faction in municipal council
is the communist one, an essential fact is that the communist can-
didate for the general mayor lost the election. Moreover, the gen-
eral mayor reelected in June 2003 might supposedly be a serious
competitor for the chair of the presidency of Moldova since the
political party that supports him accumulates political assets from
the failures that the incumbent governance incurs.
Under such economic, political and electoral circumstances the
pressure that the central government puts on municipal authorities
is rather understandable and probably will enhance in the future.
Institutional cooperation and political conflict
We envision two lines of discussing this topic. On the one hand,
it is illustrative to reveal the intra-institutional interaction among
municipal authorities, mainly the conflict between the municipal
council and the general mayor. On the other hand we will discuss
relations between the municipality and two central public bodies,
the Government and the Presidency.
Since 1999 the administrative process of the Chisinau munici-
pality was marred by a political conflict between the general mayor
and the municipal council. The conflict left only very little room
for cooperation. The roots of the conflict arise less from ideological
differences and more from the institutional and legal conditions
that the reform of 1999 set up. Even before the reform the general
mayor managed to increase its influence over the municipal af-
fairs. With the reform of 1999 accomplished, he accrued also heavy
political and legal arguments against too much involvement of the
central government in the municipal affairs. In such circum-
stances, the influence that the communist party exerts on munici-
pal affairs goes mainly through the municipal council dominated
by the communist faction.
This was the case before the local elections of May-June 2003 as
well as after, when a new council still dominated by the commu-
nist factions has been elected and the general mayor has been re-
elected. The mayoralty officials believe that an open and irrecon-
cilable political aggression emanates from the council towards the
general mayor whose executive power would be diminished by the
deliberative power of the council93.
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A serious line of institutional conflict departs from the differ-
ent policy priorities that the deliberative and executive powers
see for the Chisinau municipality. The conflict was particularly
acute before and during the local electoral race of May-June 2003.
We can cite among the main conflicting situations the disagree-
ment linked to the level of tariffs for housing services that the
municipal council wants to keep low for social reasons while put-
ting at risk the financial situation of the municipal enterprises
providing the services.
One year after coming to power, on February 5, 2002 the
Moldovan Parliament dominated by the communist party amended
the law on status of Chisinau municipality. The competencies of
the mayor have been drastically reduced and transferred to the
municipal council. Among the most important losses that the gen-
eral mayor and the mayoralty have incurred one can nominate:
1. Nomination of praetors and confirmation of praetor’s team;
2. Confirmation of the chiefs of various sub-units and public
services;
3. Approval of tariffs for housing services;
4. Choosing the volume and areas of public investments;
5. Taking measures of social protection and providing finan-
cial support to specific social categories (it is important to note
that social protection and financial support intensify right before
elections being the most preferred and efficient electoral tools of
the political elite in Moldova).
However the most serious damage to the general mayor posi-
tions occurred in November 2002 when the Parliament amended
the law on the status of Chisinau municipality. The amending
law contained only one article that left the general mayor with no
membership of the Government that he enjoyed since 1995. And
just recently, in November 2003 the government approved a deci-
sion meant to operate drastic reductions of the municipal mayor-
alty staff and an overhaul of the institutional structure94.
A short time after coming into power the Moldovan parliament
dominated by the communist party amended significantly the law
on local public administration. After the promulgation this was
practically an entire new law. One of the new legal provisions
would have abolished the system of electing the mayors directly
by the citizens and would have permitted the local councils to elect
the mayor. Analysts say that this was a blow targeting directly
the general mayor of the Chisinau municipality, because with the
Chisinau municipal council being dominated by its representa-
tives the communist party of Moldova would have taken over the
capital city by nominating and obedient general mayor. However,
this plan with high stake of changing the system of electing may-
ors in Moldova triggered a firm political opposition from domestic
actors and international organizations. The Constitutional court
deemed this amendment to be unconstitutional and in 2003 at lo-
cal general elections the mayors have been elected according to
the old scheme of citizens electing directly the mayors.
The central governance abuses its control tools to interfere with
the municipal affairs. As the general mayor declares, “there is no
one day in our mayoralty without control bodies around us”95.
Court of Accounts, prosecution, Ministry of Internal Affairs, even
the Service for Information and State Security, are nominated as
the most arduous controllers of the local public affairs.
The conflict between the Chisinau municipality and Moldovan
presidency turned into a personal conflict of the president of
Moldova and the general mayor of Chisinau. Interestingly enough,
these relations saw better times. For example, in August 2001 the
President of Moldova refused to promulgate an amendment to the
law on local public finances that would have deprived the mayor-
alty the right of managing its own budget and would have given
this function to  the Prefecture. President Voronin said with this
occasion “I can not dagger a structure that is quite well managed”96.
However, in the next two years relations with the presidency
worsened quickly. During the local elections the president got in-
volved personally in the process in a rather similar manner that
he did in regional elections of the autonomous Gagauzian region
several months before. The president publicly accused the gen-
eral mayor of corruption and lack of competence and called the
public to vote against Urechean. However, the candidate of the
communist party that allegedly was involved in embezzlement of
public funds did a rather fade performance during the elections
and lost them.
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The personal dimension of the institutional conflict between
Chisinau municipality and central governance grew into a more
serious one. The Chisinau mayor has even tried to play indepen-
dently in such a major political game as the Transnistrian con-
flict. A visit that Serafim Urechean made to the separatist re-
gions of Transnistria to meet its leader was perceived in quite
negative tones by the communist mass media. One could see the
irreconcilability of the political stances of the general mayor and
the Moldovan president even at various public manifestations and
events where the confrontation between the two leaders frequently
turns in hilarious situations.
The conflict between central and local authorities and the lack
of cooperation between the local council and the mayor lead to nega-
tive consequences for the welfare of Chisinau inhabitants. With
the approval of the government and the Parliament the city was
disconnected from the centralized system of hot water. With the
interference of the government in the local public affairs contracts
of the municipality with foreign investors are annulated and be-
cause of this the external image of the entire country suffers
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 ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC OPINION AND PUBLIC DISCOURSE
The public opinion regarding the performances of the Chisinau
municipality has been assessed using the results of different pub-
lic opinion polls, of a mass media survey, and results of the local
elections of May-June 2003. The public discourse of the municipal
authorities shaped significantly the public opinion, through its
own public relations service.
Public opinion surveys
One has to be aware that sociological surveys in Moldova are
hampered by the fact that last national census was conducted in
1989 and because of this the issues of statistical relevance and
sampling are debated intensively.
During the last couple of years several social surveys on the
performance of local public authorities have been conducted by
various public and non-governmental organizations. IDIS Viitorul,
for example, has conducted since 1999 regular surveys covering
the entire country except the left-bank Moldova on various public
administration issues. It is possible to dissociate within the pub-
lic opinion polls commissioned by IDIS Viitorul the results re-
flecting only the Chisinau sub-sample and to compare them with
other relevant sociological surveys
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. It is certain that local au-
thorities are still considered the best in performing their funda-
mental tasks and, are believed to be ‘the most effective’ in solving
day-by-day problems of citizenry.
According to the poll conducted by IDIS “Viitorul” in February
2003 approximately 50% of the Chisinau dwellers think that local
authorities have enough prerogatives and mandated competen-
cies, while 21.7% think that they don’t. 33.3% of the respondents
asserted that administrative competencies and performances of
the local authorities are important for the life of citizens as well
as for the life of the entire community while 50.4% believe that
this power does not play a significant role. The same poll shows
that during the previous six months 65.2% of the citizens only
very rarely required any service from the mayoralty, with 1.7%
having required services very often.
It is interesting also that less than a half of the citizens feel
that they would like to be consulted by the municipal public au-
Town hall 63.1
District council (town council) 10.5
Territorial offices of State Chancellor 3.1
Parliament 1.6
Presidency 0.1
Government 0.7
All of them were ineffective 20.9
TABLE 4. ACCORDING TO YOU, WHICH OF THE PUBLIC AUTHORITIES MEN-
TIONED BELLOW PROVED TO BE MORE EFFECTIVE IN SOLVING YOUR PROBLEMS?
(ONE ANSWER ONLY)
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thorities on the issues related to development of the community,
while 39.6% - would not. These results reflect a rather weak inter-
est the Chisinau citizens show towards the public affairs. The
readiness of participation in community life in Chisinau is lower
than in other parts of the country and this conclusion is consis-
tent with the higher rates of political participation in local and
general elections of people living in rural areas and in small towns
of Moldova than in Chisinau.
Interestingly, in the Chisinau area most of the citizens believe
that unemployment is the first problem to be solved by the local
administration; the second sensitive problem is providing poor
with financial and other needed support for subsistence. These
expectations correlate with the results for the entire national
sample and show that despite better living standards than in other
areas of the country, Chisinau dwellers face the same problems of
struggling for survival.
As far as we know the last public opinion poll commissioned by
the mayoralty of the Chisinau municipality was conducted in
December 2002. The Independent Service for Information and So-
ciology “Opinia” (ISIS) conducted the telephonic poll “The Con-
clusion of the Year: Chisinau 2002” on the basis of a sample con-
sisting of more than 400 respondents99. General results of the poll
are published on the official web site of the mayoralty and the
main conclusions to be derived from the poll results are the fol-
lowing.
First of all, there is an unambiguous social opinion reflected by
the poll that life in Chisinau municipality is to some extent less
difficult than in other parts of the country, especially in poor ru-
ral areas. A total of 45.8% of the Chisinau inhabitants think that
in 2002 their life turned to be slightly better or much better than
in 2001. 39.7% of the respondents also considered that the year
2002 was slightly better / much better than 2001 for the entire
country. According to the poll, 42.0% of the Chisinau inhabitants
are of the opinion that in Chisinau municipality positive changes
dominated the year 2002, 14.5% believed that negative trends domi-
nated the year, while 36.7% believed that negative changes
matched the positive ones. Again, it is remarkable that this stance
is more positive than what people of Chisinau do believe to be the
case of the entire country (percentages are 32.5, 23.5 and 36.3 re-
spectively).
A slogan that Chisinau municipal authorities promoted dur-
ing the last years as their working motto is something like “Our
city - a European city”, meaning also the look of the streets, the
cleaning of houses, the appearance of parks and halls and others.
How far is Chisinau from being at least outwardly European? 75.8%
of the respondents answered that during the last 4-5 years the
external view of the Chisinau municipality improved either slightly
or significantly, while a total of 7.2% answered the opposite. 71.9%
of the public are proud of being citizens of Chisinau while 27.0%
are not proud at all or not too much proud of being Chisinau in-
habitants. These responses may be interpreted as an indirect sig-
nal of prevalence of positive social attitudes regarding the cur-
rent performances of the Chisinau municipality.
Besides identifying the indirect attitudes, the ISIS also asked
directly the people’s opinion on the performances of the mayoralty
and the general mayor. 37.3% answered that mayoralty did pretty
well / well during 2002 while 15.9 - bad or very bad. The positive
attitude regarding the general mayor is more favorable with 44%
believing that during 2002 the general mayor had a very good /
good personal performance and 11.2% - a poor or a very poor per-
formance.
While general attitudes about the performances of the munici-
pal authorities are rather good, the daily interviews of the people
of the city show distress and dissatisfaction about poor quality of
such public services as heating, personal security on the streets,
failures of the public transportation system and others100. Nega-
tive beliefs have been enforced further during the electoral cam-
paign when “dirty” electoral technologies have been used massively
and with no penalties.
Mass media survey
The strife between the central governance and the municipal
authorities turned to be extremely strenuous in the year 2002, be-
fore the general local elections of 2003, as well as during the elec-
tions. This is reflected dependably in the mass media controlled
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by both sides at the time. After the end of elections the antagonis-
tic positions on most issues have been kept and the quarrel con-
tinues less intensively up to this day.
However one should take care of the fact that analysis of mass
media in Moldova might be a tricky issue leading to biased con-
clusions because only very few media institutions are truly inde-
pendent from any political pressures or financial favors. Such
media organizations as “Capitala-Ñòîëèöà” weekly (in Romanian
and Russian languages), “Capitala-magazine”, “Antena-C” (radio
broadcasting station), “Infotag” (press agency) and “Euro TV”
(television channel) are very positive about the performances of
the mayoralty seeing that these media are created, controlled or
financed by municipality. The thereof mass media permanently
reflect the activity of the mayoralty but very few relevant institu-
tional performance indicators are used to assess the activity in an
unbiased way. However, while the mentioned media institutions
are controlled by the mayoralty, independent observers assert that
they are much more open to other political opinions and less re-
strictive than the communist media institutions.
From another point of view, the “Communist” weekly usually
takes on a very aggressively vociferated position against the gen-
eral mayor and sheds a positive light on the communist faction of
the municipal council. Practically on the same venue is placed the
official dailies “Moldova Suverana” and “Íåçàâèñèìàÿ Ìîëäîâà”
with a much more pro-presidential stance. During the electoral
campaign not a single issue of these papers left the municipality
without “due attention”. Yet again these media do not prove their
allegations with practical evidence and do not assess the negative
performance on concrete indicators. Nor do they provide right of
appeal to people sharing different views on municipal affairs.
Both the mass media controlled by the central governance and
municipal authorities were extremely hostile against each other’s
candidates as well as against other candidates during local elec-
tions of 2003.
The national TV and radio broadcasting company is also con-
trolled by the governance and usually presents the Chisinau mu-
nicipal authorities in a negative light. However, the unilateral
governmental political control over the national TV and radio
broadcasting company is going down as more pressure is put by
domestic actors and such international organizations as Council
of Europe for the TV and company to be transformed into a true
public company free of governmental inferences.
As for now the redistribution of municipal property and inter-
governmental financial relations are invoked by mass media most
frequently. Most of independent papers narrate the issues men-
tioned above as being the main stalemates impeding the normal
functioning of municipal authorities and a good cooperation among
various levels of public administration. According to articles and
commentaries provided by such media the central administration
aims at leaving the municipal authorities with less financial re-
sources and the final target is to diminish the political power of
the general mayor and to empower the municipal council and gov-
ernmental agencies with more competencies in municipal af-
fairs101.
Analysis of the electoral results
At local elections of 1999 Serafim Urechean accumulated a to-
tal of 51% of the poll. In 2003 situation changed slightly, since he
was reelected only in the second round with 53.9% votes against
46.1% of his rival, the minister of telecommunications and roads
Vasile Zgardan, candidate promoted by the Communist Party of
Moldova. However, the victory of the incumbent mayor was very
narrowly separated from a loss and it is not clear whether elector-
ate voted for him or against the communist candidate. There are
at least two points supporting this assumption.
First of all, it is rather questionable whether the incumbent
mayor would have gained the local elections in Chisinau had the
municipal communities not voted widely for him. The large politi-
cal credit that the municipal towns and communes provided
Serafim Urecheanu with is explained among others by substan-
tial financial transfers from the municipal budget for different
infrastructural and social projects in these communities. This is
why moving the adjacent communities away from the municipal-
ity as a precondition for taking over the capital city at next local
elections of 2007 will probably remain as one of the main objec-
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tives that central governance will target at  next years.
Secondly, Mr. Urecheanu benefited from a crucial mistake that
the communist party made by the uninspired decision to promote
a rather politically weak, fairly unknown and allegedly corrupted
candidate for the post of general mayor. (Interestingly, Moldovan
papers consider that this decision was not taken by the party it-
self but directly by Mr. Voronin). Pro-municipal press revealed
stories about Vasile Zgardan’s unlawful activities in various offi-
cial posts and even the hardest supporting campaign of the offi-
cial and pro-communist press did not help acquiring the much
needy votes.
As for the fact that communists dominate the municipal council
while a non-communist is reelected as mayor is explained by spe-
cifics of electoral politics in Moldova. In this country the mayors
are elected for their personal qualities (“being a good manager”)
while the councils are assessed against their political ideologies
and background. Political structure of local councils in Moldova is
still quite similar to that of the Parliament elected in 2001.
Public discourse
The main focal points of the public discourse of the municipal
authorities are the following: “Urecheanu - a mayor for every
Chisinau citizen”; “Chisinau – a European city”; “no way for cen-
tralization”; and “from heart to heart” (the last one is also the name
of a social assistance program initiated by the mayoralty).
Serafim Urechean managed not to present himself as a politi-
cal leader holding a too nationalistic stance but rather as a mayor
trying to reconcile interests of all nations leaving in Chisinau and
of the members of social groups with various ideological back-
grounds. To cite the most known example, meetings are held with
and financial aids are provided to veterans of both the Soviet and
Romanian army of the II World War. In this position the PR cam-
paign is quite efficient and improves the image of the mayoralty.
As for the second slogan, Europeanization of Chisinau, it should
be said that it still remains in the realms of wishful thinking.
While European ideas in Chisinau are much more popular than
in other regions of Moldova, there is still a long way to go in order
to achieve a better look of the city. Rhetorically the European PR
campaign is quite loud and consistent even with the political po-
sition of the national government. But the mere example of the
distress produced to transportation system, by the agricultural
market placed right in the center of Chisinau and the associated
noise and misery leaves no further room for believing that any
European ambition will be achieved in the near future.
The decentralization campaign supported vividly by the may-
oralty found a very fruitful ground on the European stance ac-
quired by the general mayor. In a large interview given to the
Timpul weekly Mr. Urecheanu criticized fervently the policy of
administrative centralization of the country and blamed the com-
munist fraction of the parliament for their frankly stated deci-
sion of abrogating the constitutional clause offering the citizens
the right to elect directly the local public authorities102. The final
goal of this political goal he said to be the creation of a power ver-
tical and a constitutional dictatorship.
It is important to mention that had the clause of indirect elec-
tion of the mayor by the local council been passed, then Mr.
Urecheanu would have extremely small chances of being reelected
as general mayor of the Chisinau municipality at local elections of
2003, since the largest faction in the municipal council is the com-
munist one.
An open interference of the government and presidency into
the local public affairs and even into the management of public
services marked the beginning of the electoral battles long before
the formal beginning of the campaign itself. The forms of this in-
volvement were simply ridiculous. To mention only one of them,
in September 2002 the President of Moldova, Vladimir Voronin,
interfered in the dispute between the managers of the municipal
companies providing running water and the municipal council
related to the level of tariffs. The official daily Moldova Suverana
noted that Mr. Voronin “informed the general mayor of the capital
that there are mistakes in the calculations of the tariff level and
asked the mayor to provide additional information on the topic.”
In October 2002 the general mayor launched an initiative of a
charity program “De la inima la inima” (“From heart to heart”).
While the official declaration is that the new program represents
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continuation of the municipal program on poverty eradication,
there are no doubts that this was a mere electoral tool. The cen-
tral authorities were in a hurry to take the provision of social as-
sistance and financial aid to the poor off the list of competencies of
the general mayor and to grant them to the municipal council.
POLICY GUIDELINES
FOR THE PARLIAMENTARIAN REFORM
As already stated in the addenda, this study aims to clarify
which are the standards that we shall demand from the Parlia-
ment and deputies to follow, and to encourage that measures and
specific policies of upgrading the quality of these policies will be
taken and assimilated by the legislative. The scope of the Parlia-
mentarians is to use wisely the public confidence by assuming
more responsibilities of self-administration, proving to the voters
that they deserve their trust and that they are capable to put in
good order the legislative process at the national level, in spite of
the outside pressures or the narrow constitutional format. A de-
bate on the reformation of the legislative process will be produc-
tive only when we will be able to identify the reasons and demands
for this reform. Unfortunately, the absence of a correct understand-
ing over the poor legislative format is not currently providing a
good basis to understand the scale of this reform.
On the other hand, rather limited expectations from the Par-
liament - along the existence of a super-dominant role of the legis-
lative power -are translated into a weak participation of deputies
to this reform or a dream-driven contemplation of the ends of the
political battle. Finally, many of us still confound the need to re-
form the legislative process with the numerical majority of one or
another fraction, failing to understand that the legislative pro-
cess is an institutional demand/constraint, which cannot be ex-
plained or justified by political deadlock. A reformation of the leg-
islative process may succeed only when it becomes a systematic
effort of the elected deputies/fractions and civil servants employed
by the Parliament, more a continuous process than a cut-off objec-
tive, that can be approximated through statistics, thus implying
the widening of the space for consultations with political groups,
increasing the quality of the legislative drafts and public debates,
building up a personalized relationship with constituencies, while
searching for new and innovative ways of increasing vertical and
horizontal responsibilities of the legislative chamber.
Every public institution should be encouraged to define and
promote its own institutional strategies of increasing the level of
effective use of public resources and accomplish its statutory goals.
The reform of the public sector includes inter alias reform of the
legislative process, even though   for the time being, this is op-
posed by the authors of the PRSP in Moldova. Public institutions,
including the Parliament, shall be assisted to find out institu-
tional solutions and reformation instruments that will be com-
patible with the mission and democratic criteria of good gover-
nance.   Concerning the National Parliament, the most recom-
mended steps are surely expected to cover the aspects of: repre-
sentation, quality of legislation and responsibility. This Model of
institutional reform shall be promoted in connection with the leg-
islative chamber in order to achieve a more responsible Parlia-
ment, endowed with necessary resources and capacities for law
making, auditing implementation of the legislation, hearings
where executives are continuously surveyed and monitored, in-
ternally democratic and strengthened.
Measures should be taken to implement the Law on access to
information adopted in 2000. The population, journalists and pub-
lic officers must be informed of the existence of the Law, of the
instruments to use it and the officials concerned should be aware
of their responsibility to ensure transparency. Public officers and
journalists should also be trained to understand how to handle
requests for information.  Any public office should have its press
unit as the Law requires it. It should explain what kind of infor-
mation is available, how to obtain it and provide it when requested.
Ideally, all central institutions should be required to have their
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Websites (where information will be updated at least every 30
days). On the long term other public bodies at local level should
also have websites.
This model of a reformed Parliament shall promote its own leg-
islative agenda, which shall not be subservient to other pressures
- be they from the President’s office or from other influence polls,
because only when parliamentary fractions  enjoy the liberty to
share the awareness of the priorities on the legislative agenda a
more coherent government will be in place. In spite of its appar-
ent stability, the current Cabinet did not learn well how to coop-
erate with the Parliament. An effective Parliament shall be first
of all a sovereign Parliament, an independent public authority,
considerably strengthened on the principle of power separation
from the executive power. A government which is confirmed
through a confidence political vote can be easily controlled and
balanced with the political pluralistic environment reflects the
core dimension of the legislative process. Some recommendations
to improve the legislative process:
• Functional review of the Parliament (making the appara-
tus and staff  work effectively, oriented towards qualitative indi-
cators, which are to be assessed regularly by internal auditors)
• Fair and effective distribution of functions within commit-
tees among political fractions
• Increasing the number of parliamentary sittings
• Increasing the mechanisms of ensuring a good quality of
the drafts of the law prepared and notified by the specialized per-
manent or ad hoc committees of the Parliament
• Increasing expertise capacity and involvement of the non-
parliamentary experts in setting up operational funds for each of
the political fractions
• Ensuring optimal conditions for the hearing sessions with
Governmental representatives
• Ensuring regular life broadcasting of the most sensible Par-
liamentary sessions by the Public TV and Radio stations
• Establishing a position of the Parliamentary Auditor,
elected with the simple majority of votes on an annual basis, that
will not coincide with the acting members of the Permanent Bu-
reau of the Parliament (Speaker and Vice chairmen)
• In order to remove current limitations to access to parlia-
mentary sessions’ records, the April 2001 decision of the perma-
nent bureau of the Parliament should be abrogated and the media
should be given access in a non-discriminatory way. The same non-
discrimination rule should be applied with regard to the access to
the Government’s meetings or press conferences.
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